While almost any event may seem significant in the early aftermath of the uprising, I would suggest three general trends to keep an eye on, which may have important implications for the ultimate result of the Tunisian uprising:
1. Foued Mebazaa and the RCD's commitment to meaningful reform. Interim President Mebazaa is in a position to guide a democratic transition in Tunisia, but does he want to? A longtime regime ally and political veteran, Mebazaa is no democratic stalwart, and he and his party may seek a way to retain control and restore their primacy at the expense of democracy.
2. An emerging conflict between the army and the security services. Still loyal to Ben Ali, the police and security forces are being blamed for continuing to foment violence in the streets. They will benefit from disorder because it delays the formation of a cohesive political movement and assures that the most heavily armed faction will retain control. However, the military has shown already that it will not categorically support the regime or turn its guns on protesters. In another indication of the rift between army and police, neighborhood posses have formed to protect their communities and cooperate with the military, which is actually fighting Ben Ali loyalists to restore order. The military could emerge as a protector of reform, which would augur well for the state going forward.
3. The strength of the Tunisian opposition. Though no figure has emerged to lead a popular movement for change, the Tunisian opposition is moving to secure a meaningful role in the government. The legal opposition parties are in discussions to form a national unity government, but it is unclear if they have popular support. One important development to watch is the pending return to Tunisia of the leader of the banned Islamist party An-Nahda, Rachid al-Ghannouchi. I will write another post soon on the state of the Tunisian opposition and its most important players.
The final result of the uprising in Tunisia is not apparent. However, it has already begun to have regional repercussions. Demonstrators in Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan have invoked the Tunisian struggle and Arabs across the Middle East identify with the core grievances of the uprising -- namely political repression, lack of economic opportunity, and abuse of human rights -- which they experience to varying degrees in their own daily lives. (UPDATE: Protesters in Egypt and Algeria have been setting themselves on fire in an echo of Mohamed Bouazizi, the man whose self-immolation sparked the riots in Tunisia. Here are two reports on the recent wave of self-immolations)
What does all this amount to? At the moment, nothing substantial. Though there has been a wave of protests and unrest throughout the Arab world, such phases are relatively common. While activists express hope that they can follow Tunisia's example, there is no reason (yet) to believe that they actually are doing so. Within the Arab press, Tunisia has drawn numerous comparisons to the Solidarity Movement of Poland, but analysts are in agreement that Tunisia's uprising will not lead to the regional transformation initiated in Eastern Europe by Solidarity's legalization and subsequent election in 1989. In short, it is doubtful that the Tunisian revolution will cause a domino effect in the rest of the Arab Middle East. Historically speaking, revolutions are very rare (even what has happened in Tunisia is not yet a revolution in the historical sense), and it is difficult to imagine one spreading across the Arab world as it is today.
Still, the fall of Ben Ali has been significant insofar as it shows just how flimsy state power can be. While in the past popular uprisings were contained with brute force and massacre, as in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s, the new media environment in the Middle East makes it much harder for regimes to get away with such cruelty and abuse of human rights. The democratic bargain that has prevailed in the Middle East in the past generation -- in which citizens exchange their political and civil liberties for social services and stability -- is wearing thin almost everywhere. Now, for the first time, we have seen that popular dissent and protest can overthrow even the most deeply entrenched of Arab autocrats, and political activists throughout the Arab world should be emboldened by Ben Ali's ouster. Conversely, autocratic regimes should be alarmed at just how quickly they could lose control over their populace.
How regimes react to this newly perceived vulnerability will be critical to the prospects of democratization in the region. There are three basic options for an autocratic government dealing with echoes of unrest from Tunisia: first, a crackdown on regime opposition and closure of political space; second, a series of token reforms designed to secure political quietism while not actually conceding any power; and third, a program of genuine reform to rebuild the broken social contracts and dysfunctional economies that plague Arab societies. The most likely scenario at the moment is the second, in which governments seek to "muddle through." In fact this is already occurring -- Libya, Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria have all announced plans to reduce food prices in the past several days, a common method to appease popular discontent.
But before we start thinking too far into the future, the battle for Tunisia's democracy is far from over. What remains of the ruling cadre will probably not decide to fade away quietly -- they will resist liberalization and seek to preserve their hold on power and reconsolidate in Ben Ali's absence. The United States and other Western powers have an excellent opportunity now to help hold off a retrenchment and keep pressure on the regime to commit to true reform. However, without significant international attention it is doubtful Tunisia will become a democratic success story.
Similarly, Tunisia has created a unique opportunity for the United States to advocate democratic reform throughout the Middle East. Speaking at the Forum for the Future last week in Doha, Hillary Clinton warned that Arab states must offer a "positive vision" to their people in order to combat extremism and social unrest (she also apparently couldn't resist a desert metaphor, noting that the region's foundations are "sinking into the sand"). Now is the time for the United States to convince its autocratic allies that reform is necessary and the status quo is no longer tolerable. Strong, sustained support of democratic institutions in Tunisia is currently the most logical start to a program to foster democratization in the region. The international community should do its part to ensure that free and fair elections are conducted and that their results are respected. American apathy to the oppression of Tunisians for the past half century must not prevent policymakers from taking notice now, and taking effective steps to promote a peaceful and democratic transition.
Still, the fall of Ben Ali has been significant insofar as it shows just how flimsy state power can be. While in the past popular uprisings were contained with brute force and massacre, as in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s, the new media environment in the Middle East makes it much harder for regimes to get away with such cruelty and abuse of human rights. The democratic bargain that has prevailed in the Middle East in the past generation -- in which citizens exchange their political and civil liberties for social services and stability -- is wearing thin almost everywhere. Now, for the first time, we have seen that popular dissent and protest can overthrow even the most deeply entrenched of Arab autocrats, and political activists throughout the Arab world should be emboldened by Ben Ali's ouster. Conversely, autocratic regimes should be alarmed at just how quickly they could lose control over their populace.
How regimes react to this newly perceived vulnerability will be critical to the prospects of democratization in the region. There are three basic options for an autocratic government dealing with echoes of unrest from Tunisia: first, a crackdown on regime opposition and closure of political space; second, a series of token reforms designed to secure political quietism while not actually conceding any power; and third, a program of genuine reform to rebuild the broken social contracts and dysfunctional economies that plague Arab societies. The most likely scenario at the moment is the second, in which governments seek to "muddle through." In fact this is already occurring -- Libya, Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria have all announced plans to reduce food prices in the past several days, a common method to appease popular discontent.
But before we start thinking too far into the future, the battle for Tunisia's democracy is far from over. What remains of the ruling cadre will probably not decide to fade away quietly -- they will resist liberalization and seek to preserve their hold on power and reconsolidate in Ben Ali's absence. The United States and other Western powers have an excellent opportunity now to help hold off a retrenchment and keep pressure on the regime to commit to true reform. However, without significant international attention it is doubtful Tunisia will become a democratic success story.
Similarly, Tunisia has created a unique opportunity for the United States to advocate democratic reform throughout the Middle East. Speaking at the Forum for the Future last week in Doha, Hillary Clinton warned that Arab states must offer a "positive vision" to their people in order to combat extremism and social unrest (she also apparently couldn't resist a desert metaphor, noting that the region's foundations are "sinking into the sand"). Now is the time for the United States to convince its autocratic allies that reform is necessary and the status quo is no longer tolerable. Strong, sustained support of democratic institutions in Tunisia is currently the most logical start to a program to foster democratization in the region. The international community should do its part to ensure that free and fair elections are conducted and that their results are respected. American apathy to the oppression of Tunisians for the past half century must not prevent policymakers from taking notice now, and taking effective steps to promote a peaceful and democratic transition.
Thanks for the explanation and predictions. Very helpful.
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