Why Should We Care?

On this blog I frequently assert that promoting democracy in the Middle East is in the interests of the United States and is good foreign policy.  My primary arguments for this rest on a definition of American interests in the Middle East and an assessment of the major long-term threats to those interests.  If I had to boil it down to a phrase or two, the argument would go something like this: the most significant threat to long-term American dominance in the Middle East is the failure of regional allies to adequately maintain stability, and political and economic reforms are necessary today to do so; the most appropriate way for the United States to contribute to reform is through democracy promotion.

While I believe that democracy promotion should be an important component of any successful American policy in the Middle East (most especially in the Arab world), I seldom feel the need to justify my position to an audience outside the foreign policy/political science establishment.  However, today I would like to go a bit further and try to explain why an ordinary American who does not care about our foreign policy should still care (at least a little) about democracy promotion.

My desire to explain my ideas in a broader context was prompted by a recent series of surveys on American foreign policy conducted by Pew Research, which finds, not surprisingly, that Americans are not too interested in democracy promotion.  Enthusiasm for this year's "Arab Spring" seems low -- 23% of respondents said they thought it would be good for the United States, while the plurality, 36%, said it would have no effect at all.  Explicit democracy promotion was rated as the lowest among a list of priorities, with only 13% of respondents saying it was a long-term foreign policy goal (protecting U.S. jobs came in as the most common priority, indicated by 84% of respondents).  In a related survey, 46% of respondents agreed with the statement that the United States should "mind its own business" internationally, a notion that does not agree with democracy promotion as foreign policy.

So as someone who believes that democracy promotion in the Middle East is of vital strategic interest to the United States, and who has dedicated the last couple years of his life to better understanding and achieving this goal, do I think American public opinion has it wrong? Absolutely not.  At the end of the day, it is not hard to see why other priorities -- protecting jobs, energy independence, reduction of military commitments overseas, etc. -- are more important to most people than democracy promotion.

America's role in the Middle East is a result of one simple fact that few politicians are willing to admit: the only reason the United States has vital strategic interests in the Middle East is to maintain its position as the world's sole superpower.  In other words, global hegemony is the single real motivation for the extent to which American foreign policy, and the use of American power, is geared toward domination of the Middle East.  It follows, then, that the only reason (beyond a humanitarian or altruistic motivation) to care about democracy promotion in the region is a desire for continued American dominance of the international arena.  There are many compelling arguments for democracy promotion in the region, but most of them are only valid if one believes that the  United States should strive to be a global power.

This notion has never been universally accepted in the United States, which has a longstanding isolationist streak.  In times of economic downturn such as the current period, when there are more than enough urgent domestic problems to be addressed, influence abroad becomes less attractive even to those that do believe the United States should be a world leader.

Furthermore, the primary goal of foreign policy is always to protect a state's interests.  Since it is often portrayed as a humanitarian cause which does not relate directly to American security or prosperity, and since its benefits are indirect and often intangible, democracy promotion appears to be exactly the kind of quixotic foreign adventure that is so unpopular among the general public (although it cannot hold a theoretical, financial, or political candle to such projects as the Global War on Terror when it comes to quixotic).

Let's recap: democracy promotion is good policy if the United States is interested in maintaining its global hegemony.  So long as one accepts that it is worthwhile for the United States to be a world superpower, democracy promotion in the Middle East is in its interests.  Projects such as global dominance and political and social reform abroad seem far less appealing when American society appears to be crumbling.  This is exacerbated by the fact that it is not easy to explain how democracy promotion directly benefits the American people, especially when one does not want to bring up the whole hegemony thing.  So then, if all this is true, why should Americans care about democracy promotion?

I believe there are many reasons, but in the most pragmatic terms democracy promotion is a solid investment.  American prosperity has come to depend on its position as a world superpower, and American security is now deeply linked with events in the Middle East.  Democracy promotion is a far more affordable and far less bloody way to preserve American interests in the Middle East than other options, such as the war in Iraq, secret drone strikes, proxy wars, an enormous network of bases, and an immense security/counterterrorism industry.  Financially, democracy promotion is a drop in the security budget bucket, and in the long term it is one of the only attractive solutions to the social and political challenges facing the Middle East.  While democracy promotion does not come in as a priority over jobs, immediate security, prosperity, and a whole range of other political issues, it does not have to.  It is cheap, effective, and low-risk.  Successful democracy promotion in the Middle East offers American taxpayers a substantial return on investment, and that is reason enough to care about it.

A Guide to Tunisia's Political Transition

Since January 14, 2011, Tunisia has embarked on an ambitious course of political reform and democratic transition.  An interim National Unity Government (NUG) has been appointed in the wake of the old regime to handle day-to-day affairs, and elections are scheduled for October 23 to elect a National Constituent Assembly, which will rewrite the constitution.  In addition to the NUG, a host of independent committees have been appointed to develop an administrative structure for the transition period, each charged with different and sometimes redundant tasks.  Though there is currently no law defining what a political party is or regulating their activities, parties are proliferating and beginning to campaign for support; most will field candidates to serve as delegates in the National Constituent Assembly.

Amidst all the commotion that has come from numerous and often un-coordinated attempts to develop liberal democratic processes in a recently eviscerated autocracy, it can be difficult at times to know exactly who is in charge.  For example, the Ministry of Interior, which has been led by three different individuals in the past five months and is responsible for licensing political parties, often does not seem to know just how many political parties it actually has cleared to operate legally (estimates range from 80 to 100 unique groups, including several that use the same name).

Here, in as simple a way as I can present it, is a diagram of the current government and various other authorities responsible for managing a democratic transition in Tunisia.  I have not included the Parliament because they have ceded all legal authority to the President, and I have not included regional and local government because the level of organization varies so much among the provinces.  Each of the three bodies described below are administratively independent and held together by little more than mutual consensus.  Without further ado, here is Tunisia's current and soon-to-be political hierarchy:

Speculation and Conjecture: Some Future Predictions

Although seldom useful, it's always fun to make predictions.  Here are a few of mine for the near future in the Arab world and the broader Middle East:


1) Syria and Yemen will both become engulfed in civil war over the next year.  This is not a particularly bold prediction because it may already be happening.  In Yemen it is easy enough to pick out a few factions that will vie for power (here is an interesting discussion on the matter), but in Syria it is less clear.  Certain parts of the military may turn against the Assad regime, or the regular army could start fighting against the other security agencies.  The conflict could develop along sectarian lines, or the pro-democracy protest movements could become violent in response to continued crackdowns.  In any case, the longer the Assad regime seeks to preserve itself, the greater the chance that Syria will devolve into civil war.  It is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad and his ruling cadre would rather rip Syria apart than voluntarily leave power, or enact reforms and reconcile with protestors.  Sadly, it also appears that they will have their way.

2) In the next 5-10 years Saudi Arabia's influence will increase, but it will not become a regional power broker.  As other states weaken, Saudi Arabia's relative power will grow considerably.  However, this increase in influence will probably be in spite of Saudi Arabia rather than because of it.  Saudi Arabia is rich, well-armed, and is able to project its influence through support of conservative Islam throughout the Muslim world.  The main historical competitors for regional dominance in the Arab world -- Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -- will probably not be able to project power beyond their borders in the near future.  The major non-Arab players in the Middle East -- Turkey, Israel, and Iran -- have been caught off guard by the Arab uprisings and none are in position to take a leading regional role.  This leaves Saudi Arabia more powerful by default.  However, with an army that, though well equipped, has never won a war, the growing cost of maintaining order at home, and an ideology whose appeal has been diminishing in the Arab world for years and is further weakened by democratic movements, Saudi Arabia will not be able to establish its regional hegemony.  For all its riches and all its military gewgaws, Saudi Arabia is still weak in several key respects, including its low human capital, dependence on foreign labor, growing difficulties in maintaining internal order, and reliance on foreign military assistance.  Though it may become more assertive and more capable of dictating the course of events in the Middle East, it will remain a secondary player to the dominant power in the region, which will continue to be the United States for at least the next few years.  That said, we come to my next prediction...

3) American influence in the Middle East will decline over the next decade, due to political incompetence rather than a decrease in real power.  The United States has all the means to remain the sole hegemonic power in the Middle East, but its position will continue to weaken from poor leadership.  Confronted with new challenges, American policy will not adapt fast enough to retain regional dominance.  The United States will continue to be the major foreign power in the region as a whole, but amidst growing perceptions of its inability to influence the broader currents of Arab politics and the shifting regional dynamic, it will become gradually less important.  The United States policy toward the Middle East is deeply flawed, and it will not change enough in the near future to avoid a significant loss of influence.


4) Tunisia and Egypt will both develop into democracies within the next five to seven years.  At this point in time Tunisia's progress toward a complete democratic transition is far more substantial than Egypt's.  The key difference is that in Tunisia the remaining elements of the old regime do not have a say in the transition process.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is still in charge, and while the SCAF does not have any interest in governing, it also continues to hold the real power in Egypt, and is only willing to liberalize the political arena enough to protect itself and return to business as usual.  Ultimately, though, time is on the side of the protestors; if their fundamental demand for representative government will not be abandoned, then eventually the military and the other powers-that-be in Egypt will recognize that it is in their interest to liberalize.  Transitions in both countries are threatened most by economic disarray, but the momentum for political change is quite strong.

5) Morocco's attempt to placate protestors will fail.  Always eager to cast itself as a different kind of autocracy, Morocco is currently entering a process of top-down reforms which the Palace refers to as "evolution" -- as opposed to "revolution," of course.  After large-scale protests began in Morocco on February 20, the King attempted to get out ahead of reform movements by announcing a program of constitutional reforms that could considerably reduce his power and answer protestor's demands while not overtly acknowledging them.  Now the announcement of constitutional reforms is imminent, to be followed by a referendum in early July and elections for a new parliament under the new constitution in early October.  While superficially promising, these reforms will amount to little more than the cosmetic changes that King Mohammed VI has implemented since he came to the throne in 1999.  The Moroccan protestors will not accept this token gesture, though it is unclear if they will be able to mount an uprising such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain.


6) The pro-democracy uprisings of 2011 will eventually be judged as a continuation of the past rather than a break from it.  Given the dramatic nature of the uprisings in every corner of the Arab world, and the fall of two governments (perhaps three including Yemen), 2011 currently seems like a wild break from the political currents of the past.  Yet over the long term, analysts will regard these movements as a continuation of the development of post-colonial political ideologies.  The common thread between pan-Arabism, Islamism, and now the so-called Arab Spring, is the desire for self-determination and freedom from foreign influences.  Pan-Arabism became the leading ideology of many Arab governments, perhaps most notably Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, but ultimately failed to achieve its goal of unifying the Arab people and freeing them from foreign domination.  Islamism, though it became a powerful cultural force and an ideology of resistance to the status quo, was only embraced by governments at the margins of the Arab world.  Today, the struggle for self-determination has taken a new tack.  While Islamists remain an influential political force, the desire for political rights and popular sovereignty is now being expressed on a large scale in terms of democracy and good governance.  This new development is not different in kind from the movements of the past, but rather in manner.  Whether it will ultimately prevail and help the Arab people secure their rights is still uncertain, but it has already shown its potential to transform the political landscape of the Middle East as we know it, and may yet have even greater significance.

Three Down? Yemen Passes a Turning Point

The protest movement in Yemen has been one of the most consistent, universal, and long-lasting of the recent wave of uprisings in the Arab world.  President Ali Abdallah Saleh, who has been in power in Yemen in some capacity since 1978, held on for nearly five months after major upheavals against him began in January.  After a seemingly endless array of failed resignation deals, protestors received their first genuine piece of good news over the weekend when Saleh left Yemen for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, along with a substantial entourage including key ministers of his government; it is a distinct likelihood that he will not return, even if he wants to (though that does not necessarily mean that his regime is finished).

What will happen now in Yemen is beyond me.  Saleh's Vice President is Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and that is more or less all I know about him.  Comparatively, though, of the three Arab states to force their presidents to leave power this year, Yemen is in the least advantageous position to emerge as a democracy, or as a functional centralized state of any kind, for that matter.  Yemen is currently on the verge of a serious humanitarian emergency.  Yemen is the poorest Arab country, with paltry natural resources, the highest birthrate in the world, the lowest rate of women's literacy in the world, and with an Islamic extremist presence of ever-growing concern.  It is awash in illegal arms and will run out of water in about ten years.  Never a harmonious state, it has suffered years of low-level internecine violence.  Saleh was an autocrat like Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, but he and his government seem never to have had much control over their territory.

Saleh's departure is good news for pro-democracy protestors -- a democratic transition was essentially impossible for as long as he remained in power.  However much the chances of such a transition have improved, they remain alarmingly slim.  The courage of peaceful protestors throughout Yemen has been inspiring, but it was an act of violence from a tribal militia that eventually sent Saleh packing.  As long as armed clans are the power-brokers in Yemen, it will remain a weak state, one with little chance of becoming a successful democracy.

As with the transitions currently underway in Egypt and Tunisia, there are a seemingly limitless number of possible outcomes for Yemen.  One possibility that is not shared with either Egypt or Tunisia is that Yemen as we now know it could disintegrate entirely.  Considering the spread of violence through the country now, and the difficulty of maintaining order throughout the past fifty years, a national government over all of Yemen may not replace Saleh.  It is possible that it could split into northern and southern realms, or disintegrate even further into tribal enclaves and small urbanized statelets around Aden, Sanaa, and the the major cities in between.

In any case, the Arab uprisings continue to demonstrate both the unity and the diversity of the Arab world.  While social unrest has swept nearly the entire region, its outcomes have varied significantly in each country.  The complaints of the protestors are remarkably similar, but government responses have covered a broad spectrum; outcomes have ranged from brutal crackdowns, to moderately successful appeasement, to government collapse and even civil war.  Three states have now managed to force their leaders out of power, but each case is quite different from the other, and illustrative of different and unique trends in modern Arab politics.  As events develop in the Arab world they seem less coherent in some ways and more so in others.

However, it is important to note what remains the same -- Arabs everywhere in the Middle East are demanding democratic rights and popular sovereignty.  The United States would be unwise to oppose this, but it is caught in a difficult situation because its alliances in the region have been based on support for autocrats.  There is no graceful way out of this quandary, but it is essential that American policymakers find a way to support democratic change in the Middle East now.  The status quo is shifting under our feet, and to ignore this and pursue business as usual could have dire consequences.  Yemen is an instructive example of what is at stake -- while democracy is still a faint hope there, the alternatives could be disastrous and are all too easy to imagine.