Getting Syrious

Hama, Syria --1982

Until now I have withheld from making too many comments about Syria, for two reasons: 1) I am not an expert on Syria, and there are quite a few people who know the country far better than I do, and 2) I did not want to pass judgment on the American reaction to the Syrian uprising until there was a clear political or diplomatic response from the Obama Administration.

Well, depending on when you start counting, it has been between four and five weeks since protests began, and at least three weeks since violence escalated significantly.  The Syrian government led by Bashar al-Asad has resorted to brutal repression of dissent, first attacking, arresting, or shooting peaceful protesters, and now simply killing indiscriminately.  While making preposterously trivial political concessions, such as repealing Syria's long standing emergency law while continuing a brutal onslaught against the protesters, Asad's regime has essentially declared war on its own people.  This is certainly not the first time that political dissent has been met with bloody reprisals in Syria.  The recent violence, especially the military occupation of Deraa, has drawn comparisons to the 1982 massacre of Muslim Brothers in Hama, which crushed a low-level militant Islamist resistance that had begun in the late 1970s.

The current period of unrest bears little resemblance to that era.  The protest movement in Syria is nationwide, not isolated in one city, and its supporters come from diverse backgrounds.  The movement is not Islamist, although Islamists are participating in the protests.  Rather, it is motivated by widespread disillusion with the Asad government, its corruption, economic mismanagement, violation of civil liberties, and merciless repression of any and all forms of dissent.  Like other pro-reform movements that have recently swept the Arab world, there is no clear leadership or platform for the protests; people are not united by an organization, but by a set of common, basic aspirations, not the least of which is to end the Baathist regime and the tyranny of the Asad family.  In fact, the only aspect of past strife that bears any close resemblance to the current uprising is the unduly violent response from the Syrian government.

Syria was long picked out as a sort of bulwark of authoritarianism, one of the least likely Arab states to become embroiled in a mass uprising.  Bashar al-Asad was considered relatively popular and more than capable of quashing any opposition.  It was expected that memories of Hama and pervasive security forces would intimidate and discourage Syrians from speaking out against their government.  While this has not turned out to be true -- protests did reach Syria, and a nationwide protest movement appears quite determined to endure even the harshest violence -- it does not seem that Asad is in any great danger of being forced out of power either.  So long as the army remains loyal to him, there will almost certainly be no victory for the protesters.

What might happen in Syria if Asad were overthrown is unclear.  The possibility of internecine warfare seems very real -- while the protesters come from all regions of Syria and from all its major ethnic groups and sects, there is no question that certain factions have remained loyal to the Asad regime, and they are easily characterized by sectarian background.  It is not difficult to imagine Sunnis seeking retribution against Alawis and Christians, and many speculate that post-Asad Syria could fall prey to the same  sectarian conflicts that plague its neighbors Lebanon and Iraq.

This uncertainty, combined with a perceived lack of American leverage in Syrian internal affairs, may have played a role in the Obama Administration's reticence toward anti-Asad activists.  Furthermore, one of Barack Obama's first initiatives in the Middle East as president was to seek a rapprochement with Syria and begin to restore normal bi-lateral relations.  Now, it seems that Asad's crackdown has gone a step too far, and there is some anticipation that the President will now authorize an increase of pressure on the Syrian government to at least stop attacking protesters (it seems doubtful that they will publicly call for Asad to step down, at least for the moment).

Asad himself does not have many options left if his crackdown does not work.  It is extremely doubtful that he is capable of delivering the necessary reforms to restore his legitimacy and satisfy the demands of protestors who increasingly (and in my opinion, rightly) consider him inseparable from the corruption and repression under which they suffer.  He can continue to wage war against his own people, but risks losing the loyalty of influential figures within his regime, who may see more opportunity in offering him as a concession to popular dissent, as the Egyptian army did with Hosni Mubarak.  Moreover, Asad would invite armed rebellion by escalating bloodshed; indeed, it is not inconceivable that some of the reports of attacks on Syrian security forces are the first signs of a civil war.  On the other hand it is far less likely that he will be able to muddle through with his current strategy of mixed repression and marginal concessions, which has only galvanized protestors against him.

One thing is clear -- Asad cannot make Syria's political problems go away.  In fact, his continued presence will doubtlessly exacerbate them.  His regime has built its power upon unfair patronage, corruption, and brutal repression of all opposition.  It will not be able to solve these inequities which threaten Syrian stability because ultimately they are its lifeblood.  It is no mistake that international actors have severe anxieties about forcefully removing Asad.  His government has carefully engineered Syrian politics so that there is no clear alternative to the current regime.

In any case, time is growing increasingly short.  While there is still time for the Syrian government to change its course, and there is still time for the United States and its allies to influence the outcome of the uprising, the events of the next week or two will probably limit available options.  The question now is not if Asad's regime will fall, but when it will, how it will happen, and what will replace him.  The eventual outcome will have resounding consequences for decades to come.

What's Next? Taking Stock of the Arab Uprisings

As time drags farther on from the breathless first moments of the Arab uprisings this winter, their precise meaning becomes ever more enigmatic.  The early days of this year made it easy to see the interrelationship of politics among Arab states.   Small protests in Tunisia became national movements throughout the entire Middle East and led to the fall of two seemingly intractable governments.  The grievances of protestors, their demands, and their demography were remarkably uniform -- they even borrowed each other's slogans and shared tactics for staging rallies and for impromptu first aid.  Their message, championed by pan-Arab satellite networks, was one of ideological unity against a status quo that was no longer acceptable.

In contrast, the second phase of the uprisings has brought the differences among Arab states to the fore.  Due to their unique political dynamics, the uprisings have had different outcomes in each of the Arab states.  Tunisia was the catalyst for the current upheaval, and it has gone farther than any other Arab country toward eliminating the old system.  As in Tunisia, Egyptians forced their president to leave office, but many of the critical elements of his old regime remain, and they do not seem to be in imminent danger.

Elsewhere in the Arab world the autocrats have managed to survive for the moment.  The three at the greatest risk of sudden overthrow are probably Muammar al-Qaddhafi of Libya, Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen, and Bashar al-Asad of Syria.  Protests in each of these countries, and in Bahrain as well, have become quite bloody. In Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and Algeria, protests have earned concessions and promises for reform, but are probably not powerful enough to stage a revolution or seriously alter their governments.

So what exactly is happening in the Arab world?  Instead of providing an opportunity for perspective, the passage of weeks and months has only offered confounding, contradictory, and ambiguous developments.  In search of some readily comprehensible meaning, a host of old terms have been reassigned to the unrest in the Arab world.  Tunisia's uprising became the Jasmine Revolution, a rehash of the term coined for Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's accession to power in 1987.  The spread of protests became the Arab Spring, a term that has been used to describe various pro-reform movements in the Arab world since as early as 2003.  While Eastern European revolutions were assigned colors, Arab uprisings have been assigned dates -- January 14 for Tunisia, January 25 or February 11 for Egypt, February 14 for Bahrain, February 17 for Libya, February 20 for Morocco.  Yet none of these terms even hints at a greater understanding of what has transpired, and what it means over the long term, or what it means just for next week.

At the moment the ultimate significance of this period in Middle East history is probably not possible to predict with any precision, nor is there any certain outcome for the Arab awakening/ Spring/ Intifadah/ Fourth Wave/ Fifth Wave/ what-have-you.  Still, the likely events fall within certain parameters.  Here are three extreme scenarios for the near future; I believe the actual course of events will fall somewhere in between these possibilities:

1) Authoritarian Backlash.  Unable to consolidate, democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt are co-opted by illiberal forces and a new version of the security state takes hold.  Entrenched forces throughout the Middle East regain their footing and use extensive repression to cow their restive populations.  Seeing the uprisings of early 2011 as a momentary interruption of the prevailing autocratic hold on the Middle East, foreign powers go about rebuilding relations with repressive regimes and drop calls for reform.  The defeated protest movements feed a new generation of radicals and terrorist movements who once more become the most recognizable face of resistance against the region's governments and the foreign alliances that help sustain them.  Iran seeks to capitalize on the continued marginalization of Shi'is and the broader lack of legitimacy among Arab governments to increase its regional influence.

2) Liberal Renaissance.  Pro-democracy forces overcome massive odds and violent resistance from despotic incumbent regimes.  With a few exceptions the movement spreads throughout the Arab world and orderly transitions eventually occur in most states.  The United States recognizes the changing tide, and divests itself from longtime allies, forging new relationships based on mutually held security interests and economic partnership.  With no foothold in the Arab world and lacking any significant ideological appeal, Iran's influence wanes.  Other legacies of more radical Islamism moderate or become marginalized as they integrate further into democratic politics and adapt to existence in open societies.


3) Weak and Decentralized States.  A series of internal political stalemates greatly weakens the post-colonial Arab system of states.  Civil war in Libya results in a deadlock, and it breaks into two or more statelets.  The central government in Yemen fades and its regions break into tribal enclaves or into loosely governed northern and southern divisions.  Syria collapses and descends into violence as factions compete for power.  Never strong states, Iraq and Lebanon further disintegrate.  Egypt and Tunisia struggle to forge new governments, and trudge through long periods of disorder marked by strife and economic decline.  Extremist groups are able to expand their operations and find many new recruits among orphans and other victims of the increased levels of violence and civil war.  The modern map of Arab states slowly transforms as states break up.


While I do not believe that any of these scenarios will occur, none are entirely inconceivable.  At any rate, it seems most likely that elements of all three will play out to varying degrees.  Ultimately I expect the course of events to vary significantly from country to country; there is no discernible progression to the uprisings in the Arab world now, and it is a virtual certainty that none will arise going forward.  There are too many differences and mitigating factors for one democratic movement to spread uniformly throughout the Middle East, or for one counter-revolution to roll back all of the past months' changes.  In the short term, the authoritarian reprisal against reform movements has not crested yet.  Saudi Arabia in particular is beginning to produce an authoritarians' response to the uprisings, and it is not pretty.

But in the end, no authoritarian backlash seems likely to prevent what has begun in the Arab world.  The system of repression, patronage, and manipulation -- employed effectively by Arab leaders for decades -- is crumbling, and it is hard to imagine that things will return to the way they were.  Even the most deeply entrenched dictators now seem beleaguered, vulnerable, and feckless against the tide of popular discontent.  Some, perhaps even most, of the incumbent regimes may yet survive, but they will not escape unscathed, and they will not be able to continue ruling indefinitely.  In many ways it seems only a matter of time before more dramatic changes arrive in the Arab world.  The final influence of these changes on American interests in the Middle East will depend in part on how American policymakers respond to them.  The options may not be clear, but the stakes certainly are.  I will examine some of the factors shaping current American policy in the Middle East, and how the United States can respond constructively to the current state of affairs, in my next post.

Arab Autocrats' Protest Response Flow Chart

Egypt's Economy Hits a Speed Bump (April Fool's)

There was disappointing news today for Egypt's economy, as the Ministry of Tourism announced the cancellation of a highly anticipated promotion for 2011.  On Friday, April 1, the Tourism Minister Mounir Fakhry Abdel Nour announced that the "Hollywood Classics" reenactment series will be on hold for 2011 due to "political reasons."

The much ballyhooed reproduction of "Jaws 2," scheduled for late summer 2011, has been officially cancelled.  While the recent social upheavals were cited by the Minister as the main cause, there is speculation that the cancellation is also related to the mixed reviews of Egypt's real-life reproduction of the 1975 Steven Spielberg classic "Jaws" in the resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh.  The promotion became controversial when South Sinai governor and erstwhile Roy Scheider impersonator Mohammed Abdel Fadil Shousha went off-script and blamed Israel for releasing the shark, a costly ad-lib that caused him to be thrown off the project.

While the real-life reenactments have run into some trouble, Minister Abdel Nour remains confident that they can help revive Egypt's critical tourism sector after recent political turmoil.  "We still saw increases in revenue and a reduction in Russians from our presentation of 'Jaws',"  said Abdel Nour.  "We are hopeful our recreation of Hollywood classics in real time here in Egypt can promote increased tourism to other areas as well."  When asked if "Jaws 3" might be on the table for 2012, Abdel Nour responded, "We anticipate a shift in focus to some other regions for next year's season," adding, "that movie sucked anyway."

Sources close to the Ministry of Tourism have recently informed al-Jawaala that next year's probable recreation will be another Spielberg adventure, "Raiders of the Lost Ark."  There is still some disagreement over who will fill the role of pop-culture icon Indiana Jones, but History-Channel-darling and de rigeur archaeologist Zahi Hawass is an early frontrunner.  Others speculate that "The Ten Commandments" will be recreated, in an effort to boost tourism in the Sinai among evangelical Christians, with the ubiquitous Egyptian screen actor Adil Imam slated to play Moses.  However, Minister Abdel Nour threw cold water on this rumor by saying that cooperation with Israel on the project would be impossible, "until they give us our shark back."