Traveling

For the next ten days I will be traveling to Tunisia on a working trip.  Blogging will be on hiatus for the duration, but I will be working overtime to get a better sense of the political landscape and the state of the transition.  I will be asking many questions while I'm there, and hopefully I'll be able to explore them a little once I return.  Here are a few things I'll be looking into:

• What are the most important obstacles to democratization in Tunisia?  How are activists or the interim government addressing these obstacles?
• How much does the public trust the current interim government?  Are they confident the authorities have the will and the ability to organize free and fair elections?
• What are the defining characteristics of Tunisian politics at this stage of the transition?
• What do Tunisians expect from their revolution?

More to come.  In the meantime, here's some light reading:

Max Boot defends "nation building" -- provocative op-ed piece in the LA Times.  I will write a full reaction to this article once I have a moment because I believe it raises some important issues.

9/11 and One Measure of bin Laden's Success from The Atlantic

Morocco's Constitutional Face Lift, breaking new ground in frustration and futility.

Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring; @GregGause -- not exactly.  Many people saw it coming, a few even warned other people.  Still a very thoughtful and interesting article.

The Baby and Baath Water from BBC's Adam Curtis.  A brief introduction to a fascinating and often overlooked period of Syrian history.

Quiz Time

The news from the Middle East continues to pile up without any sign of slowing down.  To be sure you're staying on top of it all, here is the latest in Jawaala quiz technology (if you missed the last one you can test yourself here).  Answers are at the bottom.

1. Egyptian billionaire and telecom mogul Naguib Sawiris drew the ire of Egyptian Muslims when he tweeted a picture of which of the following?

a. A woman in a bikini

b. A bearded Mickey Mouse

c. Anthony Weiner’s groin

d. Hosni Mubarak

e. A faked picture of a Muslim Brotherhood leader drinking whiskey

2. The Saudi government recently allowed women to do which of the following activities for the first time?

a. Drive a car

b. Sell lingerie to each other

c. Take out loans without a man’s permission

d. Travel without a man to accompany them

e. Deliver the call to prayer

3. Next month, Iran plans to demonstrate its growing military and scientific prowess by doing which of the following?

a. Testing ballistic missiles

b. Introducing a new line of halal portable meals

c. Doubling its capacity to enrich uranium

d. Launching a monkey into outer space

e. Unveiling a new type of bomb delivered by migratory birds

4. What is the new name given to Pearl Square – the center of pro-democracy protests in Bahrain, which was cleared and demolished in March – by the Bahraini government?

a.  Gulf Cooperation Council Square

b. Martyrs’ Square

c. Khalifa Square

d. Sectarian Unity Square

e. New Pearl Square

5. Who of the following international figures visited Muammar Qaddhafi in Tripoli on June 13?

a. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez

b. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev

c. Juventus FC Chairman Jean-Claude Blanc

d. World Chess Federation head Kirsam Ilyumzhinov

e. Musician and activist Wyclef Jean

6. On July 3 the Vice President of Lebanon’s Higher Shiite Council, Abd al-Amir Qabalan, described the indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon as:

a. A Zionist conspiracy

b. A hoax

c. A Trojan horse

d. A practical joke

e. A mockery of justice

7. Saudi women have engaged in a high-publicity protest for greater civil rights by:

a. Driving on video

b. Removing their veils in public

c. Publishing a “by women, for women” newspaper

d. Staging their own “Day of Rage” in cities across the country

e. Withholding sex from their husbands

8. During his June trip to Syria, Rep. Dennis Kucinich said which of the following about Syrian President Bashar al-Asad?

a. “Many of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe he’s a reformer"

b. “"President al-Assad is highly loved and appreciated by the Syrians"

c. “…the promise of reform, which has been made over and over again and which you reported on just a few months ago – I’m a reformer, I’m going to reform, and I’ve talked to members of Congress and others about that, that we hear from the highest levels of leadership in Syria – will actually be turned into reality.”

d. “He doesn't want to lead a religious-based country”

9.  Egyptian self-styled strongman Sayyed al-Essawy drew widespread international attention when he announced in June that he would fight a lion with his bare hands in order to:

a. Get out of a bet he lost

b. Prove he is worthy competing in Olympic freestyle wrestling

c. Issue a challenge to Navy SEAL team 6 for hand-to-hand combat

d. Promote tourism in Egypt

e. Raise money for a charitable cause

10.  For Sayyed al-Essawy’s June 27 battle with a lion, trainers were able to curtail the lion’s aggression by:

a. Administering animal tranquilizers

b. Feeding it cold medicine

c. Feeding it an entire donkey

d. Quartering it with ten female lions during the prior week

e. Running it on a treadmill

Answer key:       1) b 2) b 3) d 4) a 5) d 6) c 7) a 8) b 9) d 10) c

Why Should We Care?

On this blog I frequently assert that promoting democracy in the Middle East is in the interests of the United States and is good foreign policy.  My primary arguments for this rest on a definition of American interests in the Middle East and an assessment of the major long-term threats to those interests.  If I had to boil it down to a phrase or two, the argument would go something like this: the most significant threat to long-term American dominance in the Middle East is the failure of regional allies to adequately maintain stability, and political and economic reforms are necessary today to do so; the most appropriate way for the United States to contribute to reform is through democracy promotion.

While I believe that democracy promotion should be an important component of any successful American policy in the Middle East (most especially in the Arab world), I seldom feel the need to justify my position to an audience outside the foreign policy/political science establishment.  However, today I would like to go a bit further and try to explain why an ordinary American who does not care about our foreign policy should still care (at least a little) about democracy promotion.

My desire to explain my ideas in a broader context was prompted by a recent series of surveys on American foreign policy conducted by Pew Research, which finds, not surprisingly, that Americans are not too interested in democracy promotion.  Enthusiasm for this year's "Arab Spring" seems low -- 23% of respondents said they thought it would be good for the United States, while the plurality, 36%, said it would have no effect at all.  Explicit democracy promotion was rated as the lowest among a list of priorities, with only 13% of respondents saying it was a long-term foreign policy goal (protecting U.S. jobs came in as the most common priority, indicated by 84% of respondents).  In a related survey, 46% of respondents agreed with the statement that the United States should "mind its own business" internationally, a notion that does not agree with democracy promotion as foreign policy.

So as someone who believes that democracy promotion in the Middle East is of vital strategic interest to the United States, and who has dedicated the last couple years of his life to better understanding and achieving this goal, do I think American public opinion has it wrong? Absolutely not.  At the end of the day, it is not hard to see why other priorities -- protecting jobs, energy independence, reduction of military commitments overseas, etc. -- are more important to most people than democracy promotion.

America's role in the Middle East is a result of one simple fact that few politicians are willing to admit: the only reason the United States has vital strategic interests in the Middle East is to maintain its position as the world's sole superpower.  In other words, global hegemony is the single real motivation for the extent to which American foreign policy, and the use of American power, is geared toward domination of the Middle East.  It follows, then, that the only reason (beyond a humanitarian or altruistic motivation) to care about democracy promotion in the region is a desire for continued American dominance of the international arena.  There are many compelling arguments for democracy promotion in the region, but most of them are only valid if one believes that the  United States should strive to be a global power.

This notion has never been universally accepted in the United States, which has a longstanding isolationist streak.  In times of economic downturn such as the current period, when there are more than enough urgent domestic problems to be addressed, influence abroad becomes less attractive even to those that do believe the United States should be a world leader.

Furthermore, the primary goal of foreign policy is always to protect a state's interests.  Since it is often portrayed as a humanitarian cause which does not relate directly to American security or prosperity, and since its benefits are indirect and often intangible, democracy promotion appears to be exactly the kind of quixotic foreign adventure that is so unpopular among the general public (although it cannot hold a theoretical, financial, or political candle to such projects as the Global War on Terror when it comes to quixotic).

Let's recap: democracy promotion is good policy if the United States is interested in maintaining its global hegemony.  So long as one accepts that it is worthwhile for the United States to be a world superpower, democracy promotion in the Middle East is in its interests.  Projects such as global dominance and political and social reform abroad seem far less appealing when American society appears to be crumbling.  This is exacerbated by the fact that it is not easy to explain how democracy promotion directly benefits the American people, especially when one does not want to bring up the whole hegemony thing.  So then, if all this is true, why should Americans care about democracy promotion?

I believe there are many reasons, but in the most pragmatic terms democracy promotion is a solid investment.  American prosperity has come to depend on its position as a world superpower, and American security is now deeply linked with events in the Middle East.  Democracy promotion is a far more affordable and far less bloody way to preserve American interests in the Middle East than other options, such as the war in Iraq, secret drone strikes, proxy wars, an enormous network of bases, and an immense security/counterterrorism industry.  Financially, democracy promotion is a drop in the security budget bucket, and in the long term it is one of the only attractive solutions to the social and political challenges facing the Middle East.  While democracy promotion does not come in as a priority over jobs, immediate security, prosperity, and a whole range of other political issues, it does not have to.  It is cheap, effective, and low-risk.  Successful democracy promotion in the Middle East offers American taxpayers a substantial return on investment, and that is reason enough to care about it.

A Guide to Tunisia's Political Transition

Since January 14, 2011, Tunisia has embarked on an ambitious course of political reform and democratic transition.  An interim National Unity Government (NUG) has been appointed in the wake of the old regime to handle day-to-day affairs, and elections are scheduled for October 23 to elect a National Constituent Assembly, which will rewrite the constitution.  In addition to the NUG, a host of independent committees have been appointed to develop an administrative structure for the transition period, each charged with different and sometimes redundant tasks.  Though there is currently no law defining what a political party is or regulating their activities, parties are proliferating and beginning to campaign for support; most will field candidates to serve as delegates in the National Constituent Assembly.

Amidst all the commotion that has come from numerous and often un-coordinated attempts to develop liberal democratic processes in a recently eviscerated autocracy, it can be difficult at times to know exactly who is in charge.  For example, the Ministry of Interior, which has been led by three different individuals in the past five months and is responsible for licensing political parties, often does not seem to know just how many political parties it actually has cleared to operate legally (estimates range from 80 to 100 unique groups, including several that use the same name).

Here, in as simple a way as I can present it, is a diagram of the current government and various other authorities responsible for managing a democratic transition in Tunisia.  I have not included the Parliament because they have ceded all legal authority to the President, and I have not included regional and local government because the level of organization varies so much among the provinces.  Each of the three bodies described below are administratively independent and held together by little more than mutual consensus.  Without further ado, here is Tunisia's current and soon-to-be political hierarchy:

Speculation and Conjecture: Some Future Predictions

Although seldom useful, it's always fun to make predictions.  Here are a few of mine for the near future in the Arab world and the broader Middle East:


1) Syria and Yemen will both become engulfed in civil war over the next year.  This is not a particularly bold prediction because it may already be happening.  In Yemen it is easy enough to pick out a few factions that will vie for power (here is an interesting discussion on the matter), but in Syria it is less clear.  Certain parts of the military may turn against the Assad regime, or the regular army could start fighting against the other security agencies.  The conflict could develop along sectarian lines, or the pro-democracy protest movements could become violent in response to continued crackdowns.  In any case, the longer the Assad regime seeks to preserve itself, the greater the chance that Syria will devolve into civil war.  It is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad and his ruling cadre would rather rip Syria apart than voluntarily leave power, or enact reforms and reconcile with protestors.  Sadly, it also appears that they will have their way.

2) In the next 5-10 years Saudi Arabia's influence will increase, but it will not become a regional power broker.  As other states weaken, Saudi Arabia's relative power will grow considerably.  However, this increase in influence will probably be in spite of Saudi Arabia rather than because of it.  Saudi Arabia is rich, well-armed, and is able to project its influence through support of conservative Islam throughout the Muslim world.  The main historical competitors for regional dominance in the Arab world -- Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -- will probably not be able to project power beyond their borders in the near future.  The major non-Arab players in the Middle East -- Turkey, Israel, and Iran -- have been caught off guard by the Arab uprisings and none are in position to take a leading regional role.  This leaves Saudi Arabia more powerful by default.  However, with an army that, though well equipped, has never won a war, the growing cost of maintaining order at home, and an ideology whose appeal has been diminishing in the Arab world for years and is further weakened by democratic movements, Saudi Arabia will not be able to establish its regional hegemony.  For all its riches and all its military gewgaws, Saudi Arabia is still weak in several key respects, including its low human capital, dependence on foreign labor, growing difficulties in maintaining internal order, and reliance on foreign military assistance.  Though it may become more assertive and more capable of dictating the course of events in the Middle East, it will remain a secondary player to the dominant power in the region, which will continue to be the United States for at least the next few years.  That said, we come to my next prediction...

3) American influence in the Middle East will decline over the next decade, due to political incompetence rather than a decrease in real power.  The United States has all the means to remain the sole hegemonic power in the Middle East, but its position will continue to weaken from poor leadership.  Confronted with new challenges, American policy will not adapt fast enough to retain regional dominance.  The United States will continue to be the major foreign power in the region as a whole, but amidst growing perceptions of its inability to influence the broader currents of Arab politics and the shifting regional dynamic, it will become gradually less important.  The United States policy toward the Middle East is deeply flawed, and it will not change enough in the near future to avoid a significant loss of influence.


4) Tunisia and Egypt will both develop into democracies within the next five to seven years.  At this point in time Tunisia's progress toward a complete democratic transition is far more substantial than Egypt's.  The key difference is that in Tunisia the remaining elements of the old regime do not have a say in the transition process.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is still in charge, and while the SCAF does not have any interest in governing, it also continues to hold the real power in Egypt, and is only willing to liberalize the political arena enough to protect itself and return to business as usual.  Ultimately, though, time is on the side of the protestors; if their fundamental demand for representative government will not be abandoned, then eventually the military and the other powers-that-be in Egypt will recognize that it is in their interest to liberalize.  Transitions in both countries are threatened most by economic disarray, but the momentum for political change is quite strong.

5) Morocco's attempt to placate protestors will fail.  Always eager to cast itself as a different kind of autocracy, Morocco is currently entering a process of top-down reforms which the Palace refers to as "evolution" -- as opposed to "revolution," of course.  After large-scale protests began in Morocco on February 20, the King attempted to get out ahead of reform movements by announcing a program of constitutional reforms that could considerably reduce his power and answer protestor's demands while not overtly acknowledging them.  Now the announcement of constitutional reforms is imminent, to be followed by a referendum in early July and elections for a new parliament under the new constitution in early October.  While superficially promising, these reforms will amount to little more than the cosmetic changes that King Mohammed VI has implemented since he came to the throne in 1999.  The Moroccan protestors will not accept this token gesture, though it is unclear if they will be able to mount an uprising such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain.


6) The pro-democracy uprisings of 2011 will eventually be judged as a continuation of the past rather than a break from it.  Given the dramatic nature of the uprisings in every corner of the Arab world, and the fall of two governments (perhaps three including Yemen), 2011 currently seems like a wild break from the political currents of the past.  Yet over the long term, analysts will regard these movements as a continuation of the development of post-colonial political ideologies.  The common thread between pan-Arabism, Islamism, and now the so-called Arab Spring, is the desire for self-determination and freedom from foreign influences.  Pan-Arabism became the leading ideology of many Arab governments, perhaps most notably Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, but ultimately failed to achieve its goal of unifying the Arab people and freeing them from foreign domination.  Islamism, though it became a powerful cultural force and an ideology of resistance to the status quo, was only embraced by governments at the margins of the Arab world.  Today, the struggle for self-determination has taken a new tack.  While Islamists remain an influential political force, the desire for political rights and popular sovereignty is now being expressed on a large scale in terms of democracy and good governance.  This new development is not different in kind from the movements of the past, but rather in manner.  Whether it will ultimately prevail and help the Arab people secure their rights is still uncertain, but it has already shown its potential to transform the political landscape of the Middle East as we know it, and may yet have even greater significance.

Three Down? Yemen Passes a Turning Point

The protest movement in Yemen has been one of the most consistent, universal, and long-lasting of the recent wave of uprisings in the Arab world.  President Ali Abdallah Saleh, who has been in power in Yemen in some capacity since 1978, held on for nearly five months after major upheavals against him began in January.  After a seemingly endless array of failed resignation deals, protestors received their first genuine piece of good news over the weekend when Saleh left Yemen for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, along with a substantial entourage including key ministers of his government; it is a distinct likelihood that he will not return, even if he wants to (though that does not necessarily mean that his regime is finished).

What will happen now in Yemen is beyond me.  Saleh's Vice President is Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and that is more or less all I know about him.  Comparatively, though, of the three Arab states to force their presidents to leave power this year, Yemen is in the least advantageous position to emerge as a democracy, or as a functional centralized state of any kind, for that matter.  Yemen is currently on the verge of a serious humanitarian emergency.  Yemen is the poorest Arab country, with paltry natural resources, the highest birthrate in the world, the lowest rate of women's literacy in the world, and with an Islamic extremist presence of ever-growing concern.  It is awash in illegal arms and will run out of water in about ten years.  Never a harmonious state, it has suffered years of low-level internecine violence.  Saleh was an autocrat like Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, but he and his government seem never to have had much control over their territory.

Saleh's departure is good news for pro-democracy protestors -- a democratic transition was essentially impossible for as long as he remained in power.  However much the chances of such a transition have improved, they remain alarmingly slim.  The courage of peaceful protestors throughout Yemen has been inspiring, but it was an act of violence from a tribal militia that eventually sent Saleh packing.  As long as armed clans are the power-brokers in Yemen, it will remain a weak state, one with little chance of becoming a successful democracy.

As with the transitions currently underway in Egypt and Tunisia, there are a seemingly limitless number of possible outcomes for Yemen.  One possibility that is not shared with either Egypt or Tunisia is that Yemen as we now know it could disintegrate entirely.  Considering the spread of violence through the country now, and the difficulty of maintaining order throughout the past fifty years, a national government over all of Yemen may not replace Saleh.  It is possible that it could split into northern and southern realms, or disintegrate even further into tribal enclaves and small urbanized statelets around Aden, Sanaa, and the the major cities in between.

In any case, the Arab uprisings continue to demonstrate both the unity and the diversity of the Arab world.  While social unrest has swept nearly the entire region, its outcomes have varied significantly in each country.  The complaints of the protestors are remarkably similar, but government responses have covered a broad spectrum; outcomes have ranged from brutal crackdowns, to moderately successful appeasement, to government collapse and even civil war.  Three states have now managed to force their leaders out of power, but each case is quite different from the other, and illustrative of different and unique trends in modern Arab politics.  As events develop in the Arab world they seem less coherent in some ways and more so in others.

However, it is important to note what remains the same -- Arabs everywhere in the Middle East are demanding democratic rights and popular sovereignty.  The United States would be unwise to oppose this, but it is caught in a difficult situation because its alliances in the region have been based on support for autocrats.  There is no graceful way out of this quandary, but it is essential that American policymakers find a way to support democratic change in the Middle East now.  The status quo is shifting under our feet, and to ignore this and pursue business as usual could have dire consequences.  Yemen is an instructive example of what is at stake -- while democracy is still a faint hope there, the alternatives could be disastrous and are all too easy to imagine.

Some Reading, and a Read-out on Egypt's Second Day of Anger

This will have to be a brief post because I am short on time.  First, some reading recommendations -- here are a couple excellent pieces on the Arab uprisings as a regional phenomenon:


Larry Diamond in Foreign Affairs: "A Fourth Wave or False Start?  Democracy After the Arab Spring"

Michael Hudson for Jadaliyya: "Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reflections on the Current Wave of Protest in the Arab World"

Also worth checking out are Joseph Stiglitz's piece on Tunisia in the Financial Times, this article in Bloomberg News from Vali Nasr on the Saudi campaign to quash political reform throughout the Arab world, and this anonymous article on the Syrian media from the Daily Beast. 

One major news story to watch tomorrow and into the weekend is a new protest in Midan Tahrir in Egypt planned for this Friday.  This protest, which is intended to voice dissatisfaction with the current transition process and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), is a sign of the military's loss of favor with the Egyptian public.  During the January and February uprising, the military enjoyed a high level of public support.  This illusion was bound to fade as the transition period got under way, because the military in fact has no interest in democratization and has its own agenda for reform which does not match well with the general needs of most Egyptians.  The past few weeks have served to reveal the gap between what the military wants and what Egyptians want.  It is no accident that this Friday is being referred to as the "Friday to Save the Revolution" -- the SCAF's incompetent management and unwillingness to enact a transparent, democratic reform process is the greatest threat to the ideals of the Egyptian revolution, and activists seem to be running out of patience.

I am encouraged by these protests insofar as I believe the only way the SCAF will liberalize Egypt is under enormous popular pressure.  Protests such as these will be crucial to convince the military leadership that they need to make a more sincere commitment to meaningful political reform.  At the same time, I worry that demonstrations may not be enough in the end.  When Hosni Mubarak was still in power, activist groups were unified around one cause.   Since Mubarak stepped down on February 11, some divisions have emerged, and the military has quietly undermined the protest movements by allowing sectarian violence and rounding up political dissidents.  The repression is not really so quiet anymore -- on Thursday the army arrested four activists who had called for a Friday protest.  I think time is ultimately on the side of the protestors, but in the short term one must wonder if they will be able to sustain the necessary level of pressure to get real results from the SCAF.

One of the more interesting subplots in these protests is the role the Muslim Brotherhood and lesser Islamist groups are playing.  The Brotherhood's commitment to democracy has been a subject of debate for years; one camp of analysts has maintained that at bottom they are anti-democratic, while another camp argues that they are willing to share power and participate in democratic governments.  I have always fallen in the latter camp, but this week the Brotherhood has weakened my position by announcing its opposition to the Friday protests, siding clearly with the military.  Salafi groups, never considered pro-democratic by anyone, have also come down against the protests.

At the moment the MB does not seem concerned with the fate of Egyptian democracy, but with their own political fortunes.  The current transition is an unprecedented opportunity for the Brotherhood to gain power in an Egyptian government, and they seem more concerned with power than with true political reform.  They were slow to jump on the January 25 revolution bandwagon, and it seems they are still reluctant to do anything that might hurt the chances of increasing their relative control of Egyptian politics.  While this seems like it could change, it is still a discouraging sign.

Small Talk -- Obama Stays the Course

President Obama's speech (text here) on May 19 was billed as the announcement of a bold new strategy; when she introduced the President, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton extolled an "innovative" new approach that would change American foreign policy in the region.  What the President delivered was more a reaffirmation of past American policy, with a subtle shift in emphasis.  Of course, it was also exemplary of Obama's unique talent to deliver an even-handed, considered speech that balances multiple contradictory interests, and somehow leaves everyone pissed off and disappointed.

The speech was not well received anywhere in the Middle East.  In Israel President Obama's totally unremarkable (more on this later) reference to the 1967 borders as a basis of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations was described by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu as "indefensible." Palestinians were not pleased with Obama's speech either;  Fatah leader and occasional negotiator Nabil Shaath remarked that it contained "little hope" for Palestinians.  In the rest of the Middle East, reactions were subdued.  Aside from the fact that they have more pressing matters to worry about in Damascus, Cairo, and elsewhere, the President just did not say much in the way of bold and new.

Unlike many other observers, I was not disappointed by President Obama's speech.  Perhaps that is because I had somewhat low expectations, but I think in general it was neither a triumph nor an aberration.  The President said what needed to be said and nothing more.  In its present position the United States is forced to promulgate a cautious and inherently contradictory policy.  President Obama has shown no desire to transcend these contradictions or to take any unnecessary risks in his approach to the Middle East, and so it was unrealistic to believe his speech would announce anything unconventional.  Perhaps it is a matter of perspective, too; as someone who believes that the rules of international politics have not changed much over centuries, I tend to view anything heralded as a major shift in foreign policy to be more comical than momentous.

Of course, the portion of the President's speech that has received the most attention was his reference to the Israeli borders of 1967 as the basis for a peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  This is apparently the first time an American president has explicitly referred to the pre-1967 borders, but it is hardly a new idea (in fact, it is 44 years old).  Furthermore, the United States has implicitly agreed to use the pre-1967 borders as the basis for peace by supporting and upholding UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, and UNSCR 338, adopted in October 1973, not to mention every single Israel-Palestine peace plan endorsed by the United States ever.  The hubbub around this is based on hype, not facts.

Ultimately, however, Israel-Palestine was a relatively minor topic of the speech, and one of less interest to the Middle East as a whole.  The consequential news for the past five months has been coming from elsewhere in the region, and the Arab uprisings were appropriately the focus of President Obama's speech.  While it did not announce any major shift in American policy, the President's speech did acknowledge that a course correction is necessary.  President Obama came into office with the intention of "resetting" American relations with the Muslim world.  This reset should have meant a new focus on eliminating the pathologies perpetuated by American foreign policy over the past generation -- a redefinition of how the United States would relate to the states of the Middle East, and an acknowledgment of the harm it has done both to its interests and to Arab societies by aiding and abetting the predatory and abusive rule of autocrats and despots without regard for the welfare of their people.  Instead, it was a reaffirmation of such alliances, as political reform was thrown off the table in bilateral relations with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other American allies.  The Obama administration was virtually allergic to democracy promotion in the region, until it became impossible to ignore this past winter.

The President admitted as much in his speech, though whether he means what he said is yet to be seen.  Indeed, his words indicate that he realizes that the United States has been a part of the problem in Middle Eastern politics, but can still be a part of the solution.  Furthermore, the speech indicated that he understands that the necessary shift in American policy is one of method, not of philosophy.  Not only did he say that the United States will continue to pursue its interests, he correctly stated that American interests include meaningful political and economic reform in the Middle East.

In the short term, these remarks simply mean that the United States will continue its reactive, ad-hoc policy toward the Arab uprisings.  This is not such a bad thing in itself -- it certainly could be bad, if the Obama administration uses poor judgment in its reaction to events in the region (I would argue that in fact this has been happening in at least Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, but not to the extent that some Obama detractors would have you believe).  While I would like things to be simpler and more clear cut, considering the inherent difficulties of protecting all American interests in the region at this time, ad-hoc reactions may be the best one can hope for.

In the end, the President's speech was typical of his leadership style.  He remains cautious and risk-averse, interested in balancing between what he sees as conflicting goals in American policy.  He willfully rejected the cause of political reform in the Middle East before, but now cannot avoid it.  The events of the past months will not drastically alter his former approach the way the September 11, 2001 attacks did for George W. Bush.  In the end, the President gave no indication that he intends to move beyond business as usual in the Middle East.  It is a shame, but it seems that the Arab uprisings are being viewed in the American policy establishment as an obstacle rather than an opportunity.  Still, it is clear as well that circumstances are forcing a change in perspective; one can only hope that this change will come quickly enough for the United States to have a more positive impact.

Ex-speech-tations

Tomorrow (Thursday, May 19) Barack Obama will deliver an address to the American people and the international community on events in the Arab world and American policy in the Middle East.  The speech is expected to touch on a wide range of issues, from the killing of Osama bin Laden to the democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, to the Israel-Palestine conflict.  President Obama is expected to unveil a plan for economic aid to support democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, and some are hoping he will articulate a clear strategy for the American approach to a changing Middle East.  In terms of specific policy, expectations are that the President will outline in some way a regional strategy for response to the democratic wave in the Arab world.  It is believed he will indicate the United States' position on the reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and its effect on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

I do not know what the President will say tomorrow, but personally I am prepared for disappointment.  It will be a surprise to me if he actually goes into specific details on any of the current issues at play in the region, and even more if he announces a new strategic approach.  Still, it will be enlightening in other ways.  I will provide a full reaction to the speech after it is delivered, but for now, I will simply share what I would wish to hear from President Obama.  I understand that he cannot say many of the things I list below in a public speech, but I will be looking for indications that he or his administration understand them, and that they are employing a prudent and considered strategy to navigate the current challenges they face.

• The United States' relationships with Middle Eastern states is based on vital strategic interests.  For years these interests have been pursued with little regard for the health of Arab societies or the long-term sustainability of American-allied Arab regimes.  While this was often adequate to serve American interests, it has cased enormous systemic problems in the Arab world which can only be resolved by political and economic reform.  The uprisings of 2011 mark a historic milestone in the struggle of Arab peoples for liberty, dignity, and popular sovereignty.
• The United States can no longer ignore domestic politics in the Middle East.  The needs and aspirations of Arab peoples are legitimate and must be represented by their leaders.  The stability of the Arab world is paramount to American interests in the region, and the only basis for true stability over generations is effective, accountable governance.  
• In continuing to protect its interests and deepen relationships with its allies, the United States will stand unequivocally for the inalienable rights and dignity of the Arab people, and furthermore for all people across the globe.
• The overthrow of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt is a historic opportunity to create flourishing democracies in the Arab world.  The United States will contribute to this effort with economic and technical assistance as necessary to ensure the success of the transitions currently underway.  This support is offered not to impose an American solution, but to allow the Tunisians and Egyptians the necessary means to fulfill the goals of their revolution.  No state can will itself to democracy; American assistance will ensure that the Tunisians and Egyptians do not need to.
• Regarding the United States' autocratic allies, American policy will seek opportunities for reform and will encourage governments to respond to the legitimate demands of their people.  In the past there has been too little pressure and too much complacency toward despotic rulers.  It is not the place of the United States to forcibly remove these rulers, but what leverage exists to promote reform will be fully utilized.  The United States will also support democratic activists and protect them as best it can from repression.
• The United States' response will be on a country by country basis and will often seem hypocritical.  However, in this time it is crucial to understand the unique circumstances of reform movements and individual governments' willingness to change.  Rather than operate on vague region-wide assumptions, policy will be determined by intimate knowledge of the country in question and the potential for American influence there.
• The United States cannot expect stability by allying itself with coercive and corrupt governments, and neither can Israel expect peace through coercion and subjugation of the Palestinian people.  It is a great wish of Americans and people throughout the world to see peace in Israel-Palestine, but it is clearly not the wish of important power brokers on both sides.  While the United States will do whatever it can to facilitate negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, peace will not be possible until both sides are ready to make the necessary concessions.  The parameters of a two state solution are nearly unchanged since the 1970s; the major obstacle to peace is not lack of a reasonable solution, but the will of the parties involved to make political sacrifices.
• The United States, like all nations, designs its policy first and foremost to serve the interests of its people.  This is as true today in the Middle East as it is for any other region of the world at any other time in American history.  Today these interests are shared with the vast majority of Arab people: liberalization and protection of fundamental rights, political and social stability, economic progress, resistance to violent extremism, and peace in Israel and Palestine.  The United States will seek to cooperate with people throughout the Arab world to achieve these common goals.

Backsliding in Tunisia and Egypt?

The Arab world is well into the "stall" phase now in its democratic awakening; the resurgence of autocrats and escalation of violence has turned the tide against peaceful protests and popular resistance.  Reform movements have been stalled for over a month now in Libya -- which remains in civil war -- and Bahrain, which is steadily building an apartheid state while the United States looks the other way.  Violence continues in Syria, and while unrest in Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco continues to simmer, none of these states appears close to a revolutionary tipping point.

Meanwhile the monarchies of the Arab world are beginning to advance a response to the democratic wave.  On May 10 the Gulf Cooperation Council announced it had accepted membership bids from Jordan and Morocco.  If these two kingdoms do join the GCC it would effectively turn the organization into an alliance of all the Arab monarchies, positioned firmly against further reform in the Middle East.  Since this grouping of states would no longer be ostensibly related to geographic location, the name "Gulf Cooperation Council" should probably be scrapped.  Feel free to leave your suggestions for new names in the comment section below.  For my part, I think "League of Evil" has a nice ring to it; or alternatively the C.O.U.R.T ("Council of Unjustifiably Rich Tyrants") or perhaps the G.R.O.S.S ("Geriatric Royals Oppressing Sorry Subjects").

Even Tunisia and Egypt, where uprisings have been most successful, appear to be entering a period of regression as disorder sets in and stark social divisions emerge.  In Egypt sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims has become a serious issue, exacerbated by police absenteeism and general disorder.  Amidst the unrest, suddenly resurgent salafis have become a source of sectarian discord, blamed as the instigators in violence throughout Egypt, including an attack on churches in the impoverished Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba in which 15 people were killed.

The sudden appearance of the salafis has raised all kinds of suspicions; they have been connected alternately to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia, the military, and National Democratic Party loyalists.  None of these conspiracy theories is totally impossible (the Muslim Brotherhood scenario seems a little more far-fetched to me than the others) -- the difficulty with the situation is that there are any number of plausible explanations, and it is ultimately doubtful that the sectarian tensions are entirely the result of pre-meditated provocation.  Counter-revolution or not, Egypt really does have a sectarian problem, which is exacerbated by groups who have an interest in sowing disorder, a lack of police presence, and fears of further instability.  While the killing is lamentable in its own right, it is perhaps worse as a threat to the nascent democratic transition in Egypt.  Not only does sectarian violence serve as a distraction, it plays into the hands of illiberal forces who do not want to see a democratic Egypt.  In the midst of such strife, the vast majority of people are not likely to mount the necessary pressure on the military for democratic reform.  Most will probably be content to just let the powers that be have their way so long as order is restored.

The transition in Tunisia has also become a precarious situation.  The public has never had much trust in the interim National Unity Government (NUG), and political differences have started to become more divisive as factions compete for influence.  Tensions reached a critical point last week when a hidden-camera interview of former Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi was posted to Facebook (you can watch it here on YouTube or here) in which he said that the military is planning a coup if Islamists win elections, the same scenario that led to a decade of civil war in Algeria.  The accusation, in an atmosphere of high suspicion of a government that is perceived to be dragging its feet on reform, caused protests to break out across the country.  The police did not help matters by using heavy-handed tactics to disperse crowds, imposing a curfew in greater Tunis and arresting over 200 dissidents.  The incident exposed the thin veneer of legitimacy with which the NUG is operating, and the enormous level of anxiety among many Tunisians who are disappointed with the slow pace of change and fearful of co-optation by counterrevolutionary forces.

Tunisia may have far worse problems than Facebook videos.  Squabbling among the NUG and its various commissions in charge of engineering a democratic transition has hindered progress and may have long-term political consequences.  After lengthy debate, on April 27 the verbosely-named  Higher Commission for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition finally agreed to ban former RCD officials from running for public office for 10 years instead of 23, a bone of contention with the NUG that stalled drafting of more immediately important reforms for several weeks.  The Independent Election Committee, a body charged with organizing and conducting the July 24 elections, is still understaffed and far behind schedule.  In fact, it is a distinct possibility that elections will need to be postponed, an eventuality that could be politically disastrous.  Postponement of elections could confirm the suspicions of many that the NUG has no intention of supporting Tunisian democracy, and is attempting to leave the door open for the former ruling party, the RCD, to return (even though a postponement may actually have the opposite effect).  It would also rankle Islamists, especially Tunisia's largest and oldest Islamist party El-Nahdha, which is well organized and poised to do quite well in elections.  This is problematic because one of the most contentious divisions in Tunisia today is between secularists and Islamists.  The population is split almost evenly between the two sides, and many secularists have become quite fearful of an Islamist takeover.  The balance of power between secular and Islamic parties will be a critical aspect of Tunisian politics going forward, and postponement of elections is a potential flashpoint for tension.  As a matter of process a postponement may raise the chances of holding a successful, free, and fair election, but it will be viewed by at least a few as a setback, and it creates its own set of difficulties which will not be easily resolved.

So do these events signal the beginning of an authoritarian comeback in Egypt and Tunisia?  In my opinion, they certainly could, and there may be cause for alarm if stability continues to deteriorate.  However, these tensions may also be natural growing pains.  The former regimes in both countries actively maintained the sectarian and political rifts that now threaten their transition from authoritarianism.  In short, there was really no way something like these events was not going to happen.  The degree to which they threaten democratization is not entirely clear, but there is plenty of evidence of progress toward that goal too.  Salafis in Egypt have not won many friends from their provocations, and there are precious few calls for a return to the old police state.  In fact, the pro-democracy movement has been a triumph of Christian-Muslim solidarity, and the scenes from Tahrir of Christians protecting Muslims from thugs during their prayers (and vice versa) are some of the most memorable from the January uprising.

The apparent trajectory in Tunisia, in spite of recent upheavals and the likelihood of  a delay in the transition, is actually quite good.  While tourism has been devastated, the manufacturing sector in Tunisia is exceeding expectations and has actually grown relative to last year, a sign that the Tunisian economy remains resilient.  Even though political progress has not met expectations, the NUG and its reform commissions have made some notable achievements including the abolition of the political police and security apparatus, the dissolution of the RCD, the removal of regime loyalists from government and security positions, the end of large-scale media censorship, and the legalization of over 60 political parties.  Even preparations for the elections have started to look better, with the selection this week of all but three members of the Independent Election Commission (referred to in the link as the Independent High Authority for Elections).

The biggest lesson of the difficulties in Egypt and Tunisia is that the reform process is exceptionally fragile.  In the end, there is a vast array of possible outcomes for each country, and liberal democracy is only one of them.  The other alternatives are not nearly as desirable for the welfare of the Tunisian and Egyptian people, or for the interests of the United States.  There is a great deal of danger ahead, and in spite of admirable progress the task of a successful democratic transition in either country is still quite daunting.  That said, only a few months ago the idea of true liberalization in any part of the Arab world seemed laughable.  The uprisings in Tunisia and then in Egypt have changed the dynamic of the Middle East, and the determination and courage of the the Tunisian and Egyptian people is, at the very least, a cause for hope.

The SECOND Jawaala News Quiz!!!

I have given you all plenty of time to study and set yourselves right after all your disappointing performances on the last quiz.  But it's time now to re-assess your Middle East news knowledge, and for me to lower my expectations.  Without further ado, I present to you the new Jawaala news quiz, now with 20% more Donald Trump (answers below):

1. Which of the following has NOT been blamed by Bashar al-Assad for fomenting unrest in Syria?

a. A plot by foreign powers to cause civil war

b. Saboteurs pushing an Israeli agenda

c. Satellite television channels

d. American vigilantes

e. The Muslim Brotherhood

2. Kuwaiti protestors presented parliamentarians with watermelons in March as a symbol of what?

a. Liberty

b. Disenfranchised farm communities

c. Reconciliation and forgiveness

d. Chaos and discontent

e. Corruption

3. In an interview with CNN’s Candy Crowley on April 17, Donald Trump said which of the following about NATO operations in Libya?

a. “We need one thing. Brain power.”

b. “In the old days when you have a war and you win, that nation is yours.  Either I go in and take the oil or I don't go in at all."

c. “I saw a report yesterday. There's so much oil, all over the world, they don't know where to dump it.”

d. “Look. I’m going to look ‘em in the eye and say, ‘Fellas, you’ve had your fun.  Your fun is over.’”

e. “At this moment in time there is a Muslim problem in the world.”

4. How many protestors have been killed in Syria since Hillary Clinton called Bashar al-Assad a “reformer” on March 27?

a.  200

b. 300

c. 400

d. 500

e. 600

5. In her profile in Vogue Magazine, Asma al-Assad said it was important that Syria does not lose which of the following:

a. Its culture

b. Its Arab identity

c. Its spirit of openness

d. Its liberal values

e. Its cuisine

6. On May 3, American vigilante Gary Faulkner demanded a portion of the $25 million reward for information leading to Osama bin Laden’s capture because:

a. “I scared the squirrel out of his hole, he popped his head up and he got capped”

b. “All it takes is one good man”

c. “I wanted to bring him to justice. I'm not greedy, but I sold everything I had and I put my life on the line”

d. “I'm worried that in Pakistan, they won't give him his dialysis. And if he doesn't get it, he's in serious trouble”

7. Pakistani computer programmer Sohaib Athar became famous overnight when he:

a. Was revealed as the author of the Stuxnet worm

b. Leaked the full email archives of nuclear engineer and traitor A.Q. Khan

c. Inadvertently live-Tweeted the Navy SEALS raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound

d. Was arrested for plotting Lashkar-e-Taiba’s 2008 attack on Mumbai

e. Patented a cheese-seeking robot

8. Match the Donald Trump quotation to the nation he is discussing:

                                                                                   

i. Libya                                                                        a. “Why aren't they paying us?  When they said that you should have said, we'll go in… We want $5 billion right now and we'll go in. You know what? That's peanuts to them. They'd give you a check in two seconds."

ii. China

                                                                                    b. “It’s so easy.  It’s all about the messenger.  They wouldn’t even be there if it wasn’t for us.  If it weren’t for us, they wouldn’t be there. “

iii. Iraq                                                                         c. “Excuse me.  You’re not stealing.  Excuse me.  You’re not stealing anything.  You’re taking-- we’re reimbursing ourselves-- at least, at a minimum, and I say more.  We’re taking back $1.5 trillion to reimburse ourselves.”

iv. Saudi Arabia                                                          d. “We’re dealing with people who truly are not only smart, they’re great natural negotiators. They’re not our friends. They’re looking to strip us of everything they can strip us of”

9.  What prop did demonstrators in the Syrian city of Douma use to signify their demands in a march on April 15?

a. An effigy of President Bashar al-Assad

b. Tunisian flags

c. Yellow cards and whistles

d. Shoes

e. Brooms

10.  Which of the following has NOT been used as a name for days of protest in an Arab country?

a. Friday of Defiance

b. Friday of Redemption

c. Friday of Departure

d. Friday of Dignity

e. Friday of Martyrs

11. Egyptians often referred to Hosni Mubarak as which of the following commercial advertising characters?

a. Count Chocula

b. The Laughing Cow

c. Poppin’ Fresh

d. Colonel Sanders

e. Snuggle

Answers: 1) d 2) d 3) b 4) d 5) c 6) a 7) c 8) i. a, ii. d, iii. c, iv. d 9) c 10) b 11) b

Osama bin Laid Down -- A Reaction

Early on Sunday evening I was discussing the threat global terrorism poses to the U.S. with a friend and sometime colleague.  We were wondering whether the lack of any major terrorist attack against the United States since September 11, 2001, is evidence that the American government is managing the threat of terrorism, or whether it shows that terrorism is not actually the threat it is so often made out to be.  Which was a stronger factor in al-Qaeda and its sympathizers' inability to mount a significant attack against the United States -- was it competence on the part of security officials, or incompetence on the part of terrorist networks?

Shortly after this conversation I opened my computer to find rumors across major news sites that Osama bin Laden was dead.  We both watched as the President announced that bin Laden had been killed on Sunday by American soldiers, the result of a covert manhunt that had been re-invigorated since he took office in 2009.  Whatever you believe (know?) about the capabilities of al-Qaeda and similar groups, this is a point for the "threat management" column.

Ultimately this will mean a great deal more for American domestic politics and relations with Pakistan than it will for the Arab world.  However, the killing of bin Laden is a symbolic victory for the United States and it will have an impact on its image, if not an immediate effect on American policies or the defense of American interests in the Middle East.  In fact, bin Laden's fate is more revealing of the past than it is of the future.  While I do not believe his death will greatly effect events in the Arab world, bin Laden's story in some ways signifies several key failures in American policy toward the Middle East over the past generations.

Osama bin Laden was the founder of al-Qaeda, a violent extremist group that called for the killing of Americans, Jews, and any other collaborators with the so-called "Zionist-Crusader alliance," including Muslims.  Al-Qaeda was never a mainstream political movement -- bin Laden and his followers eschewed politics to play the role of a quasi-Leninist vanguard, which aimed to create a radically different society through terrorism.  Al-Qaeda was never a major part of the Middle Eastern or Arab political landscape.  It never enjoyed broad-based support or acceptance, and it never had any true political influence in the Middle East (though it was a significant player in Taliban-dominated Afghanistan, where it had no need of popular support anyway).

Though bin Laden achieved his greatest notoriety for the attacks of September 11, 2001, in many ways that event was his ultimate failure.  Terrorists anywhere are too weak to defeat their enemies through overwhelming force.  Instead they must strike hard enough to provoke a disproportionate response, thereby causing their enemy to waste blood and treasure and cause enough collateral damage as to turn larger, mainstream forces against it.  The attacks of September 11 were meant to draw the United States to retaliate indiscriminately and thus turn the entire Muslim world against them, in a global revolution that, it was hoped, would alter the entire international system.  In a sense the strategy had its desired effect, provoking a heavy-handed and widely unpopular response from the United States in the form of invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a global campaign against Islamic extremists that resulted in shameful abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and secret prisons around the world.

However, in the end bin Laden's strategy failed.  While many Muslims -- and many Arabs -- consider the United States their enemy, they have no great sympathy for Osama bin Laden, and they have not been inspired in any significant numbers to attack the United States, even though they loathe American policy toward their countries.  Al-Qaeda remains a marginal movement which commands no real authority and has little appeal among the general public of the Arab world, or the Muslim world at large.  Viewed in a broader context, the September 11 attacks were a desperate measure, a last-ditch attempt to revive Islamic extremism, which had reached the height of its influence in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  By 2001 bin Laden and his ilk had been recognized as the atavistic murderers they are, offering a vision of the world that could not possibly be acceptable to the vast majority of Muslims.  While their message of resistance to oppressive governments and their patron superpower resonated across the Arab world, its ideology and methods were too extreme to command significant popular sympathy there.

Ultimately, bin Laden was a sideshow to a wider problem of Middle Eastern politics.  While he was certainly dangerous, much of his influence was the product of a milieu in the Arab world that had created widespread desperation, radicalization, and hatred toward the United States.  The root of this problem was not, as bin Laden argued, irreconcilable conflict between Islam and the West.  It was actually the loss of popular legitimacy of Arab governments, repression of popular dissent and peaceful means of opposition, and the complicity of the United States in the resultant poisoning of Arab societies.

Osama bin Laden is dead today, but the system of autocracies that enabled his rise to infamy largely remains.  Fortunately, at no point in history has this system ever been in as much danger of disintegration as it is now.  Across the Middle East people are calling for an end to the old order, not through martyrdom and extremism as al-Qaeda would have it, but through peaceful protest and democracy.  The Middle East is on the brink of a historic transformation, and although tremendous challenges remain there are many reasons to believe in a brighter future.  Yet as much cause as there may be for hope, the stakes are extremely high, for Arab societies and the United States alike.  It is incumbent upon the United States to facilitate transition in the Arab world to more stable governments that base their legitimacy in popular sovereignty.  Failure to do so may ultimately unleash forces that are just as dangerous or worse than Osama bin Laden, and far harder to kill.

Getting Syrious

Hama, Syria --1982

Until now I have withheld from making too many comments about Syria, for two reasons: 1) I am not an expert on Syria, and there are quite a few people who know the country far better than I do, and 2) I did not want to pass judgment on the American reaction to the Syrian uprising until there was a clear political or diplomatic response from the Obama Administration.

Well, depending on when you start counting, it has been between four and five weeks since protests began, and at least three weeks since violence escalated significantly.  The Syrian government led by Bashar al-Asad has resorted to brutal repression of dissent, first attacking, arresting, or shooting peaceful protesters, and now simply killing indiscriminately.  While making preposterously trivial political concessions, such as repealing Syria's long standing emergency law while continuing a brutal onslaught against the protesters, Asad's regime has essentially declared war on its own people.  This is certainly not the first time that political dissent has been met with bloody reprisals in Syria.  The recent violence, especially the military occupation of Deraa, has drawn comparisons to the 1982 massacre of Muslim Brothers in Hama, which crushed a low-level militant Islamist resistance that had begun in the late 1970s.

The current period of unrest bears little resemblance to that era.  The protest movement in Syria is nationwide, not isolated in one city, and its supporters come from diverse backgrounds.  The movement is not Islamist, although Islamists are participating in the protests.  Rather, it is motivated by widespread disillusion with the Asad government, its corruption, economic mismanagement, violation of civil liberties, and merciless repression of any and all forms of dissent.  Like other pro-reform movements that have recently swept the Arab world, there is no clear leadership or platform for the protests; people are not united by an organization, but by a set of common, basic aspirations, not the least of which is to end the Baathist regime and the tyranny of the Asad family.  In fact, the only aspect of past strife that bears any close resemblance to the current uprising is the unduly violent response from the Syrian government.

Syria was long picked out as a sort of bulwark of authoritarianism, one of the least likely Arab states to become embroiled in a mass uprising.  Bashar al-Asad was considered relatively popular and more than capable of quashing any opposition.  It was expected that memories of Hama and pervasive security forces would intimidate and discourage Syrians from speaking out against their government.  While this has not turned out to be true -- protests did reach Syria, and a nationwide protest movement appears quite determined to endure even the harshest violence -- it does not seem that Asad is in any great danger of being forced out of power either.  So long as the army remains loyal to him, there will almost certainly be no victory for the protesters.

What might happen in Syria if Asad were overthrown is unclear.  The possibility of internecine warfare seems very real -- while the protesters come from all regions of Syria and from all its major ethnic groups and sects, there is no question that certain factions have remained loyal to the Asad regime, and they are easily characterized by sectarian background.  It is not difficult to imagine Sunnis seeking retribution against Alawis and Christians, and many speculate that post-Asad Syria could fall prey to the same  sectarian conflicts that plague its neighbors Lebanon and Iraq.

This uncertainty, combined with a perceived lack of American leverage in Syrian internal affairs, may have played a role in the Obama Administration's reticence toward anti-Asad activists.  Furthermore, one of Barack Obama's first initiatives in the Middle East as president was to seek a rapprochement with Syria and begin to restore normal bi-lateral relations.  Now, it seems that Asad's crackdown has gone a step too far, and there is some anticipation that the President will now authorize an increase of pressure on the Syrian government to at least stop attacking protesters (it seems doubtful that they will publicly call for Asad to step down, at least for the moment).

Asad himself does not have many options left if his crackdown does not work.  It is extremely doubtful that he is capable of delivering the necessary reforms to restore his legitimacy and satisfy the demands of protestors who increasingly (and in my opinion, rightly) consider him inseparable from the corruption and repression under which they suffer.  He can continue to wage war against his own people, but risks losing the loyalty of influential figures within his regime, who may see more opportunity in offering him as a concession to popular dissent, as the Egyptian army did with Hosni Mubarak.  Moreover, Asad would invite armed rebellion by escalating bloodshed; indeed, it is not inconceivable that some of the reports of attacks on Syrian security forces are the first signs of a civil war.  On the other hand it is far less likely that he will be able to muddle through with his current strategy of mixed repression and marginal concessions, which has only galvanized protestors against him.

One thing is clear -- Asad cannot make Syria's political problems go away.  In fact, his continued presence will doubtlessly exacerbate them.  His regime has built its power upon unfair patronage, corruption, and brutal repression of all opposition.  It will not be able to solve these inequities which threaten Syrian stability because ultimately they are its lifeblood.  It is no mistake that international actors have severe anxieties about forcefully removing Asad.  His government has carefully engineered Syrian politics so that there is no clear alternative to the current regime.

In any case, time is growing increasingly short.  While there is still time for the Syrian government to change its course, and there is still time for the United States and its allies to influence the outcome of the uprising, the events of the next week or two will probably limit available options.  The question now is not if Asad's regime will fall, but when it will, how it will happen, and what will replace him.  The eventual outcome will have resounding consequences for decades to come.

What's Next? Taking Stock of the Arab Uprisings

As time drags farther on from the breathless first moments of the Arab uprisings this winter, their precise meaning becomes ever more enigmatic.  The early days of this year made it easy to see the interrelationship of politics among Arab states.   Small protests in Tunisia became national movements throughout the entire Middle East and led to the fall of two seemingly intractable governments.  The grievances of protestors, their demands, and their demography were remarkably uniform -- they even borrowed each other's slogans and shared tactics for staging rallies and for impromptu first aid.  Their message, championed by pan-Arab satellite networks, was one of ideological unity against a status quo that was no longer acceptable.

In contrast, the second phase of the uprisings has brought the differences among Arab states to the fore.  Due to their unique political dynamics, the uprisings have had different outcomes in each of the Arab states.  Tunisia was the catalyst for the current upheaval, and it has gone farther than any other Arab country toward eliminating the old system.  As in Tunisia, Egyptians forced their president to leave office, but many of the critical elements of his old regime remain, and they do not seem to be in imminent danger.

Elsewhere in the Arab world the autocrats have managed to survive for the moment.  The three at the greatest risk of sudden overthrow are probably Muammar al-Qaddhafi of Libya, Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen, and Bashar al-Asad of Syria.  Protests in each of these countries, and in Bahrain as well, have become quite bloody. In Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and Algeria, protests have earned concessions and promises for reform, but are probably not powerful enough to stage a revolution or seriously alter their governments.

So what exactly is happening in the Arab world?  Instead of providing an opportunity for perspective, the passage of weeks and months has only offered confounding, contradictory, and ambiguous developments.  In search of some readily comprehensible meaning, a host of old terms have been reassigned to the unrest in the Arab world.  Tunisia's uprising became the Jasmine Revolution, a rehash of the term coined for Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's accession to power in 1987.  The spread of protests became the Arab Spring, a term that has been used to describe various pro-reform movements in the Arab world since as early as 2003.  While Eastern European revolutions were assigned colors, Arab uprisings have been assigned dates -- January 14 for Tunisia, January 25 or February 11 for Egypt, February 14 for Bahrain, February 17 for Libya, February 20 for Morocco.  Yet none of these terms even hints at a greater understanding of what has transpired, and what it means over the long term, or what it means just for next week.

At the moment the ultimate significance of this period in Middle East history is probably not possible to predict with any precision, nor is there any certain outcome for the Arab awakening/ Spring/ Intifadah/ Fourth Wave/ Fifth Wave/ what-have-you.  Still, the likely events fall within certain parameters.  Here are three extreme scenarios for the near future; I believe the actual course of events will fall somewhere in between these possibilities:

1) Authoritarian Backlash.  Unable to consolidate, democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt are co-opted by illiberal forces and a new version of the security state takes hold.  Entrenched forces throughout the Middle East regain their footing and use extensive repression to cow their restive populations.  Seeing the uprisings of early 2011 as a momentary interruption of the prevailing autocratic hold on the Middle East, foreign powers go about rebuilding relations with repressive regimes and drop calls for reform.  The defeated protest movements feed a new generation of radicals and terrorist movements who once more become the most recognizable face of resistance against the region's governments and the foreign alliances that help sustain them.  Iran seeks to capitalize on the continued marginalization of Shi'is and the broader lack of legitimacy among Arab governments to increase its regional influence.

2) Liberal Renaissance.  Pro-democracy forces overcome massive odds and violent resistance from despotic incumbent regimes.  With a few exceptions the movement spreads throughout the Arab world and orderly transitions eventually occur in most states.  The United States recognizes the changing tide, and divests itself from longtime allies, forging new relationships based on mutually held security interests and economic partnership.  With no foothold in the Arab world and lacking any significant ideological appeal, Iran's influence wanes.  Other legacies of more radical Islamism moderate or become marginalized as they integrate further into democratic politics and adapt to existence in open societies.


3) Weak and Decentralized States.  A series of internal political stalemates greatly weakens the post-colonial Arab system of states.  Civil war in Libya results in a deadlock, and it breaks into two or more statelets.  The central government in Yemen fades and its regions break into tribal enclaves or into loosely governed northern and southern divisions.  Syria collapses and descends into violence as factions compete for power.  Never strong states, Iraq and Lebanon further disintegrate.  Egypt and Tunisia struggle to forge new governments, and trudge through long periods of disorder marked by strife and economic decline.  Extremist groups are able to expand their operations and find many new recruits among orphans and other victims of the increased levels of violence and civil war.  The modern map of Arab states slowly transforms as states break up.


While I do not believe that any of these scenarios will occur, none are entirely inconceivable.  At any rate, it seems most likely that elements of all three will play out to varying degrees.  Ultimately I expect the course of events to vary significantly from country to country; there is no discernible progression to the uprisings in the Arab world now, and it is a virtual certainty that none will arise going forward.  There are too many differences and mitigating factors for one democratic movement to spread uniformly throughout the Middle East, or for one counter-revolution to roll back all of the past months' changes.  In the short term, the authoritarian reprisal against reform movements has not crested yet.  Saudi Arabia in particular is beginning to produce an authoritarians' response to the uprisings, and it is not pretty.

But in the end, no authoritarian backlash seems likely to prevent what has begun in the Arab world.  The system of repression, patronage, and manipulation -- employed effectively by Arab leaders for decades -- is crumbling, and it is hard to imagine that things will return to the way they were.  Even the most deeply entrenched dictators now seem beleaguered, vulnerable, and feckless against the tide of popular discontent.  Some, perhaps even most, of the incumbent regimes may yet survive, but they will not escape unscathed, and they will not be able to continue ruling indefinitely.  In many ways it seems only a matter of time before more dramatic changes arrive in the Arab world.  The final influence of these changes on American interests in the Middle East will depend in part on how American policymakers respond to them.  The options may not be clear, but the stakes certainly are.  I will examine some of the factors shaping current American policy in the Middle East, and how the United States can respond constructively to the current state of affairs, in my next post.