Getting Syrious

Hama, Syria --1982

Until now I have withheld from making too many comments about Syria, for two reasons: 1) I am not an expert on Syria, and there are quite a few people who know the country far better than I do, and 2) I did not want to pass judgment on the American reaction to the Syrian uprising until there was a clear political or diplomatic response from the Obama Administration.

Well, depending on when you start counting, it has been between four and five weeks since protests began, and at least three weeks since violence escalated significantly.  The Syrian government led by Bashar al-Asad has resorted to brutal repression of dissent, first attacking, arresting, or shooting peaceful protesters, and now simply killing indiscriminately.  While making preposterously trivial political concessions, such as repealing Syria's long standing emergency law while continuing a brutal onslaught against the protesters, Asad's regime has essentially declared war on its own people.  This is certainly not the first time that political dissent has been met with bloody reprisals in Syria.  The recent violence, especially the military occupation of Deraa, has drawn comparisons to the 1982 massacre of Muslim Brothers in Hama, which crushed a low-level militant Islamist resistance that had begun in the late 1970s.

The current period of unrest bears little resemblance to that era.  The protest movement in Syria is nationwide, not isolated in one city, and its supporters come from diverse backgrounds.  The movement is not Islamist, although Islamists are participating in the protests.  Rather, it is motivated by widespread disillusion with the Asad government, its corruption, economic mismanagement, violation of civil liberties, and merciless repression of any and all forms of dissent.  Like other pro-reform movements that have recently swept the Arab world, there is no clear leadership or platform for the protests; people are not united by an organization, but by a set of common, basic aspirations, not the least of which is to end the Baathist regime and the tyranny of the Asad family.  In fact, the only aspect of past strife that bears any close resemblance to the current uprising is the unduly violent response from the Syrian government.

Syria was long picked out as a sort of bulwark of authoritarianism, one of the least likely Arab states to become embroiled in a mass uprising.  Bashar al-Asad was considered relatively popular and more than capable of quashing any opposition.  It was expected that memories of Hama and pervasive security forces would intimidate and discourage Syrians from speaking out against their government.  While this has not turned out to be true -- protests did reach Syria, and a nationwide protest movement appears quite determined to endure even the harshest violence -- it does not seem that Asad is in any great danger of being forced out of power either.  So long as the army remains loyal to him, there will almost certainly be no victory for the protesters.

What might happen in Syria if Asad were overthrown is unclear.  The possibility of internecine warfare seems very real -- while the protesters come from all regions of Syria and from all its major ethnic groups and sects, there is no question that certain factions have remained loyal to the Asad regime, and they are easily characterized by sectarian background.  It is not difficult to imagine Sunnis seeking retribution against Alawis and Christians, and many speculate that post-Asad Syria could fall prey to the same  sectarian conflicts that plague its neighbors Lebanon and Iraq.

This uncertainty, combined with a perceived lack of American leverage in Syrian internal affairs, may have played a role in the Obama Administration's reticence toward anti-Asad activists.  Furthermore, one of Barack Obama's first initiatives in the Middle East as president was to seek a rapprochement with Syria and begin to restore normal bi-lateral relations.  Now, it seems that Asad's crackdown has gone a step too far, and there is some anticipation that the President will now authorize an increase of pressure on the Syrian government to at least stop attacking protesters (it seems doubtful that they will publicly call for Asad to step down, at least for the moment).

Asad himself does not have many options left if his crackdown does not work.  It is extremely doubtful that he is capable of delivering the necessary reforms to restore his legitimacy and satisfy the demands of protestors who increasingly (and in my opinion, rightly) consider him inseparable from the corruption and repression under which they suffer.  He can continue to wage war against his own people, but risks losing the loyalty of influential figures within his regime, who may see more opportunity in offering him as a concession to popular dissent, as the Egyptian army did with Hosni Mubarak.  Moreover, Asad would invite armed rebellion by escalating bloodshed; indeed, it is not inconceivable that some of the reports of attacks on Syrian security forces are the first signs of a civil war.  On the other hand it is far less likely that he will be able to muddle through with his current strategy of mixed repression and marginal concessions, which has only galvanized protestors against him.

One thing is clear -- Asad cannot make Syria's political problems go away.  In fact, his continued presence will doubtlessly exacerbate them.  His regime has built its power upon unfair patronage, corruption, and brutal repression of all opposition.  It will not be able to solve these inequities which threaten Syrian stability because ultimately they are its lifeblood.  It is no mistake that international actors have severe anxieties about forcefully removing Asad.  His government has carefully engineered Syrian politics so that there is no clear alternative to the current regime.

In any case, time is growing increasingly short.  While there is still time for the Syrian government to change its course, and there is still time for the United States and its allies to influence the outcome of the uprising, the events of the next week or two will probably limit available options.  The question now is not if Asad's regime will fall, but when it will, how it will happen, and what will replace him.  The eventual outcome will have resounding consequences for decades to come.