Another Brick... Egypt on the Brink

During college I had the opportunity to spend a couple weeks in Syria after studying Arabic for a semester in Egypt.   I rode in a taxi to my first hotel in Damascus, and the driver immediately recognized my Egyptian accent when I told him where I was going.  He asked if I was Egyptian, and I told him that I had been studying there.  He asked me how it was to live in Egypt, and I responded that I had enjoyed it and that I was amazed at the genuine kindness and warmth of the Egyptian people.  He asked if it was hard living under such a terrible government.  I responded that I thought the Syrian regime was similar, and  he said, "Yes, it is.  But we have order here."

Egypt is essentially a police state, and power is concentrated in the hands of only a few.  Yet to a foreign visitor it seldom seems that anyone is in control.  Police are nearly ubiquitous, but they seem totally unable to direct traffic and even less able to impose order on the crowded streets of cities like Cairo and Alexandria.  The military and security services usually operate below the surface; at the very least they do not harass foreigners, making it difficult to judge at times just how pervasive they really are.

To a certain extent this image is a fiction -- Egypt's society is tightly controlled in all its vital political aspects, and ordinary Egyptians are constantly subject to the harassment and repression of the police, unlike most temporary visitors such as myself.  Still, it is also a reflection of the Mubarak regime's strategy to diffuse and control its opposition.  The regime permits some open criticism, and uses rigged elections to offer political incentives for the opposition to cooperate with them.  This creates a veneer of pluralism, when in fact the real mechanisms of power remain strictly in the hands of the ruling party.

While perceived chaos has always favored the regime, today real chaos is its only opportunity to stem a popular uprising and retain dominance.  After a week of enormous protests, the police and the military have been unable so far to quell unrest through violence (though they are still trying in some areas).  Mubarak's midnight speech on Friday offered a new cabinet and the first Vice President since 1981 in an effort to placate the crowds.  Unsurprisingly, the protestors -- who have been calling for Mubarak to leave and the whole government to be eviscerated -- were not satisfied.

Protests continue today (follow Al-Jazeera's live blog here, or the Guardian's here), and Mubarak has few options left.  He was unable to appease the protestors, and he has been unable to cow them with force either.  The only viable option left for him is to rob the protests of their mission and their momentum by allowing chaos to reign in the streets.  Indeed, this began on Saturday and has continued into today, as police and the army have withdrawn from residential areas and have allowed (encouraged?) gangs of thugs to loot stores and homes and attack ordinary citizens.  In a parallel to Tunisia's uprising, neighborhood posses have formed to defend their communities from roving bands of looters and criminals.

To what degree the government is responsible for these mobs is uncertain, but it is clear that they are allowing the violence to happen in a bid to undermine the protests through chaos.  Reports from all across the country indicate that police and the army have disappeared from the streets, leaving citizens to defend themselves.  This seems to be Mubarak's only remaining option to stay in power; nothing else he has done thus far has worked.  

It is unlikely that Hosni Mubarak can convince his public that his leadership is still better than anarchy, but if protestors have to stay home to defend their families, they cannot protest.  This will obviously not solve the problem, however.  What Mubarak does not seem to understand, or at any rate what he refuses to acknowledge, is that these protests are about him and his government.  There is no bargaining with a people that are fed up with decades of incompetence, corruption, and disinterest in their needs and aspirations.  Egypt reached a nationwide tipping point this week -- protestors will not settle for anything less than Mubarak's ouster.  He is ready to dig in and fight, and I do not doubt he will use all tools at his disposal to remain in power.  What happens next is anyone's guess -- but I am nearly convinced now that Mubarak is finished.  If this turns out to be the case, then we will have arrived at a seminal moment in the history of the modern Middle East, and an extraordinary opportunity to transform the region.

March Like a Tunisian: Egypt gets its groove back

For me, Egypt has always been the great tease of democratization in the Middle East.  The most populous Arab country, with a relatively strong liberal tradition, Egypt is attractive for democracy promotion advocates for both its regional significance and its potential to develop.  There are relatively strong opposition voices and a widely read independent press.  An uncertain transition in leadership is fast approaching with 30-year President Hosni Mubarak in failing health.  Furthermore, the United States, due to its crucial economic and military support of the Egyptian regime, has more leverage there than in perhaps any other Arab state.

If one follows the news from Egypt and speaks with the opposition, it can seem as if Egypt is perpetually on the brink of revolution.  It may well be the case that it is, but until the present no amount of abuse by the government or the police has been enough to actually cause a major uprising.  The Mubarak regime has effectively, if clumsily, divided and subdued its opponents and maintained just enough control to continue ruling (enormous rents extracted from the United States have enabled this to a great extent).  Naturally most analysts and many Egyptians are pessimistic about the prospects for any positive change in the status quo, which continues on in defiance of logic and even – in the case of Mubarak’s own lifespan – the laws of nature.  

The "Day of Anger" and subsequent mass demonstrations emerge from this dismal milieu.  The result of several weeks of planning by activists and promotion through Facebook and word of mouth, the protests corresponded with Police Day.  Once a national holiday that marked an occasion in 1952 when Egyptian police resisted British attempts to crush Egypt’s independence movement, Police Day more recently has become a symbol of the dominance of the security state and the brutality that sustains it.  Protestors all around the country gathered in massive numbers to express opposition to the presidency of Hosni Mubarak and his son’s possible succession. 

Protests have continued each day since January 25.  The police have begun to crack down on demonstrators, arresting hundreds -- perhaps even thousands -- of dissidents.  While the streets were apparently quieter on Thursday, demonstrators are preparing another round of protests for Friday, which could force the regime into a corner if they are large enough.  The security services are well aware of this approaching confrontation, and they are ominously preparing for it.

Meanwhile, calls for Mubarak's resignation and the end of the NDP regime have multiplied.  Even Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei of the National Association for Change -- whose reluctance to play a more prominent role in the Egyptian opposition has irked activists -- has announced that he will lead an interim government if he is invited to do so.  While he was in Vienna when the protests began, he returned to Cairo on Thursday afternoon to lend his full support to the protests.  

There is no question that these protests are extraordinary – some are even saying they are the largest since independence.  And while none of this amounts to a revolution yet, there is an aura of destiny in these events, perhaps because of Ben Ali’s recent ouster from Tunisia.  Indeed, the Tunisian example has emboldened regime opponents and many are wondering out loud if Egypt can stage an uprising of its own.  There are numerous reasons why such an uprising would be far more difficult in Egypt, not the least of which is its enormous military which has every reason to side with Mubarak and not with the protestors.  The Egyptian government seems unlikely to fall the way Ben Ali did -- that said, two months ago Tunisia looked far more stable than Egypt, and nobody could have precisely predicted what has occurred since then (many, including myself, have felt this was coming, but nobody could have guessed how sudden it actually was).

Though it seems that Mubarak is poised to hang on for now, that does not mean that he will.  Something feels different about this moment; the protesters’ numbers, their diverse backgrounds, their courage against the police, their explicit calls for an end to the regime, and the presence of a figure in ElBaradei who can lead them all point to something momentous. 

This upheaval may not be the end of Mubarak and the NDP, but it is probably the beginning of the end.  It could be years before the current autocracy falls, but it will not recover its full strength even if it does win back control of the streets.  Ossified, ineffective, and unresponsive, the Mubarak government is entering its final stage.  How much longer we must wait before it ultimately runs its course is yet to be seen.

Now that we've had a moment...

The purpose of this blog is to provide a platform for current analysis of Middle Eastern politics and American foreign policy in the Middle East.  More specifically, I will focus my commentary on the issues of political reform, democracy promotion, and human rights in the Arab world.

In most matters, I advocate strongly for democratization in the Middle East, and for a shift in American foreign policy to more assertively support democratic change in the region.  I argue for democratic reform because governments of the Middle East have failed for decades to provide adequate services to their people, and at this time the costs of continued autocracy far outweigh its benefits.  Lacking popular legitimacy, regimes have held on to power by repressing their populations, constructing inefficient networks of economic patronage, and diverting attention from their own shortcomings and abuses of power with false rhetoric and media censorship.  Autocracies prevail throughout the Arab world not because they are able to govern effectively, but because they have become very good at maintaining just enough control over their populations to continue in power, while their societies stagnate and their people become ever more desperate.

Over a generation of corrupt, incompetent, abusive governance has created a multitude of negative consequences.  Among these are dismally high levels of unemployment, religious extremism, sectarian divisions, poverty, and social decline.  Today, the people living under these despotic regimes are clamoring for a change that will allow them a voice in their own governance.  The fall of the regime of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia is the strongest of many signs over the past decade that Arab publics have no faith in their leaders to provide even the most basic freedoms and social services.

While Tunisia's popular revolt is extraordinary in several important ways, it is crucial to realize that in many Middle Eastern countries revolt and regime change are the only options available to people who are not content with the performance of their leaders.  Given the widespread resentment of autocrats throughout the region, one should expect more upheavals like that of Tunisia.  In fact, if conditions are allowed to deteriorate as they have been, social unrest in the Arab world will become more dangerous, not just to the welfare of Arab states but to the security of the United States.

If American policymakers wish to retain the regional and global hegemony of the United States, democratization in the Middle East is vital to American interests, and democracy promotion should be an important component of U.S. foreign policy.  As events continue to develop in the Middle East, I will write on this blog to discuss their effect on the prospects of democratization and on the relevance of democracy promotion for American interests.  I will approach these questions from a regional perspective, but I will also discuss the internal politics of individual states.  Furthermore, I will continue to reassess and adjust my perspective -- as variables change, so should conclusions.

One major problem in the policy community is the tendency to adopt a narrow devotion to a specific perspective.  Analysts and politicians alike often prefer to interpret facts in a way that confirms their own pre-determined narrative, rather than taking the harder route of considering the validity of that narrative and revising their opinions or admitting they were wrong.  While I cannot claim to be wholly exempt from this foible, I hope that this blog can be a haven of open-mindedness, objectivity, and candor in a world where analysts are often employed to articulate a certain point of view regardless of reality.  I will be as straightforward about my own personal biases and the limitations of my knowledge as I possibly can, and I will do my best not to let them obstruct my judgment.

In the end I hope that I am able to provide some insight to an all-too-misunderstood area of the world, and to offer some ideas of my own on the issues of democratization, U.S. foreign policy, and human rights.  If you enjoy it, and even learn something from it, that would be even better.

Longview -- Tunisia's Democratic Challenge and the International Community

In several previous posts I have mentioned that the international community has an important role to play if Tunisia's revolt is to become a democratic revolution.  What is the best way for foreign governments and organizations to support democracy in Tunisia?  I propose that given current political circumstances and the somewhat lacking resources of the Tunisian political community, Tunisia is a prime candidate for large-scale civil society promotion.

Usually I am skeptical of any civil society programs.  This is not due to intrinsic problems with civil society, but instead because it is often used in the Middle East as an inadequate substitute for comprehensive democracy promotion.  In almost every case in the Middle East, incumbent governments are the true impediment to democratization, and civil society programs tend to work at the margins of the state, where their impact is too small and piecemeal to have meaningful effects.  Moreover, they are usually designed with the approval of the state, which will only allow programs that do not threaten its power with any significant prospect of change or liberalization.  Thus, civil society promotion is often little more than a token gesture that will not effect the true balance of power in an autocratic regime.

Tunisia is an exceptional case, because these limitations -- an overbearing state that stifles true political progress and actively seeks to marginalize and co-opt civil society -- are no longer present (and I hope I never get bored of saying that).  The current political system is wide open, and as a result of Ben Ali's heavy repression there is no institutional capacity for political participation.  There are also almost no credible civil society institutions or political opposition.  Civil society promotion can help address these problems by creating an arena for development and expression of political platforms, an infrastructure for monitoring and oversight of government practices, and a network for community participation and protection of civil liberties.

Given the complete repression of any democratic institutions under Ben Ali, Tunisia's interim government faces what may well be an impossible list of tasks, which include:

1. Overhaul or replace an illiberal constitution that enshrines an authoritarian system and leaves no opportunity for democratic participation
2. Reform the laws governing civil rights and freedom of the press
3. Reform election laws to ensure fair and inclusive elections
4. Rebuild the police force and the security services to remove Ben Ali loyalists and eliminate routine police brutality and abuse of human rights
5. Dismantle the instruments of corruption and the patronage networks used by the Ben Ali family to control prosperity and bestow political favor on allies
6. Develop a framework for peaceful transfer of power according to democratic practice
7. Build the capacity of political parties and include all credible factions in the reform process
8. Restore order and maintain stability to reassure foreign investors and revitalize the tourism sector
9. Earn the trust of a population that is suspicious of former-RCD officials and demands a purge of all RCD elements from the government
10. Meet all of the above challenges with a legion of inexperienced activists and opposition politicians, most of whom are far more familiar with a prison cell than the responsibilities of political leadership and governance

In the end, the Tunisians probably do not have the expertise and institutional capacity to solve these problems.  Even a collaborative effort that makes use of all available resources (including the experience of RCD officials who are willing to preside over a transition to democracy) will probably fall short of what is necessary without significant outside help.  Essentially, democracy in Tunisia -- and perhaps anywhere -- cannot develop in isolation.  The international community, including the United States, the European Union (especially France), and prominent international NGOs can play a decisive role in channeling Tunisia's popular uprising into a democratic revolution.  These governments and organizations can offer technical expertise and financial support to help build an effective civil society and to provide an incentive for the interim government to stay committed to reform.

A successful assistance campaign should include the following initiatives: training for political parties, technical advice on legal and constitutional reform, capacity building of local NGOs and community groups, financial aid to provide insurance for foreign direct investment while the Ben Ali family's assets are seized, election monitoring and training of domestic election monitors, and retraining programs for the police forces.  Foreign governments and NGOs would both need to play a major role in such a broad effort.  International participation was critical in the success of democratization in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and parts of East Asia during the 1980s and 1990s -- it is just as necessary, if not more so, for a favorable outcome in Tunisia.

One caveat must be included with these suggestions -- the assistance relationship cannot be paternalistic. Democracy promotion must be a collaborative effort that responds to the input of the Tunisian reformers and takes into account their desires and the unique set of constraints on their capabilities.

Ultimately, Tunisia's fate is in the hands of the Tunisians.  No amount of foreign assistance can support a democratic transition if the state's leadership and populace are not up to the task.  However, it can greatly improve the prospects of success, and the current fervor for change and support for a democracy in Tunisia are encouraging signs.

Meet the New Boss? Tunisia's Interim Government Scrambles

Almost a week has passed since the abdication of former Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, and an interim government seems to have taken shape.  Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi offered cabinet positions to key members of the legal opposition, who quit the government one day later in protest of the Constitutional Democratic Rally's (RCD) continued presence in the government.  Subsequently, the remaining government has been doing its best to convince the Tunisian populace that it will respect their wishes and address the grievances that led to the past month's revolt.

Though the content of most protests is still little more than general discontent, an opposition agenda is starting to materialize, and the continued protests indicate that the government has little chance of quietly rebuilding the old regime.  Protesters are upset at the continued presence of the RCD in government, and many are calling for it be dissolved altogether.  The interim cabinet has responded to demonstrations by freeing all political prisoners and officially renouncing all of its RCD affiliations.  The RCD central committee has been dissolved and RCD officials were removed from state payrolls.  It is uncertain at this point whether these measures will mollify protestors, or if they will continue to object to the presence of former-RCD figures such as Ghannouchi, interim President Fouad Mebazaa, and Interior Minister Ahmed Friaa.  Still, protests are subsiding overall and a certain degree of normalcy has returned to the streets.

Meanwhile, the international media is replete with speculation on whether or not Tunisia represents an "Arab Gdansk," a "New Arab Spring," or some other catchphrase to signify it as a regional tipping point for widespread liberalization.  I have now read dozens of these speculations, and even wrote some of my own a few days ago.  I am happy to save you, the reader, long hours at your computer screen by boiling all of the current analysis down to this phrase: "Tunisia could be a regional tipping point, and now seems as good a time as any for a change, but it probably is not."

While I am never one to resist beating a dead horse, I think there is little more to say on the subject of Tunisia's regional effects -- at least at the moment.  I do have some thoughts on the domestic situation, however, which I have written below.  I am also preparing a post -- which should be up shortly -- with a few basic policy suggestions for the international community, especially the United States, to take a positive role in Tunisia.

1. The public push to eliminate the RCD is understandable, but problematic.  I sympathize with protesters who are demanding the complete dissolution of the RCD.  The party has existed by different names since the mid-1920s, and since independence in 1956 it has been a symbol of authoritarian rule, corruption, and denial of popular sovereignty.  It is disconcerting to hear former party officials promise change through elections, especially when it was those very men who orchestrated some of the world's most fraudulent elections over the past two decades.  This is, after all, the party that created a mockery of modern liberal democracy, adopting all of its superficial features and none of its actual substance.  The former party officials' promise of a break from the past and new reforms is not all that different from what they used to say.

However, I worry that total elimination of the RCD will not be worth the emotional satisfaction.  While it is not a perfect parallel of the now widely criticized de-Baathification in Iraq after 2003, banishing former RCD officials could have similar negative effects.  The transition from the Ben Ali era to a healthy democracy will be much easier if it is assisted by the remnants of the old regime.  Many of the key officials who remain, including Ghannouchi himself, are technocrats who were responsible for economic reforms and maintaining business and diplomatic relations.  Their experience in managing a government -- and an economy -- and their institutional memory will be needed to maintain order while a fuller transition is implemented.  The opposition lacks political experience and institutional capacity, two necessary ingredients for a smooth transition to democracy.  Some RCD participation, though unpleasant, may be necessary to ensure stability during this period.

2. The opposition is divided, especially over inclusion of the RCD in the interim government.  The main debate among the opposition at present is whether to boycott or cooperate with the interim government.  While the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), one of the most influential opposition parties, has decided to leave the government, Najib Chebbi's Progressive Democratic Party has remained.  Several prominent Islamists, including En-Nahda spokesman Hammadi Jebali, have expressed a willingness to cooperate with the interim government, though as of yet Prime Minister Ghannouchi has not offered them such an opportunity.  The matter is complicated by the return of exiles such as Moncef Marzouki and Rashid Ghannouchi, En-Nahda's founder.

Four cabinet ministers from two legal opposition parties resigned this week in protest of the RCD's ongoing role in the interim government, but no party has proposed a reform program or a comprehensive political platform.  It may be too early still to expect this, but it is very important that opposition parties develop a sophisticated agenda and not rely on being an alternative to the one-party system for political legitimacy.


3. The military has deftly handled the uprising and its aftermath, but its motives may not be completely altruistic.  The army has successfully routed Ben Ali's loyalists and shored up its credibility by arresting the most corrupt members of Leila Ben Ali's family, who were a major source of popular resentment.  The army's refusal to attack and disperse protesters was the final bellwether of Ben Ali's government, and its support for stability and popular sovereignty has enabled the revolt up to this point.  However, the military could still have designs of its own, in particular Gen. Rachid Ammar, who is described by the dissident blog Nawaat as Tunisia's "true strong man."  While Ammar has emerged as a protector of the uprising, he is said to covet political influence, and there are rumors circulating that banners have been erected in parts of the country that proclaim his presidency.

The army is currently the mainstay of stability in Tunisia.  The sooner they are able to withdraw from daily life and a civilian police force returns, the better for Tunisian democracy.  Unfortunately, given the corruption of the police and their longtime loyalty to Ben Ali, it may be while before a credible police force can return to communities.  The army may still be critical to the survival of the uprising.

While it is difficult to predict what will happen next in Tunisia, the interim government will have to move quickly now to reform the constitution and election laws to allow for free, fair, and fully inclusive elections.  It is very important that democratic institutions, including a free press and strong party structures, are developed to foster stability and a healthy political environment.  Such reforms will also demonstrate that the interim government does not intend to retain power indefinitely, and that it is committed to the principles of liberalism and popular sovereignty.  The coming weeks will reveal whether or not this is the case.

Cedar Regression: Lebanon's Backslide

Another step was taken yesterday in the long, slow march toward the final indictments from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.  Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare submitted a sealed draft of the indictment for review by the pre-trial judge Daniel Fransen -- its contents will probably not become public for another six to ten weeks.

The fact that the actual findings of the STL investigation are unknown has not stopped it from causing a major political crisis in Lebanon.  Tensions came to a head last week, when the government collapsed upon the resignation from the cabinet of Hizbullah and its allies.  The walkout came after a failure of negotiations between current Prime Minister (and son of Rafiq) Saad al-Hariri's March 14 coalition and the Hizbullah-led March 8 coalition to resolve disagreements over the implementation of the STL.

Hizbullah has objected to the STL since its creation, casting it as "an Israeli project" and a foreign intrusion into Lebanese internal affairs.  For months, there have been indications that Hizbullah members will be implicated in Hariri's assassination.  In a speech on Sunday (English translation available here), Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah reiterated his contention that the STL is a plot by Western powers and Israel to weaken Hizbullah, raising once again the fictional issue of false witnesses being used to accuse Syria and Hizbullah.*  Nasrallah said that Hizbullah and its allies resigned from Hariri's cabinet over disagreements on Lebanon's participation in and compliance with the STL, and in protest of the government's incompetence and ineffectiveness.

It is now up to President Michel Sleiman and the Lebanese parliament to form a new government.  The new prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim due to the confessional distribution of power under the Lebanese constitution -- the March 8 coalition would obviously prefer a pro-Syria Sunni, while March 14 will almost certainly support Hariri's renomination.  Nasrallah did hint that he may accept a renomination of Hariri at the end of his speech on Sunday when he said "It is possible that the MPs’ consultations might result in naming Hariri again as premier."  

In addition to his typical demagoguery and conspiracy theorizing, Nasrallah's speech gave some clues about how Hizbullah plans to navigate the current political crisis.  While the threat of violence is always just below the surface in Lebanon, Nasrallah seems confident that he can outmaneuver March 14 politically.  This is simultaneously encouraging and discouraging -- it means that Hizbullah is not interested in driving Lebanon into chaos and civil strife, but also that it has enough leverage to derail and completely neuter the STL.  Indictments will be issued, but they will probably not be enforced if political conditions continue as they are now.

Nasrallah devoted a large portion of his speech to framing his party's withdrawal from the Hariri government.  He paints the withdrawal as a political issue, pointing out dissatisfaction with corruption, lack of transparency, and incompetence.  He also attempts to make his objections to the indictment and Hizbullah's withdrawal into separate issues, saying explicitly that negotiations to name a new premier are "independent" from the STL issue.  While this is misleading -- the STL is the principal cause for the current crisis -- it shows that Hizbullah is framing the conflict as a political one, and that they intend to confront their rivals in the political arena.

This approach is the result of extensive and largely successful efforts to coerce Saad Hariri and his supporters into distancing themselves from the STL.  Hizbullah clearly views the investigation as an existential threat -- if Hizbullah were found to be responsible, or even complicit in Rafiq Hariri's assassination it would remove any shred of legitimacy they have as a political party.  Hizbullah has been using the influence it gained after the Doha Agreement of 2008 and the threat of collapsing the government to wrest concessions from Hariri until last week, when they perceived they had enough clout in the parliament to remake the Lebanese government to their advantage.

For the moment, the STL will continue with its work, and it is doubtful Hizbullah will try to stop it.  However, Hizbullah has won the message war on the STL, which is now widely perceived in Lebanon and the Arab world as a corrupt tool designed to undermine the "Resistance."

Under the current circumstances, the process of forming a government -- always laborious and messy in Lebanon -- could last for quite a while.  It took five months to form a government after elections in 2009, and with the situation even more delicate now we are looking at a similar timeline for negotiations.  Druze leader Walid Jumblatt -- who has deftly positioned himself between March 14 and March 8 -- will probably play a pivotal role in the process, and he is an interesting figure to watch going forward.  While violence remains unlikely at the moment, a political victory for Hizbullah would actually be just as damaging to its rivals in Lebanon, and even more so for the United States and the Saudis, who support Saad Hariri and March 14.

Of course, one of the great ironies of this whole ordeal is that while Nasrallah portrays Hariri as an American stooge, the United States has withdrawn any meaningful support of him.  It is the unfortunate fate of tiny Lebanon to be an arena for competition between aspiring regional powers.  Hizbullah draws support -- including its considerable military power -- from Syria and Iran, while Hariri and March 14 rely on Saudi and American backing.  But the United States under President Obama has sought to repair its relations with Syria, and in order to do so has essentially conceded its interests in Lebanon, leaving Hariri to be devoured by the men who probably killed his father.  The Obama Administration has done little but express token support for Hariri, while allowing the Syrians to reenter Lebanese politics for the first time since 2005, when the "Independence Intifada" (known in the West as the Cedar Revolution) forced the Syrian military out of Lebanon and demanded an international investigation into Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination.  Hizbullah and its allies are now poised to erase the legacy of that popular movement for independence and justice, while the United States sits on the sidelines.



*NOTE: The main argument Nasrallah uses to discredit the STL is to accuse it of using false witnesses. Like all good pieces of propaganda, there is a small bit of truth mixed into this falsehood.  Nasrallah is most likely referring to the discredited testimony of Husam Taher Husam and Muhammad Zuhair Siddiq.  Husam and Siddiq both gave depositions to Detlev Mehlis, head investigator of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC), implicating Syrian officials in the Hariri assassination plot.    Husam has since recanted his testimony, and Siddiq was arrested in France upon evidence that he was paid to make false accusations.  Both of these testimonies were given to the IIIC before the STL ever existed, and have been publicly discredited.  Because the draft STL indictment is sealed, nobody knows if evidence from these witnesses -- collected by a different investigator for a different commission -- is cited at all. For a more detailed explanation of the witness scandals and the missteps of the IIIC's investigation, see this piece by Gary C. Gambill.

Domi-No: Tunisia's Regional Significance

Since yesterday morning there have been a few potentially significant events in Tunisia -- first, Speaker of Parliament Foued Mebazaa was sworn in as interim president, as mandated by the Tunisian constitution.  He has asked Prime Minister Ghannouchi to form a "unity" government incorporating the legal opposition parties, which will be announced on Monday according to Reuters.  If Mebazaa continues to follow the constitutional procedures, the next step is to hold a presidential election in no more than 60 days.  Meanwhile, looting and rioting have continued, and the military and security forces have clashed in the streets.

While almost any event may seem significant in the early aftermath of the uprising, I would suggest three general trends to keep an eye on, which may have important implications for the ultimate result of the Tunisian uprising:

1.  Foued Mebazaa and the RCD's commitment to meaningful reform.  Interim President Mebazaa is in a position to guide a democratic transition in Tunisia, but does he want to?  A longtime regime ally and political veteran, Mebazaa is no democratic stalwart, and he and his party may seek a way to retain control and restore their primacy at the expense of democracy.  

2. An emerging conflict between the army and the security services.  Still loyal to Ben Ali, the police and security forces are being blamed for continuing to foment violence in the streets.  They will benefit from disorder because it delays the formation of a cohesive political movement and assures that the most heavily armed faction will retain control.  However, the military has shown already that it will not categorically support the regime or turn its guns on protesters.  In another indication of the rift between army and police, neighborhood posses have formed to protect their communities and cooperate with the military, which is actually fighting Ben Ali loyalists to restore order.  The military could emerge as a protector of reform, which would augur well for the state going forward.

3. The strength of the Tunisian opposition.  Though no figure has emerged to lead a popular movement for change, the Tunisian opposition is moving to secure a meaningful role in the government.  The legal opposition parties are in discussions to form a national unity government, but it is unclear if they have popular support.  One important development to watch is the pending return to Tunisia of the leader of the banned Islamist party An-Nahda, Rachid al-Ghannouchi.  I will write another post soon on the state of the Tunisian opposition and its most important players.

The final result of the uprising in Tunisia is not apparent.  However, it has already begun to have regional repercussions.  Demonstrators in Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan have invoked the Tunisian struggle and Arabs across the Middle East identify with the core grievances of the uprising -- namely political repression, lack of economic opportunity, and abuse of human rights -- which they experience to varying degrees in their own daily lives. (UPDATE: Protesters in Egypt and Algeria have been setting themselves on fire in an echo of Mohamed Bouazizi, the man whose self-immolation sparked the riots in Tunisia.  Here are two reports on the recent wave of self-immolations)

What does all this amount to?  At the moment, nothing substantial.  Though there has been a wave of protests and unrest throughout the Arab world, such phases are relatively common.  While activists express hope that they can follow Tunisia's example, there is no reason (yet) to believe that they actually are doing so.  Within the Arab press, Tunisia has drawn numerous comparisons to the Solidarity Movement of Poland, but analysts are in agreement that Tunisia's uprising will not lead to the regional transformation initiated in Eastern Europe by Solidarity's legalization and subsequent election in 1989.  In short, it is doubtful that the Tunisian revolution will cause a domino effect in the rest of the Arab Middle East.  Historically speaking, revolutions are very rare (even what has happened in Tunisia is not yet a revolution in the historical sense), and it is difficult to imagine one spreading across the Arab world as it is today.

Still, the fall of Ben Ali has been significant insofar as it shows just how flimsy state power can be.  While in the past popular uprisings were contained with brute force and massacre, as in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s, the new media environment in the Middle East makes it much harder for regimes to get away with such cruelty and abuse of human rights.  The democratic bargain that has prevailed in the Middle East in the past generation -- in which citizens exchange their political and civil liberties for social services and stability -- is wearing thin almost everywhere.  Now, for the first time, we have seen that popular dissent and protest can overthrow even the most deeply entrenched of Arab autocrats, and political activists throughout the Arab world should be emboldened by Ben Ali's ouster.  Conversely, autocratic regimes should be alarmed at just how quickly they could lose control over their populace.

How regimes react to this newly perceived vulnerability will be critical to the prospects of democratization in the region.  There are three basic options for an autocratic government dealing with echoes of unrest from Tunisia: first, a crackdown on regime opposition and closure of political space; second, a series of token reforms designed to secure political quietism while not actually conceding any power; and third, a program of genuine reform to rebuild the broken social contracts and dysfunctional economies that plague Arab societies.  The most likely scenario at the moment is the second, in which governments seek to "muddle through."  In fact this is already occurring -- Libya, Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria have all announced plans to reduce food prices in the past several days, a common method to appease popular discontent.

But before we start thinking too far into the future, the battle for Tunisia's democracy is far from over.  What remains of the ruling cadre will probably not decide to fade away quietly -- they will resist liberalization and seek to preserve their hold on power and reconsolidate in Ben Ali's absence.  The United States and other Western powers have an excellent opportunity now to help hold off a retrenchment and keep pressure on the regime to commit to true reform.  However, without significant international attention it is doubtful Tunisia will become a democratic success story.

Similarly, Tunisia has created a unique opportunity for the United States to advocate democratic reform throughout the Middle East.  Speaking at the Forum for the Future last week in Doha, Hillary Clinton warned that Arab states must offer a "positive vision" to their people in order to combat extremism and social unrest (she also apparently couldn't resist a desert metaphor, noting that the region's foundations are "sinking into the sand").  Now is the time for the United States to convince its autocratic allies that reform is necessary and the status quo is no longer tolerable.  Strong, sustained support of democratic institutions in Tunisia is currently the most logical start to a program to foster democratization in the region.  The international community should do its part to ensure that free and fair elections are conducted and that their results are respected.  American apathy to the oppression of Tunisians for the past half century must not prevent policymakers from taking notice now, and taking effective steps to promote a peaceful and democratic transition.

"Ben à Vie" No More -- Tunisia's Remarkable Uprising

One of the common themes of Middle East politics is that Arab autocracies survive.  Nobody in Las Vegas is taking bets on when these regimes will fall, and for good reason – the only sensible bet is that they won’t ever.

Or so we are told.  This week analysts, dissidents, and casual observers alike watched in shock as social unrest in Tunisia catalyzed the downfall of 23-year President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who fled the country in a move that has already drawn comparisons to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.  Suddenly, in a matter of days, one of the most tightly controlled and apparently intractable Arab regimes fell under popular pressure.  Perhaps even more surprising to some analysts, the protests have been almost entirely non-violent – even though security forces have attacked crowds with live ammunition and killed dozens – and there has been no strong Islamist presence, at least none discernible from the outside.  Tunisia was considered one of the most repressive regimes in the Middle East, which placed it high in the running for most repressive in the world.  Ben Ali’s micro-managing authoritarianism crushed the media and the Internet, controlled the economy with notorious levels of corruption, and stifled any form of true political opposition.  Six months ago it seemed to be one of the most stable and immovable of all the Arab autocracies.

Yet the whole thing crumbled with such remarkable speed that governments throughout the region must be watching these events with alarm.  Tunisia was often seen in the West as a model for North Africa – its economy was relatively successful (though this is often exaggerated, and the recent riots finally proved that many parts of the country are alarmingly poor) and it maintained cordial, uncontroversial relations with the Western powers.  Perhaps the ultimate problem is that Ben Ali was too heavy-handed in repressing opposition.  There has been no revolution in Algeria, where riots also broke out last month, because in fact riots are quite common there and they are usually tolerated.  The Egyptian regime has managed to keep opposition weak by allowing a modicum of dissent and limited participation, while continuing to manipulate all the levers of power.  Even after shamelessly corrupt elections this fall, Egyptians have been content to voice their discontent, and there has been no Jasmine Revolution (one of the names I’ve been hearing for the Tunisian uprising) there. 

It is difficult to predict what will happen next in Tunisia.  Things are happening very quickly right now, and there are mixed messages coming from the military and what remains of Ben Ali’s government (most recently, it seems the Speaker of Parliament has taken over the interim presidency, in accordance with the Tunisian constitution).  Protests are now turning into out-and-out chaos, with looting and violence reported across the country.  The lack of legitimate political opposition means there is no clear leader for the protesters, and it is unclear if the army will side with them or with the ruling party, the RCD (Constitutional Democratic Rally).  I will withhold my own predictions for now, but it is safe to say that this is far from over, and it will be very interesting to see how the situation develops now that Ben Ali is gone.

There are a lot of very knowledgeable people commenting on this, most of them more versed in Tunisian affairs than I am.  I have listed a couple of links below for some insightful commentary and reporting on the situation – anyone interested in Middle East affairs will want to check them out. 

In the past few days, more has been written on Tunisia in the mainstream media and blogs than in the past few years, so there is not really much more for me to say.  The one thing I would add to the larger discussion is that, though everyone is shocked at the Tunisian revolution (and it does feel great to say that), we should expect social unrest in the Arab world to continue.  Citizens of the Arab states are currently dealing with several decades of woefully incompetent government that cannot provide basic services and freedoms to the people and has little interest in doing so.  Entrenched autocracies seek to perfect the one thing they were ever good at – holding onto power – while their populations clamor for change.  The latest stirrings of discontent in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia have now led to the apparent downfall of one of these regimes.  And while it is probably still smart to bet on regime survival, over time that bet becomes increasingly risky.  Without democratic reforms and greater economic opportunities, more unrest, not less, is to be expected.  Arab autocracies are very good at maintaining control, and their methods of doing so have become ever more sophisticated.  Yet, ultimately, they are bucking the odds.  A stew of discontent and desperation is ready to boil over throughout the region.  In the absence of meaningful reform, upheavals such as that in Tunisia may become the rule, not the exception.

For some more reading on Tunisia and the region:

The Arabist blog

FP Middle East Channel

The Moor Next Door

Nawaat de Tunisie