Longview -- Tunisia's Democratic Challenge and the International Community

In several previous posts I have mentioned that the international community has an important role to play if Tunisia's revolt is to become a democratic revolution.  What is the best way for foreign governments and organizations to support democracy in Tunisia?  I propose that given current political circumstances and the somewhat lacking resources of the Tunisian political community, Tunisia is a prime candidate for large-scale civil society promotion.

Usually I am skeptical of any civil society programs.  This is not due to intrinsic problems with civil society, but instead because it is often used in the Middle East as an inadequate substitute for comprehensive democracy promotion.  In almost every case in the Middle East, incumbent governments are the true impediment to democratization, and civil society programs tend to work at the margins of the state, where their impact is too small and piecemeal to have meaningful effects.  Moreover, they are usually designed with the approval of the state, which will only allow programs that do not threaten its power with any significant prospect of change or liberalization.  Thus, civil society promotion is often little more than a token gesture that will not effect the true balance of power in an autocratic regime.

Tunisia is an exceptional case, because these limitations -- an overbearing state that stifles true political progress and actively seeks to marginalize and co-opt civil society -- are no longer present (and I hope I never get bored of saying that).  The current political system is wide open, and as a result of Ben Ali's heavy repression there is no institutional capacity for political participation.  There are also almost no credible civil society institutions or political opposition.  Civil society promotion can help address these problems by creating an arena for development and expression of political platforms, an infrastructure for monitoring and oversight of government practices, and a network for community participation and protection of civil liberties.

Given the complete repression of any democratic institutions under Ben Ali, Tunisia's interim government faces what may well be an impossible list of tasks, which include:

1. Overhaul or replace an illiberal constitution that enshrines an authoritarian system and leaves no opportunity for democratic participation
2. Reform the laws governing civil rights and freedom of the press
3. Reform election laws to ensure fair and inclusive elections
4. Rebuild the police force and the security services to remove Ben Ali loyalists and eliminate routine police brutality and abuse of human rights
5. Dismantle the instruments of corruption and the patronage networks used by the Ben Ali family to control prosperity and bestow political favor on allies
6. Develop a framework for peaceful transfer of power according to democratic practice
7. Build the capacity of political parties and include all credible factions in the reform process
8. Restore order and maintain stability to reassure foreign investors and revitalize the tourism sector
9. Earn the trust of a population that is suspicious of former-RCD officials and demands a purge of all RCD elements from the government
10. Meet all of the above challenges with a legion of inexperienced activists and opposition politicians, most of whom are far more familiar with a prison cell than the responsibilities of political leadership and governance

In the end, the Tunisians probably do not have the expertise and institutional capacity to solve these problems.  Even a collaborative effort that makes use of all available resources (including the experience of RCD officials who are willing to preside over a transition to democracy) will probably fall short of what is necessary without significant outside help.  Essentially, democracy in Tunisia -- and perhaps anywhere -- cannot develop in isolation.  The international community, including the United States, the European Union (especially France), and prominent international NGOs can play a decisive role in channeling Tunisia's popular uprising into a democratic revolution.  These governments and organizations can offer technical expertise and financial support to help build an effective civil society and to provide an incentive for the interim government to stay committed to reform.

A successful assistance campaign should include the following initiatives: training for political parties, technical advice on legal and constitutional reform, capacity building of local NGOs and community groups, financial aid to provide insurance for foreign direct investment while the Ben Ali family's assets are seized, election monitoring and training of domestic election monitors, and retraining programs for the police forces.  Foreign governments and NGOs would both need to play a major role in such a broad effort.  International participation was critical in the success of democratization in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and parts of East Asia during the 1980s and 1990s -- it is just as necessary, if not more so, for a favorable outcome in Tunisia.

One caveat must be included with these suggestions -- the assistance relationship cannot be paternalistic. Democracy promotion must be a collaborative effort that responds to the input of the Tunisian reformers and takes into account their desires and the unique set of constraints on their capabilities.

Ultimately, Tunisia's fate is in the hands of the Tunisians.  No amount of foreign assistance can support a democratic transition if the state's leadership and populace are not up to the task.  However, it can greatly improve the prospects of success, and the current fervor for change and support for a democracy in Tunisia are encouraging signs.