Almost a week has passed since the abdication of former Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, and an interim government seems to have taken shape. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi offered cabinet positions to key members of the legal opposition, who quit the government one day later in protest of the Constitutional Democratic Rally's (RCD) continued presence in the government. Subsequently, the remaining government has been doing its best to convince the Tunisian populace that it will respect their wishes and address the grievances that led to the past month's revolt.
Though the content of most protests is still little more than general discontent, an opposition agenda is starting to materialize, and the continued protests indicate that the government has little chance of quietly rebuilding the old regime. Protesters are upset at the continued presence of the RCD in government, and many are calling for it be dissolved altogether. The interim cabinet has responded to demonstrations by freeing all political prisoners and officially renouncing all of its RCD affiliations. The RCD central committee has been dissolved and RCD officials were removed from state payrolls. It is uncertain at this point whether these measures will mollify protestors, or if they will continue to object to the presence of former-RCD figures such as Ghannouchi, interim President Fouad Mebazaa, and Interior Minister Ahmed Friaa. Still, protests are subsiding overall and a certain degree of normalcy has returned to the streets.
Meanwhile, the international media is replete with speculation on whether or not Tunisia represents an "Arab Gdansk," a "New Arab Spring," or some other catchphrase to signify it as a regional tipping point for widespread liberalization. I have now read dozens of these speculations, and even wrote some of my own a few days ago. I am happy to save you, the reader, long hours at your computer screen by boiling all of the current analysis down to this phrase: "Tunisia could be a regional tipping point, and now seems as good a time as any for a change, but it probably is not."
While I am never one to resist beating a dead horse, I think there is little more to say on the subject of Tunisia's regional effects -- at least at the moment. I do have some thoughts on the domestic situation, however, which I have written below. I am also preparing a post -- which should be up shortly -- with a few basic policy suggestions for the international community, especially the United States, to take a positive role in Tunisia.
1. The public push to eliminate the RCD is understandable, but problematic. I sympathize with protesters who are demanding the complete dissolution of the RCD. The party has existed by different names since the mid-1920s, and since independence in 1956 it has been a symbol of authoritarian rule, corruption, and denial of popular sovereignty. It is disconcerting to hear former party officials promise change through elections, especially when it was those very men who orchestrated some of the world's most fraudulent elections over the past two decades. This is, after all, the party that created a mockery of modern liberal democracy, adopting all of its superficial features and none of its actual substance. The former party officials' promise of a break from the past and new reforms is not all that different from what they used to say.
However, I worry that total elimination of the RCD will not be worth the emotional satisfaction. While it is not a perfect parallel of the now widely criticized de-Baathification in Iraq after 2003, banishing former RCD officials could have similar negative effects. The transition from the Ben Ali era to a healthy democracy will be much easier if it is assisted by the remnants of the old regime. Many of the key officials who remain, including Ghannouchi himself, are technocrats who were responsible for economic reforms and maintaining business and diplomatic relations. Their experience in managing a government -- and an economy -- and their institutional memory will be needed to maintain order while a fuller transition is implemented. The opposition lacks political experience and institutional capacity, two necessary ingredients for a smooth transition to democracy. Some RCD participation, though unpleasant, may be necessary to ensure stability during this period.
2. The opposition is divided, especially over inclusion of the RCD in the interim government. The main debate among the opposition at present is whether to boycott or cooperate with the interim government. While the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), one of the most influential opposition parties, has decided to leave the government, Najib Chebbi's Progressive Democratic Party has remained. Several prominent Islamists, including En-Nahda spokesman Hammadi Jebali, have expressed a willingness to cooperate with the interim government, though as of yet Prime Minister Ghannouchi has not offered them such an opportunity. The matter is complicated by the return of exiles such as Moncef Marzouki and Rashid Ghannouchi, En-Nahda's founder.
Four cabinet ministers from two legal opposition parties resigned this week in protest of the RCD's ongoing role in the interim government, but no party has proposed a reform program or a comprehensive political platform. It may be too early still to expect this, but it is very important that opposition parties develop a sophisticated agenda and not rely on being an alternative to the one-party system for political legitimacy.
3. The military has deftly handled the uprising and its aftermath, but its motives may not be completely altruistic. The army has successfully routed Ben Ali's loyalists and shored up its credibility by arresting the most corrupt members of Leila Ben Ali's family, who were a major source of popular resentment. The army's refusal to attack and disperse protesters was the final bellwether of Ben Ali's government, and its support for stability and popular sovereignty has enabled the revolt up to this point. However, the military could still have designs of its own, in particular Gen. Rachid Ammar, who is described by the dissident blog Nawaat as Tunisia's "true strong man." While Ammar has emerged as a protector of the uprising, he is said to covet political influence, and there are rumors circulating that banners have been erected in parts of the country that proclaim his presidency.
The army is currently the mainstay of stability in Tunisia. The sooner they are able to withdraw from daily life and a civilian police force returns, the better for Tunisian democracy. Unfortunately, given the corruption of the police and their longtime loyalty to Ben Ali, it may be while before a credible police force can return to communities. The army may still be critical to the survival of the uprising.
While it is difficult to predict what will happen next in Tunisia, the interim government will have to move quickly now to reform the constitution and election laws to allow for free, fair, and fully inclusive elections. It is very important that democratic institutions, including a free press and strong party structures, are developed to foster stability and a healthy political environment. Such reforms will also demonstrate that the interim government does not intend to retain power indefinitely, and that it is committed to the principles of liberalism and popular sovereignty. The coming weeks will reveal whether or not this is the case.
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