Some Reading, and a Read-out on Egypt's Second Day of Anger

This will have to be a brief post because I am short on time.  First, some reading recommendations -- here are a couple excellent pieces on the Arab uprisings as a regional phenomenon:


Larry Diamond in Foreign Affairs: "A Fourth Wave or False Start?  Democracy After the Arab Spring"

Michael Hudson for Jadaliyya: "Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reflections on the Current Wave of Protest in the Arab World"

Also worth checking out are Joseph Stiglitz's piece on Tunisia in the Financial Times, this article in Bloomberg News from Vali Nasr on the Saudi campaign to quash political reform throughout the Arab world, and this anonymous article on the Syrian media from the Daily Beast. 

One major news story to watch tomorrow and into the weekend is a new protest in Midan Tahrir in Egypt planned for this Friday.  This protest, which is intended to voice dissatisfaction with the current transition process and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), is a sign of the military's loss of favor with the Egyptian public.  During the January and February uprising, the military enjoyed a high level of public support.  This illusion was bound to fade as the transition period got under way, because the military in fact has no interest in democratization and has its own agenda for reform which does not match well with the general needs of most Egyptians.  The past few weeks have served to reveal the gap between what the military wants and what Egyptians want.  It is no accident that this Friday is being referred to as the "Friday to Save the Revolution" -- the SCAF's incompetent management and unwillingness to enact a transparent, democratic reform process is the greatest threat to the ideals of the Egyptian revolution, and activists seem to be running out of patience.

I am encouraged by these protests insofar as I believe the only way the SCAF will liberalize Egypt is under enormous popular pressure.  Protests such as these will be crucial to convince the military leadership that they need to make a more sincere commitment to meaningful political reform.  At the same time, I worry that demonstrations may not be enough in the end.  When Hosni Mubarak was still in power, activist groups were unified around one cause.   Since Mubarak stepped down on February 11, some divisions have emerged, and the military has quietly undermined the protest movements by allowing sectarian violence and rounding up political dissidents.  The repression is not really so quiet anymore -- on Thursday the army arrested four activists who had called for a Friday protest.  I think time is ultimately on the side of the protestors, but in the short term one must wonder if they will be able to sustain the necessary level of pressure to get real results from the SCAF.

One of the more interesting subplots in these protests is the role the Muslim Brotherhood and lesser Islamist groups are playing.  The Brotherhood's commitment to democracy has been a subject of debate for years; one camp of analysts has maintained that at bottom they are anti-democratic, while another camp argues that they are willing to share power and participate in democratic governments.  I have always fallen in the latter camp, but this week the Brotherhood has weakened my position by announcing its opposition to the Friday protests, siding clearly with the military.  Salafi groups, never considered pro-democratic by anyone, have also come down against the protests.

At the moment the MB does not seem concerned with the fate of Egyptian democracy, but with their own political fortunes.  The current transition is an unprecedented opportunity for the Brotherhood to gain power in an Egyptian government, and they seem more concerned with power than with true political reform.  They were slow to jump on the January 25 revolution bandwagon, and it seems they are still reluctant to do anything that might hurt the chances of increasing their relative control of Egyptian politics.  While this seems like it could change, it is still a discouraging sign.

Small Talk -- Obama Stays the Course

President Obama's speech (text here) on May 19 was billed as the announcement of a bold new strategy; when she introduced the President, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton extolled an "innovative" new approach that would change American foreign policy in the region.  What the President delivered was more a reaffirmation of past American policy, with a subtle shift in emphasis.  Of course, it was also exemplary of Obama's unique talent to deliver an even-handed, considered speech that balances multiple contradictory interests, and somehow leaves everyone pissed off and disappointed.

The speech was not well received anywhere in the Middle East.  In Israel President Obama's totally unremarkable (more on this later) reference to the 1967 borders as a basis of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations was described by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu as "indefensible." Palestinians were not pleased with Obama's speech either;  Fatah leader and occasional negotiator Nabil Shaath remarked that it contained "little hope" for Palestinians.  In the rest of the Middle East, reactions were subdued.  Aside from the fact that they have more pressing matters to worry about in Damascus, Cairo, and elsewhere, the President just did not say much in the way of bold and new.

Unlike many other observers, I was not disappointed by President Obama's speech.  Perhaps that is because I had somewhat low expectations, but I think in general it was neither a triumph nor an aberration.  The President said what needed to be said and nothing more.  In its present position the United States is forced to promulgate a cautious and inherently contradictory policy.  President Obama has shown no desire to transcend these contradictions or to take any unnecessary risks in his approach to the Middle East, and so it was unrealistic to believe his speech would announce anything unconventional.  Perhaps it is a matter of perspective, too; as someone who believes that the rules of international politics have not changed much over centuries, I tend to view anything heralded as a major shift in foreign policy to be more comical than momentous.

Of course, the portion of the President's speech that has received the most attention was his reference to the Israeli borders of 1967 as the basis for a peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  This is apparently the first time an American president has explicitly referred to the pre-1967 borders, but it is hardly a new idea (in fact, it is 44 years old).  Furthermore, the United States has implicitly agreed to use the pre-1967 borders as the basis for peace by supporting and upholding UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, and UNSCR 338, adopted in October 1973, not to mention every single Israel-Palestine peace plan endorsed by the United States ever.  The hubbub around this is based on hype, not facts.

Ultimately, however, Israel-Palestine was a relatively minor topic of the speech, and one of less interest to the Middle East as a whole.  The consequential news for the past five months has been coming from elsewhere in the region, and the Arab uprisings were appropriately the focus of President Obama's speech.  While it did not announce any major shift in American policy, the President's speech did acknowledge that a course correction is necessary.  President Obama came into office with the intention of "resetting" American relations with the Muslim world.  This reset should have meant a new focus on eliminating the pathologies perpetuated by American foreign policy over the past generation -- a redefinition of how the United States would relate to the states of the Middle East, and an acknowledgment of the harm it has done both to its interests and to Arab societies by aiding and abetting the predatory and abusive rule of autocrats and despots without regard for the welfare of their people.  Instead, it was a reaffirmation of such alliances, as political reform was thrown off the table in bilateral relations with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other American allies.  The Obama administration was virtually allergic to democracy promotion in the region, until it became impossible to ignore this past winter.

The President admitted as much in his speech, though whether he means what he said is yet to be seen.  Indeed, his words indicate that he realizes that the United States has been a part of the problem in Middle Eastern politics, but can still be a part of the solution.  Furthermore, the speech indicated that he understands that the necessary shift in American policy is one of method, not of philosophy.  Not only did he say that the United States will continue to pursue its interests, he correctly stated that American interests include meaningful political and economic reform in the Middle East.

In the short term, these remarks simply mean that the United States will continue its reactive, ad-hoc policy toward the Arab uprisings.  This is not such a bad thing in itself -- it certainly could be bad, if the Obama administration uses poor judgment in its reaction to events in the region (I would argue that in fact this has been happening in at least Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, but not to the extent that some Obama detractors would have you believe).  While I would like things to be simpler and more clear cut, considering the inherent difficulties of protecting all American interests in the region at this time, ad-hoc reactions may be the best one can hope for.

In the end, the President's speech was typical of his leadership style.  He remains cautious and risk-averse, interested in balancing between what he sees as conflicting goals in American policy.  He willfully rejected the cause of political reform in the Middle East before, but now cannot avoid it.  The events of the past months will not drastically alter his former approach the way the September 11, 2001 attacks did for George W. Bush.  In the end, the President gave no indication that he intends to move beyond business as usual in the Middle East.  It is a shame, but it seems that the Arab uprisings are being viewed in the American policy establishment as an obstacle rather than an opportunity.  Still, it is clear as well that circumstances are forcing a change in perspective; one can only hope that this change will come quickly enough for the United States to have a more positive impact.

Ex-speech-tations

Tomorrow (Thursday, May 19) Barack Obama will deliver an address to the American people and the international community on events in the Arab world and American policy in the Middle East.  The speech is expected to touch on a wide range of issues, from the killing of Osama bin Laden to the democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, to the Israel-Palestine conflict.  President Obama is expected to unveil a plan for economic aid to support democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, and some are hoping he will articulate a clear strategy for the American approach to a changing Middle East.  In terms of specific policy, expectations are that the President will outline in some way a regional strategy for response to the democratic wave in the Arab world.  It is believed he will indicate the United States' position on the reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and its effect on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

I do not know what the President will say tomorrow, but personally I am prepared for disappointment.  It will be a surprise to me if he actually goes into specific details on any of the current issues at play in the region, and even more if he announces a new strategic approach.  Still, it will be enlightening in other ways.  I will provide a full reaction to the speech after it is delivered, but for now, I will simply share what I would wish to hear from President Obama.  I understand that he cannot say many of the things I list below in a public speech, but I will be looking for indications that he or his administration understand them, and that they are employing a prudent and considered strategy to navigate the current challenges they face.

• The United States' relationships with Middle Eastern states is based on vital strategic interests.  For years these interests have been pursued with little regard for the health of Arab societies or the long-term sustainability of American-allied Arab regimes.  While this was often adequate to serve American interests, it has cased enormous systemic problems in the Arab world which can only be resolved by political and economic reform.  The uprisings of 2011 mark a historic milestone in the struggle of Arab peoples for liberty, dignity, and popular sovereignty.
• The United States can no longer ignore domestic politics in the Middle East.  The needs and aspirations of Arab peoples are legitimate and must be represented by their leaders.  The stability of the Arab world is paramount to American interests in the region, and the only basis for true stability over generations is effective, accountable governance.  
• In continuing to protect its interests and deepen relationships with its allies, the United States will stand unequivocally for the inalienable rights and dignity of the Arab people, and furthermore for all people across the globe.
• The overthrow of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt is a historic opportunity to create flourishing democracies in the Arab world.  The United States will contribute to this effort with economic and technical assistance as necessary to ensure the success of the transitions currently underway.  This support is offered not to impose an American solution, but to allow the Tunisians and Egyptians the necessary means to fulfill the goals of their revolution.  No state can will itself to democracy; American assistance will ensure that the Tunisians and Egyptians do not need to.
• Regarding the United States' autocratic allies, American policy will seek opportunities for reform and will encourage governments to respond to the legitimate demands of their people.  In the past there has been too little pressure and too much complacency toward despotic rulers.  It is not the place of the United States to forcibly remove these rulers, but what leverage exists to promote reform will be fully utilized.  The United States will also support democratic activists and protect them as best it can from repression.
• The United States' response will be on a country by country basis and will often seem hypocritical.  However, in this time it is crucial to understand the unique circumstances of reform movements and individual governments' willingness to change.  Rather than operate on vague region-wide assumptions, policy will be determined by intimate knowledge of the country in question and the potential for American influence there.
• The United States cannot expect stability by allying itself with coercive and corrupt governments, and neither can Israel expect peace through coercion and subjugation of the Palestinian people.  It is a great wish of Americans and people throughout the world to see peace in Israel-Palestine, but it is clearly not the wish of important power brokers on both sides.  While the United States will do whatever it can to facilitate negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, peace will not be possible until both sides are ready to make the necessary concessions.  The parameters of a two state solution are nearly unchanged since the 1970s; the major obstacle to peace is not lack of a reasonable solution, but the will of the parties involved to make political sacrifices.
• The United States, like all nations, designs its policy first and foremost to serve the interests of its people.  This is as true today in the Middle East as it is for any other region of the world at any other time in American history.  Today these interests are shared with the vast majority of Arab people: liberalization and protection of fundamental rights, political and social stability, economic progress, resistance to violent extremism, and peace in Israel and Palestine.  The United States will seek to cooperate with people throughout the Arab world to achieve these common goals.

Backsliding in Tunisia and Egypt?

The Arab world is well into the "stall" phase now in its democratic awakening; the resurgence of autocrats and escalation of violence has turned the tide against peaceful protests and popular resistance.  Reform movements have been stalled for over a month now in Libya -- which remains in civil war -- and Bahrain, which is steadily building an apartheid state while the United States looks the other way.  Violence continues in Syria, and while unrest in Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco continues to simmer, none of these states appears close to a revolutionary tipping point.

Meanwhile the monarchies of the Arab world are beginning to advance a response to the democratic wave.  On May 10 the Gulf Cooperation Council announced it had accepted membership bids from Jordan and Morocco.  If these two kingdoms do join the GCC it would effectively turn the organization into an alliance of all the Arab monarchies, positioned firmly against further reform in the Middle East.  Since this grouping of states would no longer be ostensibly related to geographic location, the name "Gulf Cooperation Council" should probably be scrapped.  Feel free to leave your suggestions for new names in the comment section below.  For my part, I think "League of Evil" has a nice ring to it; or alternatively the C.O.U.R.T ("Council of Unjustifiably Rich Tyrants") or perhaps the G.R.O.S.S ("Geriatric Royals Oppressing Sorry Subjects").

Even Tunisia and Egypt, where uprisings have been most successful, appear to be entering a period of regression as disorder sets in and stark social divisions emerge.  In Egypt sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims has become a serious issue, exacerbated by police absenteeism and general disorder.  Amidst the unrest, suddenly resurgent salafis have become a source of sectarian discord, blamed as the instigators in violence throughout Egypt, including an attack on churches in the impoverished Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba in which 15 people were killed.

The sudden appearance of the salafis has raised all kinds of suspicions; they have been connected alternately to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia, the military, and National Democratic Party loyalists.  None of these conspiracy theories is totally impossible (the Muslim Brotherhood scenario seems a little more far-fetched to me than the others) -- the difficulty with the situation is that there are any number of plausible explanations, and it is ultimately doubtful that the sectarian tensions are entirely the result of pre-meditated provocation.  Counter-revolution or not, Egypt really does have a sectarian problem, which is exacerbated by groups who have an interest in sowing disorder, a lack of police presence, and fears of further instability.  While the killing is lamentable in its own right, it is perhaps worse as a threat to the nascent democratic transition in Egypt.  Not only does sectarian violence serve as a distraction, it plays into the hands of illiberal forces who do not want to see a democratic Egypt.  In the midst of such strife, the vast majority of people are not likely to mount the necessary pressure on the military for democratic reform.  Most will probably be content to just let the powers that be have their way so long as order is restored.

The transition in Tunisia has also become a precarious situation.  The public has never had much trust in the interim National Unity Government (NUG), and political differences have started to become more divisive as factions compete for influence.  Tensions reached a critical point last week when a hidden-camera interview of former Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi was posted to Facebook (you can watch it here on YouTube or here) in which he said that the military is planning a coup if Islamists win elections, the same scenario that led to a decade of civil war in Algeria.  The accusation, in an atmosphere of high suspicion of a government that is perceived to be dragging its feet on reform, caused protests to break out across the country.  The police did not help matters by using heavy-handed tactics to disperse crowds, imposing a curfew in greater Tunis and arresting over 200 dissidents.  The incident exposed the thin veneer of legitimacy with which the NUG is operating, and the enormous level of anxiety among many Tunisians who are disappointed with the slow pace of change and fearful of co-optation by counterrevolutionary forces.

Tunisia may have far worse problems than Facebook videos.  Squabbling among the NUG and its various commissions in charge of engineering a democratic transition has hindered progress and may have long-term political consequences.  After lengthy debate, on April 27 the verbosely-named  Higher Commission for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition finally agreed to ban former RCD officials from running for public office for 10 years instead of 23, a bone of contention with the NUG that stalled drafting of more immediately important reforms for several weeks.  The Independent Election Committee, a body charged with organizing and conducting the July 24 elections, is still understaffed and far behind schedule.  In fact, it is a distinct possibility that elections will need to be postponed, an eventuality that could be politically disastrous.  Postponement of elections could confirm the suspicions of many that the NUG has no intention of supporting Tunisian democracy, and is attempting to leave the door open for the former ruling party, the RCD, to return (even though a postponement may actually have the opposite effect).  It would also rankle Islamists, especially Tunisia's largest and oldest Islamist party El-Nahdha, which is well organized and poised to do quite well in elections.  This is problematic because one of the most contentious divisions in Tunisia today is between secularists and Islamists.  The population is split almost evenly between the two sides, and many secularists have become quite fearful of an Islamist takeover.  The balance of power between secular and Islamic parties will be a critical aspect of Tunisian politics going forward, and postponement of elections is a potential flashpoint for tension.  As a matter of process a postponement may raise the chances of holding a successful, free, and fair election, but it will be viewed by at least a few as a setback, and it creates its own set of difficulties which will not be easily resolved.

So do these events signal the beginning of an authoritarian comeback in Egypt and Tunisia?  In my opinion, they certainly could, and there may be cause for alarm if stability continues to deteriorate.  However, these tensions may also be natural growing pains.  The former regimes in both countries actively maintained the sectarian and political rifts that now threaten their transition from authoritarianism.  In short, there was really no way something like these events was not going to happen.  The degree to which they threaten democratization is not entirely clear, but there is plenty of evidence of progress toward that goal too.  Salafis in Egypt have not won many friends from their provocations, and there are precious few calls for a return to the old police state.  In fact, the pro-democracy movement has been a triumph of Christian-Muslim solidarity, and the scenes from Tahrir of Christians protecting Muslims from thugs during their prayers (and vice versa) are some of the most memorable from the January uprising.

The apparent trajectory in Tunisia, in spite of recent upheavals and the likelihood of  a delay in the transition, is actually quite good.  While tourism has been devastated, the manufacturing sector in Tunisia is exceeding expectations and has actually grown relative to last year, a sign that the Tunisian economy remains resilient.  Even though political progress has not met expectations, the NUG and its reform commissions have made some notable achievements including the abolition of the political police and security apparatus, the dissolution of the RCD, the removal of regime loyalists from government and security positions, the end of large-scale media censorship, and the legalization of over 60 political parties.  Even preparations for the elections have started to look better, with the selection this week of all but three members of the Independent Election Commission (referred to in the link as the Independent High Authority for Elections).

The biggest lesson of the difficulties in Egypt and Tunisia is that the reform process is exceptionally fragile.  In the end, there is a vast array of possible outcomes for each country, and liberal democracy is only one of them.  The other alternatives are not nearly as desirable for the welfare of the Tunisian and Egyptian people, or for the interests of the United States.  There is a great deal of danger ahead, and in spite of admirable progress the task of a successful democratic transition in either country is still quite daunting.  That said, only a few months ago the idea of true liberalization in any part of the Arab world seemed laughable.  The uprisings in Tunisia and then in Egypt have changed the dynamic of the Middle East, and the determination and courage of the the Tunisian and Egyptian people is, at the very least, a cause for hope.

The SECOND Jawaala News Quiz!!!

I have given you all plenty of time to study and set yourselves right after all your disappointing performances on the last quiz.  But it's time now to re-assess your Middle East news knowledge, and for me to lower my expectations.  Without further ado, I present to you the new Jawaala news quiz, now with 20% more Donald Trump (answers below):

1. Which of the following has NOT been blamed by Bashar al-Assad for fomenting unrest in Syria?

a. A plot by foreign powers to cause civil war

b. Saboteurs pushing an Israeli agenda

c. Satellite television channels

d. American vigilantes

e. The Muslim Brotherhood

2. Kuwaiti protestors presented parliamentarians with watermelons in March as a symbol of what?

a. Liberty

b. Disenfranchised farm communities

c. Reconciliation and forgiveness

d. Chaos and discontent

e. Corruption

3. In an interview with CNN’s Candy Crowley on April 17, Donald Trump said which of the following about NATO operations in Libya?

a. “We need one thing. Brain power.”

b. “In the old days when you have a war and you win, that nation is yours.  Either I go in and take the oil or I don't go in at all."

c. “I saw a report yesterday. There's so much oil, all over the world, they don't know where to dump it.”

d. “Look. I’m going to look ‘em in the eye and say, ‘Fellas, you’ve had your fun.  Your fun is over.’”

e. “At this moment in time there is a Muslim problem in the world.”

4. How many protestors have been killed in Syria since Hillary Clinton called Bashar al-Assad a “reformer” on March 27?

a.  200

b. 300

c. 400

d. 500

e. 600

5. In her profile in Vogue Magazine, Asma al-Assad said it was important that Syria does not lose which of the following:

a. Its culture

b. Its Arab identity

c. Its spirit of openness

d. Its liberal values

e. Its cuisine

6. On May 3, American vigilante Gary Faulkner demanded a portion of the $25 million reward for information leading to Osama bin Laden’s capture because:

a. “I scared the squirrel out of his hole, he popped his head up and he got capped”

b. “All it takes is one good man”

c. “I wanted to bring him to justice. I'm not greedy, but I sold everything I had and I put my life on the line”

d. “I'm worried that in Pakistan, they won't give him his dialysis. And if he doesn't get it, he's in serious trouble”

7. Pakistani computer programmer Sohaib Athar became famous overnight when he:

a. Was revealed as the author of the Stuxnet worm

b. Leaked the full email archives of nuclear engineer and traitor A.Q. Khan

c. Inadvertently live-Tweeted the Navy SEALS raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound

d. Was arrested for plotting Lashkar-e-Taiba’s 2008 attack on Mumbai

e. Patented a cheese-seeking robot

8. Match the Donald Trump quotation to the nation he is discussing:

                                                                                   

i. Libya                                                                        a. “Why aren't they paying us?  When they said that you should have said, we'll go in… We want $5 billion right now and we'll go in. You know what? That's peanuts to them. They'd give you a check in two seconds."

ii. China

                                                                                    b. “It’s so easy.  It’s all about the messenger.  They wouldn’t even be there if it wasn’t for us.  If it weren’t for us, they wouldn’t be there. “

iii. Iraq                                                                         c. “Excuse me.  You’re not stealing.  Excuse me.  You’re not stealing anything.  You’re taking-- we’re reimbursing ourselves-- at least, at a minimum, and I say more.  We’re taking back $1.5 trillion to reimburse ourselves.”

iv. Saudi Arabia                                                          d. “We’re dealing with people who truly are not only smart, they’re great natural negotiators. They’re not our friends. They’re looking to strip us of everything they can strip us of”

9.  What prop did demonstrators in the Syrian city of Douma use to signify their demands in a march on April 15?

a. An effigy of President Bashar al-Assad

b. Tunisian flags

c. Yellow cards and whistles

d. Shoes

e. Brooms

10.  Which of the following has NOT been used as a name for days of protest in an Arab country?

a. Friday of Defiance

b. Friday of Redemption

c. Friday of Departure

d. Friday of Dignity

e. Friday of Martyrs

11. Egyptians often referred to Hosni Mubarak as which of the following commercial advertising characters?

a. Count Chocula

b. The Laughing Cow

c. Poppin’ Fresh

d. Colonel Sanders

e. Snuggle

Answers: 1) d 2) d 3) b 4) d 5) c 6) a 7) c 8) i. a, ii. d, iii. c, iv. d 9) c 10) b 11) b

Osama bin Laid Down -- A Reaction

Early on Sunday evening I was discussing the threat global terrorism poses to the U.S. with a friend and sometime colleague.  We were wondering whether the lack of any major terrorist attack against the United States since September 11, 2001, is evidence that the American government is managing the threat of terrorism, or whether it shows that terrorism is not actually the threat it is so often made out to be.  Which was a stronger factor in al-Qaeda and its sympathizers' inability to mount a significant attack against the United States -- was it competence on the part of security officials, or incompetence on the part of terrorist networks?

Shortly after this conversation I opened my computer to find rumors across major news sites that Osama bin Laden was dead.  We both watched as the President announced that bin Laden had been killed on Sunday by American soldiers, the result of a covert manhunt that had been re-invigorated since he took office in 2009.  Whatever you believe (know?) about the capabilities of al-Qaeda and similar groups, this is a point for the "threat management" column.

Ultimately this will mean a great deal more for American domestic politics and relations with Pakistan than it will for the Arab world.  However, the killing of bin Laden is a symbolic victory for the United States and it will have an impact on its image, if not an immediate effect on American policies or the defense of American interests in the Middle East.  In fact, bin Laden's fate is more revealing of the past than it is of the future.  While I do not believe his death will greatly effect events in the Arab world, bin Laden's story in some ways signifies several key failures in American policy toward the Middle East over the past generations.

Osama bin Laden was the founder of al-Qaeda, a violent extremist group that called for the killing of Americans, Jews, and any other collaborators with the so-called "Zionist-Crusader alliance," including Muslims.  Al-Qaeda was never a mainstream political movement -- bin Laden and his followers eschewed politics to play the role of a quasi-Leninist vanguard, which aimed to create a radically different society through terrorism.  Al-Qaeda was never a major part of the Middle Eastern or Arab political landscape.  It never enjoyed broad-based support or acceptance, and it never had any true political influence in the Middle East (though it was a significant player in Taliban-dominated Afghanistan, where it had no need of popular support anyway).

Though bin Laden achieved his greatest notoriety for the attacks of September 11, 2001, in many ways that event was his ultimate failure.  Terrorists anywhere are too weak to defeat their enemies through overwhelming force.  Instead they must strike hard enough to provoke a disproportionate response, thereby causing their enemy to waste blood and treasure and cause enough collateral damage as to turn larger, mainstream forces against it.  The attacks of September 11 were meant to draw the United States to retaliate indiscriminately and thus turn the entire Muslim world against them, in a global revolution that, it was hoped, would alter the entire international system.  In a sense the strategy had its desired effect, provoking a heavy-handed and widely unpopular response from the United States in the form of invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a global campaign against Islamic extremists that resulted in shameful abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and secret prisons around the world.

However, in the end bin Laden's strategy failed.  While many Muslims -- and many Arabs -- consider the United States their enemy, they have no great sympathy for Osama bin Laden, and they have not been inspired in any significant numbers to attack the United States, even though they loathe American policy toward their countries.  Al-Qaeda remains a marginal movement which commands no real authority and has little appeal among the general public of the Arab world, or the Muslim world at large.  Viewed in a broader context, the September 11 attacks were a desperate measure, a last-ditch attempt to revive Islamic extremism, which had reached the height of its influence in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  By 2001 bin Laden and his ilk had been recognized as the atavistic murderers they are, offering a vision of the world that could not possibly be acceptable to the vast majority of Muslims.  While their message of resistance to oppressive governments and their patron superpower resonated across the Arab world, its ideology and methods were too extreme to command significant popular sympathy there.

Ultimately, bin Laden was a sideshow to a wider problem of Middle Eastern politics.  While he was certainly dangerous, much of his influence was the product of a milieu in the Arab world that had created widespread desperation, radicalization, and hatred toward the United States.  The root of this problem was not, as bin Laden argued, irreconcilable conflict between Islam and the West.  It was actually the loss of popular legitimacy of Arab governments, repression of popular dissent and peaceful means of opposition, and the complicity of the United States in the resultant poisoning of Arab societies.

Osama bin Laden is dead today, but the system of autocracies that enabled his rise to infamy largely remains.  Fortunately, at no point in history has this system ever been in as much danger of disintegration as it is now.  Across the Middle East people are calling for an end to the old order, not through martyrdom and extremism as al-Qaeda would have it, but through peaceful protest and democracy.  The Middle East is on the brink of a historic transformation, and although tremendous challenges remain there are many reasons to believe in a brighter future.  Yet as much cause as there may be for hope, the stakes are extremely high, for Arab societies and the United States alike.  It is incumbent upon the United States to facilitate transition in the Arab world to more stable governments that base their legitimacy in popular sovereignty.  Failure to do so may ultimately unleash forces that are just as dangerous or worse than Osama bin Laden, and far harder to kill.