Backsliding in Tunisia and Egypt?

The Arab world is well into the "stall" phase now in its democratic awakening; the resurgence of autocrats and escalation of violence has turned the tide against peaceful protests and popular resistance.  Reform movements have been stalled for over a month now in Libya -- which remains in civil war -- and Bahrain, which is steadily building an apartheid state while the United States looks the other way.  Violence continues in Syria, and while unrest in Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco continues to simmer, none of these states appears close to a revolutionary tipping point.

Meanwhile the monarchies of the Arab world are beginning to advance a response to the democratic wave.  On May 10 the Gulf Cooperation Council announced it had accepted membership bids from Jordan and Morocco.  If these two kingdoms do join the GCC it would effectively turn the organization into an alliance of all the Arab monarchies, positioned firmly against further reform in the Middle East.  Since this grouping of states would no longer be ostensibly related to geographic location, the name "Gulf Cooperation Council" should probably be scrapped.  Feel free to leave your suggestions for new names in the comment section below.  For my part, I think "League of Evil" has a nice ring to it; or alternatively the C.O.U.R.T ("Council of Unjustifiably Rich Tyrants") or perhaps the G.R.O.S.S ("Geriatric Royals Oppressing Sorry Subjects").

Even Tunisia and Egypt, where uprisings have been most successful, appear to be entering a period of regression as disorder sets in and stark social divisions emerge.  In Egypt sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims has become a serious issue, exacerbated by police absenteeism and general disorder.  Amidst the unrest, suddenly resurgent salafis have become a source of sectarian discord, blamed as the instigators in violence throughout Egypt, including an attack on churches in the impoverished Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba in which 15 people were killed.

The sudden appearance of the salafis has raised all kinds of suspicions; they have been connected alternately to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia, the military, and National Democratic Party loyalists.  None of these conspiracy theories is totally impossible (the Muslim Brotherhood scenario seems a little more far-fetched to me than the others) -- the difficulty with the situation is that there are any number of plausible explanations, and it is ultimately doubtful that the sectarian tensions are entirely the result of pre-meditated provocation.  Counter-revolution or not, Egypt really does have a sectarian problem, which is exacerbated by groups who have an interest in sowing disorder, a lack of police presence, and fears of further instability.  While the killing is lamentable in its own right, it is perhaps worse as a threat to the nascent democratic transition in Egypt.  Not only does sectarian violence serve as a distraction, it plays into the hands of illiberal forces who do not want to see a democratic Egypt.  In the midst of such strife, the vast majority of people are not likely to mount the necessary pressure on the military for democratic reform.  Most will probably be content to just let the powers that be have their way so long as order is restored.

The transition in Tunisia has also become a precarious situation.  The public has never had much trust in the interim National Unity Government (NUG), and political differences have started to become more divisive as factions compete for influence.  Tensions reached a critical point last week when a hidden-camera interview of former Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi was posted to Facebook (you can watch it here on YouTube or here) in which he said that the military is planning a coup if Islamists win elections, the same scenario that led to a decade of civil war in Algeria.  The accusation, in an atmosphere of high suspicion of a government that is perceived to be dragging its feet on reform, caused protests to break out across the country.  The police did not help matters by using heavy-handed tactics to disperse crowds, imposing a curfew in greater Tunis and arresting over 200 dissidents.  The incident exposed the thin veneer of legitimacy with which the NUG is operating, and the enormous level of anxiety among many Tunisians who are disappointed with the slow pace of change and fearful of co-optation by counterrevolutionary forces.

Tunisia may have far worse problems than Facebook videos.  Squabbling among the NUG and its various commissions in charge of engineering a democratic transition has hindered progress and may have long-term political consequences.  After lengthy debate, on April 27 the verbosely-named  Higher Commission for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition finally agreed to ban former RCD officials from running for public office for 10 years instead of 23, a bone of contention with the NUG that stalled drafting of more immediately important reforms for several weeks.  The Independent Election Committee, a body charged with organizing and conducting the July 24 elections, is still understaffed and far behind schedule.  In fact, it is a distinct possibility that elections will need to be postponed, an eventuality that could be politically disastrous.  Postponement of elections could confirm the suspicions of many that the NUG has no intention of supporting Tunisian democracy, and is attempting to leave the door open for the former ruling party, the RCD, to return (even though a postponement may actually have the opposite effect).  It would also rankle Islamists, especially Tunisia's largest and oldest Islamist party El-Nahdha, which is well organized and poised to do quite well in elections.  This is problematic because one of the most contentious divisions in Tunisia today is between secularists and Islamists.  The population is split almost evenly between the two sides, and many secularists have become quite fearful of an Islamist takeover.  The balance of power between secular and Islamic parties will be a critical aspect of Tunisian politics going forward, and postponement of elections is a potential flashpoint for tension.  As a matter of process a postponement may raise the chances of holding a successful, free, and fair election, but it will be viewed by at least a few as a setback, and it creates its own set of difficulties which will not be easily resolved.

So do these events signal the beginning of an authoritarian comeback in Egypt and Tunisia?  In my opinion, they certainly could, and there may be cause for alarm if stability continues to deteriorate.  However, these tensions may also be natural growing pains.  The former regimes in both countries actively maintained the sectarian and political rifts that now threaten their transition from authoritarianism.  In short, there was really no way something like these events was not going to happen.  The degree to which they threaten democratization is not entirely clear, but there is plenty of evidence of progress toward that goal too.  Salafis in Egypt have not won many friends from their provocations, and there are precious few calls for a return to the old police state.  In fact, the pro-democracy movement has been a triumph of Christian-Muslim solidarity, and the scenes from Tahrir of Christians protecting Muslims from thugs during their prayers (and vice versa) are some of the most memorable from the January uprising.

The apparent trajectory in Tunisia, in spite of recent upheavals and the likelihood of  a delay in the transition, is actually quite good.  While tourism has been devastated, the manufacturing sector in Tunisia is exceeding expectations and has actually grown relative to last year, a sign that the Tunisian economy remains resilient.  Even though political progress has not met expectations, the NUG and its reform commissions have made some notable achievements including the abolition of the political police and security apparatus, the dissolution of the RCD, the removal of regime loyalists from government and security positions, the end of large-scale media censorship, and the legalization of over 60 political parties.  Even preparations for the elections have started to look better, with the selection this week of all but three members of the Independent Election Commission (referred to in the link as the Independent High Authority for Elections).

The biggest lesson of the difficulties in Egypt and Tunisia is that the reform process is exceptionally fragile.  In the end, there is a vast array of possible outcomes for each country, and liberal democracy is only one of them.  The other alternatives are not nearly as desirable for the welfare of the Tunisian and Egyptian people, or for the interests of the United States.  There is a great deal of danger ahead, and in spite of admirable progress the task of a successful democratic transition in either country is still quite daunting.  That said, only a few months ago the idea of true liberalization in any part of the Arab world seemed laughable.  The uprisings in Tunisia and then in Egypt have changed the dynamic of the Middle East, and the determination and courage of the the Tunisian and Egyptian people is, at the very least, a cause for hope.