One Step Forward, Two Steps Somewhere Else -- Egypt's Referendum

In a few ways the March 19 constitutional referendum in Egypt was a triumph.  However, it was ultimately not enough to foster a fully democratic state, and it may now set off a chain of events that will lead Egypt yet farther away from that end.  Nearly all elements of the referendum -- its drafting, its substantive content, its promotion, the process of the vote -- indicate the military committee's flimsy commitment to reform.  While the vote was historic, and there are several things to be happy about, the final product is not yet a democracy.  Sadly, it may be no more than a very well-dressed concession, which will alter the outward appearance of the government but leave all the vital parts of the ancien régime intact.

First, the good news.  The referendum passed in an orderly, fair vote, perhaps the cleanest and most credible of any in Egyptian history.  The reports on the conduct of polling (you can read a few here, here, and here) are pretty good; the vote was a dramatic improvement over recent elections in Egypt, which were spoiled by endemic violence, rigging, and extremely poor turnouts.  Some irregularities notwithstanding, the result of the vote is a fair expression of popular will, at least on the surface.

But like many previous so-called reforms in Egyptian politics, the devil is in the details.  The referendum was not rigged, it was not marred by widespread thuggery or vote-buying or corruption, and that is at least in part because there simply was not much at stake for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  The reforms themselves pave the way for another corrupt and self-serving regime, which once in place will have far-reaching executive power and little reason to oblige the needs of ordinary Egyptians.  It still allows for a highly selective nomination process which will filter out most non-establishment candidates for president.  While the amended constitution leaves the door open to more meaningful changes, the short time frame for elections favors elements that have no interest in greater liberalization, namely the NDP, its cronies, and the Muslim Brotherhood (though the Brotherhood is undergoing a fracturing process at the moment that may change it significantly in the coming months).

I do not doubt that the referendum's approval is genuine and fair.  However, it is notable that in spite of the droves of people seen waiting in lines at polling stations, less than half of Egypt's eligible voters actually did cast a ballot, or 18 million out of a possible 45 million.  Many of those who did not vote may have been against the amendments, and presumably many of them at least felt somewhat ambivalent; but regardless of their feelings this indicates that support for the amendments is not as overwhelming as the 77.2% yes vote may indicate.

Support for the referendum notwithstanding, Egypt has moved one step farther toward a shift in its political system, albeit a smaller one than many pro-reform activists would like to see.  Pluralism is likely to increase in post-Mubarak Egypt, at least for a while.  However, the established order, including the enormous NDP political machine, still holds many of the cards in this system.  It appears that if change in Egypt is to occur at all, it will have to be incremental.  Reformers must now turn from the referendum to prepare for parliamentary elections in September, which will be the next opportunity to bring real change onto the table.  An opposition parliament would have the power to call for a new constitution, and would be able to select delegates to draft it.  However, the opposition needs to create a far-reaching political message and turn a leaderless popular movement of once politically apathetic youth into a unified front against the patronage networks of the NDP and its allies.

Though the new constitutional amendments are substantially disappointing, their passage does not spell the end for democracy in Egypt.  There was no question that the military, given the chance to dictate the pace and content of reform, would meet only the bare minimum of demands for change and seek to preserve its own privileged status.  Of course, the military's strategic calculus is more daunting when it is as effectively practiced as it was during the referendum process.  Supporters of democratization in Egypt must remain mindful of the fact that they will not be given anything by the transitional government.  Liberal reform is seldom handed down from entrenched autocrats -- it will more likely need to be seized.

March Madness: Is America's Influence in the Middle East Waning?

Another week of 2011 has gone by, and another slew of milestones in Arab politics as well.  After a period of vacillation and indecision, NATO has started a bombing campaign in Libya in an effort to turn the tide against Muammar al-Qaddhafi.  Bahrain took advantage of the international community's fixation on Libya to unleash a second brutal crackdown on protesters and Shi'i dissidents, inviting GCC soldiers -- mainly from Saudi Arabia and the UAE -- to assist in maintaining control.  Faint signs of discontent in Syria turned into the first large-scale protests in several decades, which have provoked an unsurprisingly violent government crackdown.  Finally, Egyptian voters turned out in massive numbers for what may have been the first truly free poll in their lifetimes, a constitutional referendum that was approved by a sizable majority.

I wrote several weeks ago that the Arab democracy movements have entered a second phase marked by an authoritarian backlash against uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, and conflict within pro-reform factions and elements of the old regimes in Egypt and Tunisia.  It is now widely acknowledged that the wave of people power that swept away Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak has broken on a wall of determined autocrats who are willing to use all means necessary to retain power.  In Libya and Bahrain, regime leadership have declared war on their own people.  Violence is escalating in Yemen and Syria as well.  While the pace of protest movements has slowed, regime responses have intensified and shown that superior firepower may still trump populist uprisings, at least in the short term.

This second phase of the new Arab struggle for self-determination has also made the United States look increasingly irrelevant to regional dynamics.  A number of events make the United States seem feckless and lost in a rapidly changing environment: apparent indecision over intervention in Libya, coupled with unwillingness to be the public leader of operations there; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's cold reception in both Egypt and Tunisia; Bahrain's disregard for American calls for reform, and the intervention of the GCC in Bahrain without informing the United States of its plans all.  The United States' two most significant Arab allies -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- appear to be drifting away from American influence.  Bahrain, the seat of American naval power in the Persian Gulf, has openly flouted American wishes with the encouragement and direct assistance of other American allies.  Meanwhile, relations with an increasingly extreme Israeli administration grow more strained by the day, and Israel's own strategic relevance may be diminishing as the Arab world reforges itself and regional dynamics continue to transform.  On the surface, it seems that these events will add up to a weakening of American influence in the Middle East, and perhaps the end of American hegemony there altogether.

In the near future it seems almost certain that American influence will ebb in the Middle East.  The United States is a dominant foreign power in the region; change in the status quo threatens that dominance.  However, I am not buying into the American decline just yet.  Though recent events in the Arab world have demonstrated the limits of American influence, they do not mean that the United States is irrelevant, or that it cannot play a role in the region going forward.  While people in Egypt and Tunisia are not amused by the United States' sudden commitment to democracy in their respective countries, and while they may be wary of American intentions, they still share key interests with the United States, and they need American assistance, especially economic support.

In general, the idea that American relations with Middle Eastern states were based only on cozy relationships with autocrats strikes me as terribly naive.  States do not cooperate out of friendship for each other, but out of self-interest.  In other words, the Saudis, or the Egyptians, or the Jordanians do not work closely with the United States because they like us so much (they don't), but because collaboration works to their advantage.  American relations with states throughout the Middle East are based on mutual interests which will not disappear along with the autocrats.  The idea that these leaders are entirely deferent to American wishes is also a falsehood.  In fact, they routinely ignore the wishes of American policymakers when their interests contradict those of the United States.  One recent and particularly unpleasant example may be found in the collusion between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain against the Bahraini pro-democracy movement.  The Bahraini royal family has done away with all liberal or moderate affectations even while the United States urged them to respond to popular demands for reform.  Saudi Arabia has blatantly ignored American wishes and acted in its own interests in this case as well.

The United States has formed important alliances with autocratic states throughout the Middle East.  These alliances are based on mutual interests, many -- though admittedly not all -- of which would remain if these same autocrats were swept out of power.  Of course, aspects of these relationships will have to change, but in the end the United States has a great deal to offer emerging democracies in the Middle East.  The hypothetical end of despotism in the Middle East (at the moment that is still a distant and highly improbable eventuality) does not mean the end of American influence.  In fact, it is a new and more promising beginning not just for the Arab people but for American interests.

The entire reason I argue the United States should promote democracy in the Middle East is because it is beneficial to American interests.  Those who bemoan the loss of close relations with people like Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi King Abdullah should think twice about just how valuable American relations with such regimes could be in the future.  Alliance with these autocrats has already been counterproductive in many ways for years now.  Lacking legitimacy and popular support, these regimes have become corrupt, ossified wards of American largesse.  They have failed to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, counter the growing influence of Iran, or effectively combat Islamic extremism -- in fact their continued leadership has exacerbated these problems.  They have led an economic and social decline that benefits no one but American adversaries and a self-interested elite.

Yet paradoxically the current upheavals throughout the Arab world demonstrate the value of American power in the region and its importance going forward.  Though the United States is superficially filling an ancillary role during NATO operations in Libya, it is the critical strategic power.  American weapons, American money, and American strategic objectives are the driving force behind the no-fly zone in Libya, because the United States is quite simply the only nation powerful enough to manage it (keep in mind that 75% of NATO's defense budget is funded by the United States).  In neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, American economic aid, and to a lesser extent political influence, is crucial to nascent reform movements.  For better or worse, the United States has contributed greatly to the current regional outlook, and it is still by far the most powerful single actor in the region.

The current crisis threatens the strategically favorable status quo shaped by American foreign policy.  However, that is no reason to lament the old system.  Crisis creates opportunity, and the United States needs to seize it by altering its outdated approach to the Middle East.  Strong democracies and effective governance in the Arab world will benefit American strategic and economic interests more than the illegitimate and repressive states of the past and present.  Trade-offs and short term sacrifices will be necessary, but ultimately these are tolerable for a still-dominant hegemonic power.  Of course, if the United States throws its weight behind continued autocracy, or simply sits on the sideline, then the short-term erosion of its influence will soon become permanent.

Egypt's Second Big Day

It's Referendum Day in Egypt, and if this feels a little too soon to you, you are not alone.  The short period of time between the public proposal of Egypt's constitutional amendments and a nationwide referendum is causing a great deal of anxiety in Egypt and among observers abroad.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has continued to forge ahead regardless, dropping subtle hints that they do not understand or care about the democratic process.  The most tone deaf of these signs is probably their request for a cease of all media discussion of the referendum for the past 48 hours.  I am not really sure where they got this idea, but it seems as if they are taking the "secret" part of secret ballot way too seriously.

I have already offered my take on the actual content of the amendments.  However, the amendments themselves are not the only test of Egypt's prospects for democratization.  The conduction of a poll presents several noteworthy problems.  There have been many votes in Egypt in the post-1952 era, none resembling an orderly exercise of popular will.  Elections are typically a chaotic affair, marked by widespread violence, fraud, and other kinds of foul play.  The past two presidential elections were especially ugly, with dozens of people killed in each one.

But there are several important reasons to believe that the March 19 referendum will go differently.  Not least among them is the fact that the referendum could be a win-win proposition for the military and established order, making foul play unnecessary for a favorable outcome.  In the end, a "yes" or "no" vote should not dramatically weaken the position of these elements.  The military almost certainly wants a yes vote, because it will lend them credibility while not threatening the fundamental structure of the state which gives them such privileged status.  However, a no vote could still work to their advantage.  If the amendments are rejected, the military might conclude that the constitution is fine the way it is.  Even if the public does not tolerate such an outcome, the transition remains in the hands of the military, and they can offer more or less significant reforms at their discretion.  Furthermore, debate over the reforms themselves causes division within the opposition, making the military relatively stronger and complicating efforts to mount pressure for a more serious commitment to democracy.

At the same time, the referendum contains some opportunities for the pro-reform camp.  While the passing of the referendum creates numerous dangers and offers little in the way of true change, it also does not doom the opposition.  Activist groups have proven their ability to mobilize masses of people and influence the military leadership, and it seems unlikely to me that this would become a non-factor if the referendum passed.  Differences of opinion and tactics may limit the opposition's effectiveness, but I doubt they will to a great enough extent to marginalize the protest movement altogether.

Ultimately, the outcome of the referendum process as whole -- more so than the vote alone -- is crucial to a democratic transformation in Egypt.  The poll's management so far has been decidedly undemocratic, as are the amendments under consideration.  Yet both are improvements over the past, and they do not eliminate the opportunity for meaningful change down the road.  Authoritarian elements are running out of moves in Egypt; trying to spoil this vote with the same kind of rigging and violence of past elections will not be accepted by the Egyptian people or the international community (of course, that does not mean they won't try).  I expect this poll to be controversial, though probably not as blatantly fraudulent as last fall's parliamentary elections.  In any case it will be dangerous indeed for the government to try to steal this vote.

While today's vote will most likely cloud Egypt's future even more, it may answer some important questions about the final intentions of the military (if they have those), the state of the opposition, and the prospects for democratization.  There will be no definitive answers, but the outcome of the referendum will likely set the course for events over the next few months.

The Jawaala News Quiz!!!

There has a been a pretty high volume of news coming out of the Middle East lately.  Sometimes it can be hard to know if you are really keeping up with events.  If you are looking to test your knowledge, look no further -- your Jawaala has a quiz on recent news stories from the Middle East!  Answers are at the bottom (NO PEEKING!).  If you like, post your scores to the comments.  Let's see who knows their stuff.

1.     Which of the following dictators was not invited to retire in Saudi Arabia?

a.     Hosni Mubarak

b.     Idi Amin

c.      Zine el Abidine Ben Ali

d.     Zia Ul-Haq

2.     Which of the following features of Tunisian fortunate son Sakher el-Materi’s home reminded U.S. Ambassador Robert F. Godec of Saddam Hussein’s son Uday?

a.     His South African nanny

b.     The infinity pool

c.      The pet tiger

d.     His large staff of servants

3.     Wael Ghonim, a Google executive who has become an icon for the Egyptian pro-democracy protest movement, has NOT been accused of working in league with which of the following?

a.     A plot by the United States that involved paying protesters with KFC fried chicken

b.     A Zionist conspiracy to weaken Egypt

c.      A conspiracy of Islamists and communists to conquer the world and divide it up amongst themselves

d.     Egyptian State Security
e.   Iran, Al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas

4.     Before marrying President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Leila Trabelsi worked as a:

a.     Hairdresser

b.     Actress

c.      Nurse

d.     Manicurist

5.     Match each Qaddhafi son to the international incident on the right (each son may have several incidents)

                                                                                    a. 6 charges of assault in three different countries over the past 10 years

i. Seif al-Islam                                                             b. Spending approximately $1 million to have the Pussycat Dolls perform privately for a Bulgarian stripper

ii. Hannibal

                                                                                    c. Plagiarizing a PhD dissertation as a student at the London School of Economics

iii. Saadi                                                                      d. Allegedly ordering the death of a false informant on cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda

iv. Mutassim                                                                e. Failing a drug test during an audition for a professional soccer club in Italy

v. Seif al-Arab

                                                                                    f. Assaulting a bouncer in Munich and having his Ferrari impounded for excessive noise

6.     Which of the following led to former Foreign Minister of France Michele Alliot-Marie’s resignation on February 27:

a.     Spending Christmas vacation in a Tunisian resort during the winter uprisings

b.     Flying in the private jet of a Tunisian businessman and buying property for her parents in Tunisia during the uprising

c.      A rumored authorization of a tear gas shipment to Tunisia in January 2011 at the height of the revolt

d.     Suggesting that French riot police be sent to Tunisia to quell protests

e.     All of the above

7.     Which of the following has not been a name of a day of protest during 2011?

a.     Day of Unity

b.     Friday of No Return

c.      Day of Dignity

d.     Friday of Departure

e.     Friday of Sorrows

8.     During early march at Rafiq Hariri Airport in Beirut, travelers were surprised to find:

a.     The first Hare Krishna campaign in the Middle East

b.     No on-time flights to an Arab country

c.      A spontaneous dance performance

d.     All runways were fully functional for the first time since Israeli missile strikes in 2006

9.     Which celebrity did MSNBC’s Chris Matthews compare to Muammar al-Qaddhafi on his program “Hardball?”

a.     Glenn Beck

b.     Sarah Palin

c.      Charlie Sheen

d.     Dick Cheney

e.     Mel Gibson

10.  Which country or group has not received arms from Muammar al-Qaddhafi?

a.     Uganda

b.     Hamas

c.      Nicaragua

d.     The Irish Republican Army

11.  Morocco’s Minister of Communication Khalid Neciri has blamed protests in his country on which of the following:

a.     An alliance between the United States, Algeria, and Iran

b.     Radical Islam disseminated through Facebook

c.      Israeli spies working with POLISARIO

d.     Berber separatists working with the CIA

12.  Match the country to the animal it has accused of espionage or general skullduggery for Israel (each country may accuse several animals)

i. Iran                                       a. Sharks     

ii. Palestine                              b. Pigeons

iii. Egypt                                  c. Squirrels

iv. Saudi Arabia                      d. Dog-sized rats

v. Sudan                                  e. Pelicans

                                                f. Vultures     

                                               

                                                g. Wild boars      

Answer Key: 1. d    2. c    3. d    4. a    5i. c  ii. a  iii. e,b  iv. d  v. f    6. e    7. e    8. c (video here)    9. b    10. b  
11.  a    12i. b,c  ii. d,g  iii. a  iv. f  v.  e

A Response to Issandr El Amrani

The Arabist blog is one of my favorite resources for commentary and miscellany on Arab politics.  Issandr El Amrani and everyone else at the Arabist do a fine job and their analysis is usually insightful and informative.  Though I do not always agree with Mr. El Amrani, he is very knowledgeable and I respect his perspective.  However, one of his posts today, called "Let's Buy Democracy," bothered me for a number of reasons, and I feel compelled to respond to him not just to offer a different perspective, but also to defend my profession.

Issandr starts by quoting a passage from a Washington Post article on the allocation of $150 million by the U.S. State Department for democracy promotion in Egypt (all I will ask here is why is there no comparable effort for Tunisia yet?).  The passage notes that high-level American officials have been exploring possible recipients for some of this funding, and that no local Egyptian groups have asked for financial help yet.  Issandr then criticizes democracy promotion as a whole by describing any organization that does accept American help as both parasitic and superfluous.  He goes on to label the practice of political party development, and presumably democracy promotion as a whole, as "sordid" and suggests that the money be spent elsewhere, possibly on NGOs that will collect data on human rights abuses in Egypt, or in economic aid.

While there are certainly flaws in democracy promotion policy, and I do not believe the American system is perfect, as someone who works to promote democratic development in the Middle East I feel it is necessary to point out the errors in Issandr's statements and offer a clarification of just what it is the $150 million of democracy funding will support.  In order of their occurrence, here are the most significant problems with Issandr's take on democracy promotion:

1) The Washington Post quotation is selective and misleading.  If one only reads the passage posted on the Arabist, it would seem that Egyptians have no interest in American support for their efforts to build a democracy (Issandr's comments also indicate he believes any Egyptian that does is a charlatan).  However, the Post article devotes nearly half its content to discussing the history of American organizations working with Egyptian democratic activists.  In particular the article discusses the activities of the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, both of which have worked in Egypt without the Mubarak government's permission since as early as 2003.  NDI and IRI have both worked closely with Egyptian NGOs and some politicians.  This cooperation has included training in the use of new media and communication in closed societies, election monitoring, reporting and documentation of human rights abuses, and anti-corruption.  This work is not done by cutting large checks to an aid-fattened elite -- it is relatively cheap and never offers financial support to local groups unless they are performing a service, for instance conducting a poll or focus group.  Activists have not only accepted the help of these organizations, they have specifically requested it and often risked harassment and arrest in order to receive it.  To imply that the work of these organizations has been met with disdain is deceptive.  Many of the activists who were instrumental in organizing protests during Egypt's uprising have worked with American organizations, including NDI and IRI, in the past, and their assistance has played a supportive role in the pro-democracy movements in several Arab countries, and in many other countries around the world.

2) The conflation of democracy promotion and political party development is incorrect.  Issandr remarks that he finds nothing more sordid than the idea of political party development, but discusses no other aspect of democracy promotion.  This creates an implication that the two are one and the same, but that is not the case.  In fact, political party development is one method of promoting democracy.  Organizations that specialize in liberalization and democratic development may provide assistance to activists and governments in any number of political and social areas, including political party training, improving the rule of law and transparency, election monitoring, human rights, responsive governance, civil society building, community participation, media freedom, and government oversight.  The United States government supports all of these efforts on a case-by-case basis -- different institutions of democracy promotion specialize in different areas, and they do not do the same work in every country.  In short, political party development is not the only tool of democracy promotion, nor is it the largest or most commonly used.

3) The misunderstanding of the actual work of political party development.  In addition to confusing party development with democracy promotion as a whole, Issandr hints at a deeper misconception of the practice.  Party development is not, as he implies, the artificial support of factions that would otherwise fail.  Parties, for all their limitations, can be an efficient way to organize a system of political debate and power sharing among interest groups and ideological blocs.  Political party development is not the creation of new parties and it is not designed to alter the politics of any given country.  Rather, it is intended to support the efficient functioning of the political arena.  This means helping parties develop constituencies based on distinct political perspectives and not on charismatic personalities or entrenched interest groups (these are two common problems among parties in the Middle East).  What development assistance most often entails is training in the construction of grassroots networks and mechanisms for responding to the needs of constituents.  A group of parties with diverse ideologies and issue-based platforms is integral to a healthy democracy.  Political party development seeks to help existing parties reach out to voters and serve as mechanisms for advancing political debate and representing different sectors of their country.  It is not, as Issandr seems to think, a scheme to advance foreign agendas or to unnaturally sustain marginal political groups (although this was often how it was portrayed by Egypt's authoritarian government, which was fully convinced that democracy promoters are the CIA in league with Mossad, Batman, and Glenn Beck).

4) The conclusion that funding is "better spent" on economic aid is flawed.  Issandr's final statement, that American aid is better spent on economic support, is problematic because it makes an either/or proposition when there is none.  There is no need to choose between democracy funding and economic assistance, because it is quite feasible to do both at the same time.  In fact, these two forms of assistance are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.  Assistance in reforming the rule of law, combating corruption, and creating an open environment for entrepreneurship could have a significant influence on economic recovery in Egypt, and would help attract badly needed foreign direct investment.  It is no secret that ongoing political instability is a major threat to economic progress in Egypt.  Insofar as democracy assistance can help create a stable climate for investment and development, it should be a welcome complement to direct financial aid.  Autocratic political systems throughout the Middle East have used economics as a tool to extend their control and co-opt potential threats to their power.  While the relationship between economic and political liberalization is non-deterministic, the two may be pursued concurrently, and the United States  can play a helpful role in both.

Democracy promotion is not the answer to all of Egypt's problems, nor is it the key to a successful transition from authoritarian rule.  However, international assistance can be useful to reformers and activists, and in some small ways it has contributed to the reform movements in Egypt and elsewhere.  Democracy promotion does not do the work Issandr seems to think it does, and it actually involves some of the work he says he would like to see, including economic assistance and documentation of human rights abuses and police brutality.  Though it suffers from several important shortcomings, it is not the sinister or pointless practice described in Issandr's post.  While it is personally satisfying to defend democracy promotion in response to such comments, ultimately the positive results of democracy promotion programs speak for themselves.

In the end, promoting democracy and liberalization in the Middle East is an expression of American interests in the region, and its effects can be far more positive than the previous approach of supporting autocrats and artificially sustaining their regimes.  While it is impossible to levy democracy from abroad, international involvement has proven itself as a critical factor in bringing about democratic transitions, and it may be a crucial element to democratization in the Middle East.

Hangover -- Arab Uprisings and American Headaches

After an astounding winter in the Middle East, the pace of the Arab revolts has slowed.  Up to this point breathtaking developments have unfolded almost every day since late December.  The fall of two seemingly intractable presidents in Egypt and Tunisia caused global jubilation and a wave of optimism.  These sudden triumphs of people power made regimes across the Middle East seem weak and helpless against the rising tide, and greatly raised the expectations of activists and protestors alike.

I have always felt that the status quo in the Middle East was untenable, and that change in some form was inevitable.  I am far from alone in this respect -- even Arab autocrats and regime apparatchiks have acknowledged the need for reform and improved services.  This sentiment is not new either -- it has been clear that the development model and political systems in the Middle East were failing since as early as the 1960s, when former Ambassador to Egypt John S. Badeau wrote "the tinder of social discontent has long been smoldering," and noted "in the long run it seems probable that radical change in some form must take place."  While I do not know if Badeau thought the long run would start to come up in 2011, I can say with certainty that it is about time the authoritarian grip on the Middle East is beginning to slip.

However, the Arab revolts today have entered a new phase.  The euphoria of sudden and surprising victories in Egypt and Tunisia has given way to the complicated problems of building a democratic state against the resistance of an entrenched order which wants to protect its economic and political interests.  Several protest movements that began around the same time as those in Egypt and Tunisia have stalled or regressed.  In Algeria, activists have been unable to outmaneuver a massive security response, and calls for reform have diminished since the military lifted its state of emergency.  Jordan's protesters and politicians are no closer to serious change than they were a month ago.  Yemen, teetering on the brink of failure well before protests erupted there in January, is still struggling but has a litany of problems in addition to poor governance and corruption that threaten the existence of any state at all there, let alone a stable democracy.  For the moment, Bahrain has survived its own crisis, and while unrest is continuing protestors have been unable to wrest any concessions from the ruling Khalifa family.  In Libya, protests quickly devolved into something more like a civil war when Muammar al-Qaddhafi allowed the massacre of demonstrators and hired mercenary armies to attack them.

It is difficult to exaggerate the enormous changes over the recent weeks.  While the overall outcome of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt remains unclear, reformers are now able to actually address the challenges of building effective political systems and functioning economies, rather than waiting on the sidelines for their strongmen to die and wondering helplessly what might replace them.  Furthermore the facade of autocratic inevitability in the region has been shattered, as demonstrators fill their streets demanding change.  Popular sovereignty is no longer a distant dream but a right that may be seized back from despots if they are not wiling to give it back to their citizens.  The difference could hardly be larger between the previous and present atmosphere.

That said, the violent crackdowns across the region over the past weeks have shown that many states, though shaken, are not ready to give in to demands for liberalization.  The new situations are considerably more tangled than those in Egypt and Tunisia.  In Bahrain, conservative authoritarians in the ruling family pressed violence and a strict repression of protestors.  These tactics, while they have elevated the sectarian divisions among the Sunni minority and Shi'i majority, have not quelled calls for change.  Meanwhile, Libya has become the site of a humanitarian crisis with the potential to destabilize the tenuous political situations in Egypt and Tunisia, and perhaps farther afield if his mercenaries become restive and move elsewhere.

Compared to the current challenges for American foreign policy, Egypt and Tunisia were easy.  A number of strategically critical states -- including Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen -- are headed toward protracted conflicts.  Few policy problems can match the headache these difficulties will cause if the situation escalates in any number of these states.  With formerly stalwart allies Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia all more fragile now than before, the path for American policy at the regional level will be difficult to determine.  At the level of individual states, policymakers face some tough choices as well.

While short-term solutions are tempting in times of uncertainty, U.S. strategists should be considering the long range consequences of their approach to these crises.  In short, American policy should support the resolution of the problems that have precipitated the Arab uprisings, chiefly the moribund domestic politics of the Arab nations.  In a case such as Libya, what exactly supports such a resolution is difficult to discern.  The major question of policy toward Libya now is whether or not the United States should intervene directly on behalf of anti-Qaddhafi rebels.  Humanitarian intervention is well outside my limited realm of expertise, so I will not recommend any approach, except to say that at the moment I doubt there is any satisfactory answer to the question of how the international community can help the Libyans.  Large trade-offs are involved in intervention or non-involvement, and which of these are ultimately more tolerable may be a matter of perspective rather than objective reality.

Bahrain presents its own unique challenges.  The course the United States takes there will not affect relations with only Bahrain, but with the other Gulf monarchies, who seem to have decided to treat the protests in Bahrain and Oman as the front line threat to their own regimes (the "Gulf Marshall Plan" would indicate as much, at least).  This may be the case where the argument for supporting democracy is weakest.  Bahrain is strategically important to the United States as the home of the Fifth Fleet, and it is a linchpin of American dominance in the Persian Gulf.  It is also small in population and regional influence, and lacks the symbolic and historical importance of a state like Egypt or Iraq.  Yet none of this amounts to an exception.  Instability in Bahrain will continue in the absence of greater liberalization, and instability in such a crucial ally is a threat to American interests.  The United States should support greater political opening in Bahrain and an improvement in sectarian relations.  As a result of close relations with the Bahraini royal family, pressure from the Obama administration could go a long way to ensuring that the National Dialogue initiative is taken seriously.

Matters have become more complex as the Arab uprisings have continued, but difficulty does not diminish the importance of this moment in history for American hegemony in the Middle East.  The United States needs to take advantage of this unique opportunity to change an entire region of the world for the better.  In this case, success is not an option -- it is an imperative.

Democratic Support Groups Part 2 -- Conclusion

While the revolt in Tunisia inspired Egyptians and gave them a model for their own uprising, Tunisians are now closely watching events in Egypt and looking there for cues to their own transition.  Tunisians have been upset that their country does not have the same clearly defined schedule for reforms as the Egyptians have (ironically, many activists in Egypt are very uneasy about the fast pace of planned reforms and feel that there is not sufficient time to install a true democracy).  In the absence of change and a clear agenda for change, unrest and discontent are on the rise again.  Protests have become larger again, and three demonstrators were killed in clashes over the weekend, prompting Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi's resignation.  Ghannouchi's replacement is a former Bourguibist, 84 year-old Baji Caid Essebsi -- after a rumor that Essebsi asked all ministers considering a presidential run to leave the government, a flurry of resignations have further changed the cabinet.  The influx of tens of thousands of refugees from Libya and the looming humanitarian crisis on the border provides another unneeded challenge for the embattled National Unity Government.

A course for reform remains obscure.  Since the early days of the transition popular consensus has been for presidential elections to be held first, followed by constitutional reform, then parliamentary elections, and finally regional and municipal elections.  Recently, the idea of asking a committee to redraft the constitution before presidential elections has gained traction -- President Fouad Mebezaa hinted at it in an announcement, and today July 24 was set as a date to elect a constituent assembly for the task.  Calling elections and setting a schedule for reforms has been enthusiastically welcomed by the Tunisian public, which had been growing uneasy with the lack of changes and the continued stalling of the interim government.

Changing the Tunisian constitution is an absolutely essential step in transforming the Tunisian state, and holding elections to create the body charged with doing so demonstrates a commitment to democracy.  It also presents a unique set of challenges.  The precise rules governing the election are still unclear -- will voters select the assembly's 100 members by regional distribution?  Who is eligible to serve on a constituent assembly?  Will political parties and other associations be able to nominate candidates?  Will the assembly have a deadline for its proposals?  Who will supervise the elections?  

As in Egypt, the new developments only make democracy more possible now than it was previously; ultimately they guarantee nothing.  Yet the date for elections is the most unambiguous step toward reform in Tunisia yet, and there is little doubt that a new constitution would be an improvement over the old one.  In both cases, recent events will not impede progress toward democratization, though they may not accelerate it either.  In a part of the world where virtually all political developments for decades reinforced the old order, these new opportunities look promising.

The most encouraging development is perhaps the extent to which events in each country influence the other.  Tunisians and Egyptians are both quite aware of what is happening in each other's country.  They have been able to inform one another and shape the course of events among their neighbors.  Tunisians helped teach the Egyptians ways to endure the regime crackdown against protestors, and inspired Egyptians to resist their government on an unprecedented scale.  The implementation of a rigid schedule for reform and tangible steps toward a transition in Egypt spurred Tunisians to demand the same from their government.  The development of a mutual Arab experience of democracy building is encouraging, and may have far-reaching impact at a time of great opportunity.

Democratic Support Groups Part 1 -- Egypt & Tunisia

After years of heavy censorship, Tunisians are now able to exercise their right to free speech.  Politics -- a taboo subject only weeks ago -- has become the most popular subject of conversation, and radio and television programs have added lengthy call-in portions to their programming, allowing Tunisians to broadcast their opinions far and wide.  People that for years were politically apathetic due to their leaders' aura of immutability are now enthusiastic participants who hope now to have a say in the current process, and practice their popular sovereignty for the first time.

A similar, though admittedly less inspiring, phenomenon has taken hold among Middle Eastern analysts and policymakers.  After years of watching a stagnant and slowly moldering political landscape,  there is dynamism and uncertainty.  Events now change so dramatically from day to day that they are difficult to follow, and even more difficult to predict.  This has led to a huge reversal among many experts who believed that real change in the region would not occur in their lifetime.  Where there was once only cynicism, doubt, and worry for the future, now there is optimism, some cautious, and some overkeen.

Still, you should hold off buying your "Arab Revolutions 2011" commemorative jacket for now.  I would not hold my breath waiting for a clear outcome to the revolts in Tunisia or Egypt either.  At this point it is still impossible to say how events will turn out, and the rest of the region is equally difficult to predict.  In Egypt, the military's intentions and the potential effect of proposed reforms is no clearer than it was a week ago.  One thing is for certain -- revolution is not the right term at present, and there is no better evidence of this than Foreign Minister and Mubarak-BFF Ahmed Abul Gheit's statement today that Egypt's "revolution" is one of the most important in history.  

The most interesting news of the day is perhaps the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq.  Since he was appointed by Hosni Mubarak in late January, protestors have been calling for his removal along with the dissolution of the cabinet.  The military has appointed Essam Sharaf, a former Minister of Transportation who supported Mubarak's resignation and spoke to protestors in Tahrir Square during the early days of the revolt.  Shafiq's resignation, and the military's choice of replacement, seem related to the large protests planned for Friday.  This whole thing amounts to a move to appease protestors, which is positive in that it shows that Egyptian citizens can influence their political process.  However, Sharaf is a former NDP member and served in Mubarak's cabinet previously -- not exactly an outsider.  He is certainly a more appealing figure than Shafiq, and he has better liberal credentials.  So his appointment is a good sign, though probably not good enough to guarantee the military's intentions are good; as far as those are concerned, Egyptians must continue to wait.

The military-appointed constitutional committee released its proposed amendments over the weekend (see here for an excellent detailed explanation), and while the spirit of the proposals is promising, their substance is lacking.  Many of the amendments amount to little more than empty gestures.  Among these is the restoration of full judicial supervision over elections.  While this fulfills one of the protesters' demands, it does not guarantee clean elections; after all, judicial supervision in 2000 and 2005 was somewhat less than useless in preventing fraud and irregularities, and reports of violations were simply ignored.  Another functionally useless amendment is to the rules governing nomination of presidential candidates.  While they are an improvement over the current regulations, they are still quite open to manipulation -- candidates need the endorsement of members of parliament, nomination by a party represented in parliament, or 30,000 signatures.  A corrupt parliament can effectively block nomination, and the signature requirement has been used before to disqualify and imprison prospective candidates, including Ayman Nour.  Once again, while this is an improvement over the previous rules, it is not an unequivocal victory for democracy advocates, and it may ultimately mean nothing.

Other proposed amendments are more promising, including one that would prevent a state of emergency from being extended beyond six months without approval in a popular referendum, and another that limits the president to two terms of four years.  The most encouraging proposal would allow the president or parliament to call for a new constitution and appoint a constitutional committee to draft it.  These are certainly good ideas, but they do not guarantee democracy or protection of human rights.  There is nothing that prevents the president from calling a new state of emergency every six months, and no limitation to his emergency powers.  While term limits will prevent 30-year presidencies like that of Hosni Mubarak, they cannot guarantee that the president will not be a military crony or some other type of old guard.  Finally, there is no proposal that would compel the president or parliament to draft a new constitution, and the council that would be responsible for doing so would be appointed by the incumbent parliament, and could hardly be considered an impartial force under those circumstances.  In sum, while the proposed amendments create the opportunity for democracy, they fall short of making it a reality.  While they will most likely be embraced by the Egyptian people, they may not be sufficient in the end.

Meanwhile, the military continues to show hints of its more sinister tendencies.  Late last Friday night, the military attacked demonstrators in Tahrir Square, apparently dispatching masked men with tasers and batons to disperse the crowds.  The next day, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued an apology on Facebook describing the assault as "unintentional" (apparently they decided this was smoother than "we did it because we love you" or "you know we would never hurt you" or "please take us back and everything will be different").  They also have continued to send protesters through military tribunals.  It is difficult to say this is merely old habits dying hard, especially given the advancement of tepid constitutional amendments, the rush for a referendum, and the complete silence on the emergency law, which still denies civil rights and prevents a true liberal society from developing.

Ultimately, time will provide more answers on Egypt's fortune than any analysis.  While it is impossible to predict what will happen next, it seems that the situation remains unchanged -- the military is still uneasy about full democratic reform, and it is seeking to preserve its primacy while satisfying enough demands for reform to get protesters off the streets.  The reform movement has far more ambitious goals than the generals -- the likeliest outcome for changes is somewhere between demonstrators' demands and the military's aspirations.  However, the exact results of Mubarak's overthrow will remain a mystery for the near future.