After years of heavy censorship, Tunisians are now able to exercise their right to free speech. Politics -- a taboo subject only weeks ago -- has become the most popular subject of conversation, and radio and television programs have added lengthy call-in portions to their programming, allowing Tunisians to broadcast their opinions far and wide. People that for years were politically apathetic due to their leaders' aura of immutability are now enthusiastic participants who hope now to have a say in the current process, and practice their popular sovereignty for the first time.
A similar, though admittedly less inspiring, phenomenon has taken hold among Middle Eastern analysts and policymakers. After years of watching a stagnant and slowly moldering political landscape, there is dynamism and uncertainty. Events now change so dramatically from day to day that they are difficult to follow, and even more difficult to predict. This has led to a huge reversal among many experts who believed that real change in the region would not occur in their lifetime. Where there was once only cynicism, doubt, and worry for the future, now there is optimism, some cautious, and some overkeen.
Still, you should hold off buying your "Arab Revolutions 2011" commemorative jacket for now. I would not hold my breath waiting for a clear outcome to the revolts in Tunisia or Egypt either. At this point it is still impossible to say how events will turn out, and the rest of the region is equally difficult to predict. In Egypt, the military's intentions and the potential effect of proposed reforms is no clearer than it was a week ago. One thing is for certain -- revolution is not the right term at present, and there is no better evidence of this than Foreign Minister and Mubarak-BFF Ahmed Abul Gheit's statement today that Egypt's "revolution" is one of the most important in history.
Still, you should hold off buying your "Arab Revolutions 2011" commemorative jacket for now. I would not hold my breath waiting for a clear outcome to the revolts in Tunisia or Egypt either. At this point it is still impossible to say how events will turn out, and the rest of the region is equally difficult to predict. In Egypt, the military's intentions and the potential effect of proposed reforms is no clearer than it was a week ago. One thing is for certain -- revolution is not the right term at present, and there is no better evidence of this than Foreign Minister and Mubarak-BFF Ahmed Abul Gheit's statement today that Egypt's "revolution" is one of the most important in history.
The most interesting news of the day is perhaps the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq. Since he was appointed by Hosni Mubarak in late January, protestors have been calling for his removal along with the dissolution of the cabinet. The military has appointed Essam Sharaf, a former Minister of Transportation who supported Mubarak's resignation and spoke to protestors in Tahrir Square during the early days of the revolt. Shafiq's resignation, and the military's choice of replacement, seem related to the large protests planned for Friday. This whole thing amounts to a move to appease protestors, which is positive in that it shows that Egyptian citizens can influence their political process. However, Sharaf is a former NDP member and served in Mubarak's cabinet previously -- not exactly an outsider. He is certainly a more appealing figure than Shafiq, and he has better liberal credentials. So his appointment is a good sign, though probably not good enough to guarantee the military's intentions are good; as far as those are concerned, Egyptians must continue to wait.
The military-appointed constitutional committee released its proposed amendments over the weekend (see here for an excellent detailed explanation), and while the spirit of the proposals is promising, their substance is lacking. Many of the amendments amount to little more than empty gestures. Among these is the restoration of full judicial supervision over elections. While this fulfills one of the protesters' demands, it does not guarantee clean elections; after all, judicial supervision in 2000 and 2005 was somewhat less than useless in preventing fraud and irregularities, and reports of violations were simply ignored. Another functionally useless amendment is to the rules governing nomination of presidential candidates. While they are an improvement over the current regulations, they are still quite open to manipulation -- candidates need the endorsement of members of parliament, nomination by a party represented in parliament, or 30,000 signatures. A corrupt parliament can effectively block nomination, and the signature requirement has been used before to disqualify and imprison prospective candidates, including Ayman Nour. Once again, while this is an improvement over the previous rules, it is not an unequivocal victory for democracy advocates, and it may ultimately mean nothing.
Other proposed amendments are more promising, including one that would prevent a state of emergency from being extended beyond six months without approval in a popular referendum, and another that limits the president to two terms of four years. The most encouraging proposal would allow the president or parliament to call for a new constitution and appoint a constitutional committee to draft it. These are certainly good ideas, but they do not guarantee democracy or protection of human rights. There is nothing that prevents the president from calling a new state of emergency every six months, and no limitation to his emergency powers. While term limits will prevent 30-year presidencies like that of Hosni Mubarak, they cannot guarantee that the president will not be a military crony or some other type of old guard. Finally, there is no proposal that would compel the president or parliament to draft a new constitution, and the council that would be responsible for doing so would be appointed by the incumbent parliament, and could hardly be considered an impartial force under those circumstances. In sum, while the proposed amendments create the opportunity for democracy, they fall short of making it a reality. While they will most likely be embraced by the Egyptian people, they may not be sufficient in the end.
Meanwhile, the military continues to show hints of its more sinister tendencies. Late last Friday night, the military attacked demonstrators in Tahrir Square, apparently dispatching masked men with tasers and batons to disperse the crowds. The next day, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued an apology on Facebook describing the assault as "unintentional" (apparently they decided this was smoother than "we did it because we love you" or "you know we would never hurt you" or "please take us back and everything will be different"). They also have continued to send protesters through military tribunals. It is difficult to say this is merely old habits dying hard, especially given the advancement of tepid constitutional amendments, the rush for a referendum, and the complete silence on the emergency law, which still denies civil rights and prevents a true liberal society from developing.
Ultimately, time will provide more answers on Egypt's fortune than any analysis. While it is impossible to predict what will happen next, it seems that the situation remains unchanged -- the military is still uneasy about full democratic reform, and it is seeking to preserve its primacy while satisfying enough demands for reform to get protesters off the streets. The reform movement has far more ambitious goals than the generals -- the likeliest outcome for changes is somewhere between demonstrators' demands and the military's aspirations. However, the exact results of Mubarak's overthrow will remain a mystery for the near future.
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