One Step Forward, Two Steps Somewhere Else -- Egypt's Referendum

In a few ways the March 19 constitutional referendum in Egypt was a triumph.  However, it was ultimately not enough to foster a fully democratic state, and it may now set off a chain of events that will lead Egypt yet farther away from that end.  Nearly all elements of the referendum -- its drafting, its substantive content, its promotion, the process of the vote -- indicate the military committee's flimsy commitment to reform.  While the vote was historic, and there are several things to be happy about, the final product is not yet a democracy.  Sadly, it may be no more than a very well-dressed concession, which will alter the outward appearance of the government but leave all the vital parts of the ancien régime intact.

First, the good news.  The referendum passed in an orderly, fair vote, perhaps the cleanest and most credible of any in Egyptian history.  The reports on the conduct of polling (you can read a few here, here, and here) are pretty good; the vote was a dramatic improvement over recent elections in Egypt, which were spoiled by endemic violence, rigging, and extremely poor turnouts.  Some irregularities notwithstanding, the result of the vote is a fair expression of popular will, at least on the surface.

But like many previous so-called reforms in Egyptian politics, the devil is in the details.  The referendum was not rigged, it was not marred by widespread thuggery or vote-buying or corruption, and that is at least in part because there simply was not much at stake for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  The reforms themselves pave the way for another corrupt and self-serving regime, which once in place will have far-reaching executive power and little reason to oblige the needs of ordinary Egyptians.  It still allows for a highly selective nomination process which will filter out most non-establishment candidates for president.  While the amended constitution leaves the door open to more meaningful changes, the short time frame for elections favors elements that have no interest in greater liberalization, namely the NDP, its cronies, and the Muslim Brotherhood (though the Brotherhood is undergoing a fracturing process at the moment that may change it significantly in the coming months).

I do not doubt that the referendum's approval is genuine and fair.  However, it is notable that in spite of the droves of people seen waiting in lines at polling stations, less than half of Egypt's eligible voters actually did cast a ballot, or 18 million out of a possible 45 million.  Many of those who did not vote may have been against the amendments, and presumably many of them at least felt somewhat ambivalent; but regardless of their feelings this indicates that support for the amendments is not as overwhelming as the 77.2% yes vote may indicate.

Support for the referendum notwithstanding, Egypt has moved one step farther toward a shift in its political system, albeit a smaller one than many pro-reform activists would like to see.  Pluralism is likely to increase in post-Mubarak Egypt, at least for a while.  However, the established order, including the enormous NDP political machine, still holds many of the cards in this system.  It appears that if change in Egypt is to occur at all, it will have to be incremental.  Reformers must now turn from the referendum to prepare for parliamentary elections in September, which will be the next opportunity to bring real change onto the table.  An opposition parliament would have the power to call for a new constitution, and would be able to select delegates to draft it.  However, the opposition needs to create a far-reaching political message and turn a leaderless popular movement of once politically apathetic youth into a unified front against the patronage networks of the NDP and its allies.

Though the new constitutional amendments are substantially disappointing, their passage does not spell the end for democracy in Egypt.  There was no question that the military, given the chance to dictate the pace and content of reform, would meet only the bare minimum of demands for change and seek to preserve its own privileged status.  Of course, the military's strategic calculus is more daunting when it is as effectively practiced as it was during the referendum process.  Supporters of democratization in Egypt must remain mindful of the fact that they will not be given anything by the transitional government.  Liberal reform is seldom handed down from entrenched autocrats -- it will more likely need to be seized.