Although seldom useful, it's always fun to make predictions. Here are a few of mine for the near future in the Arab world and the broader Middle East:
1) Syria and Yemen will both become engulfed in civil war over the next year. This is not a particularly bold prediction because it may already be happening. In Yemen it is easy enough to pick out a few factions that will vie for power (here is an interesting discussion on the matter), but in Syria it is less clear. Certain parts of the military may turn against the Assad regime, or the regular army could start fighting against the other security agencies. The conflict could develop along sectarian lines, or the pro-democracy protest movements could become violent in response to continued crackdowns. In any case, the longer the Assad regime seeks to preserve itself, the greater the chance that Syria will devolve into civil war. It is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad and his ruling cadre would rather rip Syria apart than voluntarily leave power, or enact reforms and reconcile with protestors. Sadly, it also appears that they will have their way.
2) In the next 5-10 years Saudi Arabia's influence will increase, but it will not become a regional power broker. As other states weaken, Saudi Arabia's relative power will grow considerably. However, this increase in influence will probably be in spite of Saudi Arabia rather than because of it. Saudi Arabia is rich, well-armed, and is able to project its influence through support of conservative Islam throughout the Muslim world. The main historical competitors for regional dominance in the Arab world -- Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -- will probably not be able to project power beyond their borders in the near future. The major non-Arab players in the Middle East -- Turkey, Israel, and Iran -- have been caught off guard by the Arab uprisings and none are in position to take a leading regional role. This leaves Saudi Arabia more powerful by default. However, with an army that, though well equipped, has never won a war, the growing cost of maintaining order at home, and an ideology whose appeal has been diminishing in the Arab world for years and is further weakened by democratic movements, Saudi Arabia will not be able to establish its regional hegemony. For all its riches and all its military gewgaws, Saudi Arabia is still weak in several key respects, including its low human capital, dependence on foreign labor, growing difficulties in maintaining internal order, and reliance on foreign military assistance. Though it may become more assertive and more capable of dictating the course of events in the Middle East, it will remain a secondary player to the dominant power in the region, which will continue to be the United States for at least the next few years. That said, we come to my next prediction...
3) American influence in the Middle East will decline over the next decade, due to political incompetence rather than a decrease in real power. The United States has all the means to remain the sole hegemonic power in the Middle East, but its position will continue to weaken from poor leadership. Confronted with new challenges, American policy will not adapt fast enough to retain regional dominance. The United States will continue to be the major foreign power in the region as a whole, but amidst growing perceptions of its inability to influence the broader currents of Arab politics and the shifting regional dynamic, it will become gradually less important. The United States policy toward the Middle East is deeply flawed, and it will not change enough in the near future to avoid a significant loss of influence.
4) Tunisia and Egypt will both develop into democracies within the next five to seven years. At this point in time Tunisia's progress toward a complete democratic transition is far more substantial than Egypt's. The key difference is that in Tunisia the remaining elements of the old regime do not have a say in the transition process. In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is still in charge, and while the SCAF does not have any interest in governing, it also continues to hold the real power in Egypt, and is only willing to liberalize the political arena enough to protect itself and return to business as usual. Ultimately, though, time is on the side of the protestors; if their fundamental demand for representative government will not be abandoned, then eventually the military and the other powers-that-be in Egypt will recognize that it is in their interest to liberalize. Transitions in both countries are threatened most by economic disarray, but the momentum for political change is quite strong.
5) Morocco's attempt to placate protestors will fail. Always eager to cast itself as a different kind of autocracy, Morocco is currently entering a process of top-down reforms which the Palace refers to as "evolution" -- as opposed to "revolution," of course. After large-scale protests began in Morocco on February 20, the King attempted to get out ahead of reform movements by announcing a program of constitutional reforms that could considerably reduce his power and answer protestor's demands while not overtly acknowledging them. Now the announcement of constitutional reforms is imminent, to be followed by a referendum in early July and elections for a new parliament under the new constitution in early October. While superficially promising, these reforms will amount to little more than the cosmetic changes that King Mohammed VI has implemented since he came to the throne in 1999. The Moroccan protestors will not accept this token gesture, though it is unclear if they will be able to mount an uprising such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain.
6) The pro-democracy uprisings of 2011 will eventually be judged as a continuation of the past rather than a break from it. Given the dramatic nature of the uprisings in every corner of the Arab world, and the fall of two governments (perhaps three including Yemen), 2011 currently seems like a wild break from the political currents of the past. Yet over the long term, analysts will regard these movements as a continuation of the development of post-colonial political ideologies. The common thread between pan-Arabism, Islamism, and now the so-called Arab Spring, is the desire for self-determination and freedom from foreign influences. Pan-Arabism became the leading ideology of many Arab governments, perhaps most notably Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, but ultimately failed to achieve its goal of unifying the Arab people and freeing them from foreign domination. Islamism, though it became a powerful cultural force and an ideology of resistance to the status quo, was only embraced by governments at the margins of the Arab world. Today, the struggle for self-determination has taken a new tack. While Islamists remain an influential political force, the desire for political rights and popular sovereignty is now being expressed on a large scale in terms of democracy and good governance. This new development is not different in kind from the movements of the past, but rather in manner. Whether it will ultimately prevail and help the Arab people secure their rights is still uncertain, but it has already shown its potential to transform the political landscape of the Middle East as we know it, and may yet have even greater significance.
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