A Response to Issandr El Amrani

The Arabist blog is one of my favorite resources for commentary and miscellany on Arab politics.  Issandr El Amrani and everyone else at the Arabist do a fine job and their analysis is usually insightful and informative.  Though I do not always agree with Mr. El Amrani, he is very knowledgeable and I respect his perspective.  However, one of his posts today, called "Let's Buy Democracy," bothered me for a number of reasons, and I feel compelled to respond to him not just to offer a different perspective, but also to defend my profession.

Issandr starts by quoting a passage from a Washington Post article on the allocation of $150 million by the U.S. State Department for democracy promotion in Egypt (all I will ask here is why is there no comparable effort for Tunisia yet?).  The passage notes that high-level American officials have been exploring possible recipients for some of this funding, and that no local Egyptian groups have asked for financial help yet.  Issandr then criticizes democracy promotion as a whole by describing any organization that does accept American help as both parasitic and superfluous.  He goes on to label the practice of political party development, and presumably democracy promotion as a whole, as "sordid" and suggests that the money be spent elsewhere, possibly on NGOs that will collect data on human rights abuses in Egypt, or in economic aid.

While there are certainly flaws in democracy promotion policy, and I do not believe the American system is perfect, as someone who works to promote democratic development in the Middle East I feel it is necessary to point out the errors in Issandr's statements and offer a clarification of just what it is the $150 million of democracy funding will support.  In order of their occurrence, here are the most significant problems with Issandr's take on democracy promotion:

1) The Washington Post quotation is selective and misleading.  If one only reads the passage posted on the Arabist, it would seem that Egyptians have no interest in American support for their efforts to build a democracy (Issandr's comments also indicate he believes any Egyptian that does is a charlatan).  However, the Post article devotes nearly half its content to discussing the history of American organizations working with Egyptian democratic activists.  In particular the article discusses the activities of the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, both of which have worked in Egypt without the Mubarak government's permission since as early as 2003.  NDI and IRI have both worked closely with Egyptian NGOs and some politicians.  This cooperation has included training in the use of new media and communication in closed societies, election monitoring, reporting and documentation of human rights abuses, and anti-corruption.  This work is not done by cutting large checks to an aid-fattened elite -- it is relatively cheap and never offers financial support to local groups unless they are performing a service, for instance conducting a poll or focus group.  Activists have not only accepted the help of these organizations, they have specifically requested it and often risked harassment and arrest in order to receive it.  To imply that the work of these organizations has been met with disdain is deceptive.  Many of the activists who were instrumental in organizing protests during Egypt's uprising have worked with American organizations, including NDI and IRI, in the past, and their assistance has played a supportive role in the pro-democracy movements in several Arab countries, and in many other countries around the world.

2) The conflation of democracy promotion and political party development is incorrect.  Issandr remarks that he finds nothing more sordid than the idea of political party development, but discusses no other aspect of democracy promotion.  This creates an implication that the two are one and the same, but that is not the case.  In fact, political party development is one method of promoting democracy.  Organizations that specialize in liberalization and democratic development may provide assistance to activists and governments in any number of political and social areas, including political party training, improving the rule of law and transparency, election monitoring, human rights, responsive governance, civil society building, community participation, media freedom, and government oversight.  The United States government supports all of these efforts on a case-by-case basis -- different institutions of democracy promotion specialize in different areas, and they do not do the same work in every country.  In short, political party development is not the only tool of democracy promotion, nor is it the largest or most commonly used.

3) The misunderstanding of the actual work of political party development.  In addition to confusing party development with democracy promotion as a whole, Issandr hints at a deeper misconception of the practice.  Party development is not, as he implies, the artificial support of factions that would otherwise fail.  Parties, for all their limitations, can be an efficient way to organize a system of political debate and power sharing among interest groups and ideological blocs.  Political party development is not the creation of new parties and it is not designed to alter the politics of any given country.  Rather, it is intended to support the efficient functioning of the political arena.  This means helping parties develop constituencies based on distinct political perspectives and not on charismatic personalities or entrenched interest groups (these are two common problems among parties in the Middle East).  What development assistance most often entails is training in the construction of grassroots networks and mechanisms for responding to the needs of constituents.  A group of parties with diverse ideologies and issue-based platforms is integral to a healthy democracy.  Political party development seeks to help existing parties reach out to voters and serve as mechanisms for advancing political debate and representing different sectors of their country.  It is not, as Issandr seems to think, a scheme to advance foreign agendas or to unnaturally sustain marginal political groups (although this was often how it was portrayed by Egypt's authoritarian government, which was fully convinced that democracy promoters are the CIA in league with Mossad, Batman, and Glenn Beck).

4) The conclusion that funding is "better spent" on economic aid is flawed.  Issandr's final statement, that American aid is better spent on economic support, is problematic because it makes an either/or proposition when there is none.  There is no need to choose between democracy funding and economic assistance, because it is quite feasible to do both at the same time.  In fact, these two forms of assistance are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.  Assistance in reforming the rule of law, combating corruption, and creating an open environment for entrepreneurship could have a significant influence on economic recovery in Egypt, and would help attract badly needed foreign direct investment.  It is no secret that ongoing political instability is a major threat to economic progress in Egypt.  Insofar as democracy assistance can help create a stable climate for investment and development, it should be a welcome complement to direct financial aid.  Autocratic political systems throughout the Middle East have used economics as a tool to extend their control and co-opt potential threats to their power.  While the relationship between economic and political liberalization is non-deterministic, the two may be pursued concurrently, and the United States  can play a helpful role in both.

Democracy promotion is not the answer to all of Egypt's problems, nor is it the key to a successful transition from authoritarian rule.  However, international assistance can be useful to reformers and activists, and in some small ways it has contributed to the reform movements in Egypt and elsewhere.  Democracy promotion does not do the work Issandr seems to think it does, and it actually involves some of the work he says he would like to see, including economic assistance and documentation of human rights abuses and police brutality.  Though it suffers from several important shortcomings, it is not the sinister or pointless practice described in Issandr's post.  While it is personally satisfying to defend democracy promotion in response to such comments, ultimately the positive results of democracy promotion programs speak for themselves.

In the end, promoting democracy and liberalization in the Middle East is an expression of American interests in the region, and its effects can be far more positive than the previous approach of supporting autocrats and artificially sustaining their regimes.  While it is impossible to levy democracy from abroad, international involvement has proven itself as a critical factor in bringing about democratic transitions, and it may be a crucial element to democratization in the Middle East.