As time drags farther on from the breathless first moments of the Arab uprisings this winter, their precise meaning becomes ever more enigmatic. The early days of this year made it easy to see the interrelationship of politics among Arab states. Small protests in Tunisia became national movements throughout the entire Middle East and led to the fall of two seemingly intractable governments. The grievances of protestors, their demands, and their demography were remarkably uniform -- they even borrowed each other's slogans and shared tactics for staging rallies and for impromptu first aid. Their message, championed by pan-Arab satellite networks, was one of ideological unity against a status quo that was no longer acceptable.
In contrast, the second phase of the uprisings has brought the differences among Arab states to the fore. Due to their unique political dynamics, the uprisings have had different outcomes in each of the Arab states. Tunisia was the catalyst for the current upheaval, and it has gone farther than any other Arab country toward eliminating the old system. As in Tunisia, Egyptians forced their president to leave office, but many of the critical elements of his old regime remain, and they do not seem to be in imminent danger.
Elsewhere in the Arab world the autocrats have managed to survive for the moment. The three at the greatest risk of sudden overthrow are probably Muammar al-Qaddhafi of Libya, Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen, and Bashar al-Asad of Syria. Protests in each of these countries, and in Bahrain as well, have become quite bloody. In Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and Algeria, protests have earned concessions and promises for reform, but are probably not powerful enough to stage a revolution or seriously alter their governments.
So what exactly is happening in the Arab world? Instead of providing an opportunity for perspective, the passage of weeks and months has only offered confounding, contradictory, and ambiguous developments. In search of some readily comprehensible meaning, a host of old terms have been reassigned to the unrest in the Arab world. Tunisia's uprising became the Jasmine Revolution, a rehash of the term coined for Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's accession to power in 1987. The spread of protests became the Arab Spring, a term that has been used to describe various pro-reform movements in the Arab world since as early as 2003. While Eastern European revolutions were assigned colors, Arab uprisings have been assigned dates -- January 14 for Tunisia, January 25 or February 11 for Egypt, February 14 for Bahrain, February 17 for Libya, February 20 for Morocco. Yet none of these terms even hints at a greater understanding of what has transpired, and what it means over the long term, or what it means just for next week.
At the moment the ultimate significance of this period in Middle East history is probably not possible to predict with any precision, nor is there any certain outcome for the Arab awakening/ Spring/ Intifadah/ Fourth Wave/ Fifth Wave/ what-have-you. Still, the likely events fall within certain parameters. Here are three extreme scenarios for the near future; I believe the actual course of events will fall somewhere in between these possibilities:
1) Authoritarian Backlash. Unable to consolidate, democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt are co-opted by illiberal forces and a new version of the security state takes hold. Entrenched forces throughout the Middle East regain their footing and use extensive repression to cow their restive populations. Seeing the uprisings of early 2011 as a momentary interruption of the prevailing autocratic hold on the Middle East, foreign powers go about rebuilding relations with repressive regimes and drop calls for reform. The defeated protest movements feed a new generation of radicals and terrorist movements who once more become the most recognizable face of resistance against the region's governments and the foreign alliances that help sustain them. Iran seeks to capitalize on the continued marginalization of Shi'is and the broader lack of legitimacy among Arab governments to increase its regional influence.
2) Liberal Renaissance. Pro-democracy forces overcome massive odds and violent resistance from despotic incumbent regimes. With a few exceptions the movement spreads throughout the Arab world and orderly transitions eventually occur in most states. The United States recognizes the changing tide, and divests itself from longtime allies, forging new relationships based on mutually held security interests and economic partnership. With no foothold in the Arab world and lacking any significant ideological appeal, Iran's influence wanes. Other legacies of more radical Islamism moderate or become marginalized as they integrate further into democratic politics and adapt to existence in open societies.
3) Weak and Decentralized States. A series of internal political stalemates greatly weakens the post-colonial Arab system of states. Civil war in Libya results in a deadlock, and it breaks into two or more statelets. The central government in Yemen fades and its regions break into tribal enclaves or into loosely governed northern and southern divisions. Syria collapses and descends into violence as factions compete for power. Never strong states, Iraq and Lebanon further disintegrate. Egypt and Tunisia struggle to forge new governments, and trudge through long periods of disorder marked by strife and economic decline. Extremist groups are able to expand their operations and find many new recruits among orphans and other victims of the increased levels of violence and civil war. The modern map of Arab states slowly transforms as states break up.
While I do not believe that any of these scenarios will occur, none are entirely inconceivable. At any rate, it seems most likely that elements of all three will play out to varying degrees. Ultimately I expect the course of events to vary significantly from country to country; there is no discernible progression to the uprisings in the Arab world now, and it is a virtual certainty that none will arise going forward. There are too many differences and mitigating factors for one democratic movement to spread uniformly throughout the Middle East, or for one counter-revolution to roll back all of the past months' changes. In the short term, the authoritarian reprisal against reform movements has not crested yet. Saudi Arabia in particular is beginning to produce an authoritarians' response to the uprisings, and it is not pretty.
But in the end, no authoritarian backlash seems likely to prevent what has begun in the Arab world. The system of repression, patronage, and manipulation -- employed effectively by Arab leaders for decades -- is crumbling, and it is hard to imagine that things will return to the way they were. Even the most deeply entrenched dictators now seem beleaguered, vulnerable, and feckless against the tide of popular discontent. Some, perhaps even most, of the incumbent regimes may yet survive, but they will not escape unscathed, and they will not be able to continue ruling indefinitely. In many ways it seems only a matter of time before more dramatic changes arrive in the Arab world. The final influence of these changes on American interests in the Middle East will depend in part on how American policymakers respond to them. The options may not be clear, but the stakes certainly are. I will examine some of the factors shaping current American policy in the Middle East, and how the United States can respond constructively to the current state of affairs, in my next post.
Thank you--very interesting and informative.
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