Take a deep breath... the battle for reform is only just begun. Over the past few days, jubilation in Egypt over Hosni Mubarak's resignation has largely subsided, giving way to apprehension as Egyptians wait to learn more about the military's intentions for the transition. Protests persist and Midan Tahrir, the sentimental center of the protests in Cairo, remains occupied by activists. Still, the first major obstacle to democratization in Egypt has been removed, and it is possible now to seriously discuss reform and advance an agenda for transformation of the Egyptian state.
The Egyptian government as it existed -- until the military dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution pending a referendum -- was deeply flawed. There is no shortage of sensible and productive ideas for reform, in part because there is just so much that was wrong about the way government operated under Mubarak. A few good suggestions can be read here, here, here, here, and here -- this is not an exhaustive list, but it represents most of the reasonable proposals for transition toward democracy.
However, discussion of practicable democratic reform programs for Egypt may soon be little more than academic. While it is mostly clear what must happen for Egypt to liberalize, it is not clear whether the military cadre in charge of governing is remotely interested in relinquishing power, or whether the military even considers democracy a good idea.
Indeed, at present it seems far more likely that the military is pursuing a course of cosmetic reforms that will offer some concessions to the opposition and supporters of the protests, while leaving the system that they revolted against largely unchanged. The military has identified six articles of Egypt's current constitution for amendment by a special commission it appointed without consulting the opposition in a process devoid of transparency. The articles in question concern the election of the president and parliament, and in their current form they facilitate political exclusion and the perpetuation of a one-party system. However, the military council has not indicated any intention to repeal the notorious emergency law, one of the core demands of the protest movement. Egypt has been under some form of emergency law for all but three years since 1952 -- the law enables the regime to make arbitrary arrests, deny due process of the law, try citizens in military courts, restrict free assembly and association, and legalizes numerous other violations of civil rights. It provides the critical legal framework for the security apparatus to repress dissent and allow the incumbent regime to dominate the political arena.
While the articles being considered for amendment certainly need to be changed, the Egyptian constitution is little more than a patchwork of amendments and clauses that serve to consolidate power in the executive and eliminate avenues of political opposition (the most recent batch of amendments, 34 total, were added in two months during 2007). It is not a solid basis for a liberal state, but the military still intends to preserve it with only a few amendments. Meanwhile, Mubarak's cabinet remains in office and the military leadership continues to urge protestors to go home and leave reform to them, with just enough consultation to lend their final decisions a semblance of legitimacy.
Since 1952, Egypt has essentially been a military regime with a civilian face. The protests have torn off that face, forcing the suspension of parliament, the effective end of the National Democratic Party, and the resignation of the president. The military will seek to put on a new face, while keeping its same organs and vital mechanisms unchanged. For now, it does not seem interested in democratization or meaningfully addressing the numerous problems for which Egyptians have demanded a resolution.
The current situation in Egypt illustrates two basic principles of politics quite well. First, those who hold power will always seek to maintain the status quo, because they want to preserve their influence and prosperity. Second, decision-makers will always act in their self-interest, or at least according to their perception of it. Together these two principles may predict the military's approach to the current period of transition. They may also clarify a strategy for pressuring the regime to adopt a real program of reform that eventually brings about democratization in Egypt.
Egypt's military leadership has a very clear interest in preserving the status quo, a situation in which they enjoy power, prestige, and prosperity (the military has enormous holdings in the Egyptian economy, and military leaders have used its enterprises to considerably enrich themselves over the past generation). The protest movement has shaken the very foundations of this status quo, and the Egyptian people have clearly demanded a fundamental change to their government. The dysfunctions, corruption, and injustices that led the populace to rise up and unseat their president cannot be easily fixed while maintaining the favorable status quo. So the military will now go to great lengths to weaken, divide, and ultimately marginalize the opposition; its leaders will try to make enough concessions to defang the protestors but prevent truly meaningful reform. It is naïve to assume that the military would go against its own self-interest, and at the moment it clearly does not consider democratization a good way to preserve its prominence.
However, if the military can be persuaded to accept that it will benefit more from a stable democracy than from a tattered and broken autocracy, then reform has a chance. It will not be easy for top-level military commanders who have supported the current regime for decades to admit that they need to liberalize and allow greater political participation, but it is probably necessary. The military is an essential institution, and it cannot be forced relinquish its role and retire to a beachside redoubt. Instead, it must support true reform for the political process in Egypt to move forward.
Since 1952, Egypt has essentially been a military regime with a civilian face. The protests have torn off that face, forcing the suspension of parliament, the effective end of the National Democratic Party, and the resignation of the president. The military will seek to put on a new face, while keeping its same organs and vital mechanisms unchanged. For now, it does not seem interested in democratization or meaningfully addressing the numerous problems for which Egyptians have demanded a resolution.
The current situation in Egypt illustrates two basic principles of politics quite well. First, those who hold power will always seek to maintain the status quo, because they want to preserve their influence and prosperity. Second, decision-makers will always act in their self-interest, or at least according to their perception of it. Together these two principles may predict the military's approach to the current period of transition. They may also clarify a strategy for pressuring the regime to adopt a real program of reform that eventually brings about democratization in Egypt.
Egypt's military leadership has a very clear interest in preserving the status quo, a situation in which they enjoy power, prestige, and prosperity (the military has enormous holdings in the Egyptian economy, and military leaders have used its enterprises to considerably enrich themselves over the past generation). The protest movement has shaken the very foundations of this status quo, and the Egyptian people have clearly demanded a fundamental change to their government. The dysfunctions, corruption, and injustices that led the populace to rise up and unseat their president cannot be easily fixed while maintaining the favorable status quo. So the military will now go to great lengths to weaken, divide, and ultimately marginalize the opposition; its leaders will try to make enough concessions to defang the protestors but prevent truly meaningful reform. It is naïve to assume that the military would go against its own self-interest, and at the moment it clearly does not consider democratization a good way to preserve its prominence.
However, if the military can be persuaded to accept that it will benefit more from a stable democracy than from a tattered and broken autocracy, then reform has a chance. It will not be easy for top-level military commanders who have supported the current regime for decades to admit that they need to liberalize and allow greater political participation, but it is probably necessary. The military is an essential institution, and it cannot be forced relinquish its role and retire to a beachside redoubt. Instead, it must support true reform for the political process in Egypt to move forward.
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