The protests that rocked Egypt on January 25 surprised everyone involved -- foreign observers and governments, Egyptian politicians, the security services, even the protestors themselves seemed shocked at the magnitude of the moment. All of a sudden, a nation that had long endured humiliation and incompetent leadership had decided it could endure no more, something many, including myself, never expected to see in their lifetime.
Since then the Mubarak government's strategy to survive the crisis has come into focus as one of the rare "teachable moments" of authoritarian repression. The regime has deftly employed a cocktail of insincere conciliatory gestures and violent attacks that display an alarming level of disdain and indifference for the welfare and desires of its people. The major components of this strategy include:
1. Good Soldier, Bad Cop -- The military has been walking a tightrope in the streets since it was first called into service last week. Expressing support for peaceful protests and pledging not to intervene, the military sought to portray itself as a neutral institution. This initial neutrality has since turned to complicity, as soldiers did nothing to maintain law and order when the police withdrew from the streets, and as they stood aside and allowed plain-clothed regime agents and hired thugs to savagely attack unarmed protestors. The military has never shown any interest in supporting democracy. Instead, it has allowed the police to crack down on protestors while Hosni Mubarak placed a slew of military leaders in his new cabinet and appointed intelligence chief and general Omar Suleiman to the position of Vice President. Throughout the uprising the military has been careful not to cross the line of firing on peaceful demonstrations, while allowing the regime to use all other tools at its disposal to quell the protests. The result is a military which has taken an even stronger role in Egyptian politics and will be loath to relinquish it to the same activists whose slaughter it has enabled.
2. Hem, Haw, Hedge -- While turning the security services loose and arresting activists and reporters, President Mubarak and his inner circle have offered a number of ultimately worthless concessions, including Mubarak's pledge to step down from the presidency in September. The regime has offered several other meaningless concessions and empty promises, such as the firing of Mubarak's cabinet, promises of constitutional reform, and a review of disputed parliamentary elections. The ruling National Democratic Party has begun a game of musical chairs in which officials are being replaced by close allies and deputies in the spirit -- but not the palpable flesh -- of change. None of these maneuvers are superficially bad for democracy activists, but none of them require the regime to begin real reform. All of the signs thus far are that these measures will only serve to re-touch the pluralistic veneer that disguises the autocratic Egyptian leadership. Regime officials have promised reform before -- there is no reason to believe that this time they actually intend to change the system, because they only stand to lose by doing so. However, continuing to offer token concessions helps deflect international criticism and may entice some of the opposition into cooperation.
3. Blame Everyone Else -- The government continues to deflect criticism and identify scapegoats as the source of all trouble in Egypt. Former ministers Habib al-Adly, Ahmed el-Maghrabi, and Zuhair Garana, as well as Ahmed Ezz, a wealthy businessman, have all been banned from travel pending probes "to establish who was criminally and administratively responsible for all those events," according to the Ministry of Interior. The de rigeur threats of an Islamist takeover have also surfaced once again, and received inordinate attention in the West considering just how little the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's only Islamist party with significant popular support, has actually been involved in the protests thus far. It is not surprising that the Egyptian leadership would deny responsibility for its failures, but it is indicative of the systemic constraints that prevent the ruling cadre from pursuing any meaningful change, let alone democratization.
At present, the regime seems set to outlast the protestors, and intent on preserving the current system of one-party rule with heavy influence and decisive control from the military. The international community and especially the United States, after a week of reportedly trying to convince Egyptian leaders to embark on real change, has apparently settled for the subtle shift that has already occurred. On Saturday, press secretary Robert Gibbs called for such "concrete steps" as "dialogue" with the opposition. American and European policymakers have begun to express their support for Omar Suleiman as Vice President and for a "gradual transition" in Egypt. I doubt that President Obama, Hillary Clinton, or their European counterparts truly believe that democratization is possible with the current personnel managing a transition. Instead, they have decided to settle for a handoff from Mubarak to the next general, and they are ready to accept whatever that may entail in exchange for his cooperation on regional issues and military coordination.
If this is true, it spells the effective end of this episode in Egyptian history. Unprecedented domestic pressure has not yet been enough to convince the regime that it is time to liberalize, and with the support of the international community its seems that shift will not occur for some time yet. Of course, a change from one autocrat to another does not solve the numerous problems that have fomented the protests. If anything, it exacerbates them. Furthermore, failure to elicit a meaningful response from the government at this time opens the door to radicalization of an enormous generation of young Egyptians. That is a sobering prospect considering how much of the modern militant Islamist movement was born in Egyptian prisons. While Islamists have been conspicuously absent from the uprisings going on throughout the Arab world, they stand to gain if the current movement for reform is stifled with an American blessing. Islamist or not, protests are far more likely to be violent in the future if there is no other means for Egyptians to resist their repression. There are many dangers to a revolution in Egypt, but such a change will only be uglier and bloodier the longer it is delayed.
There is still a chance for these protests to become a true democratic movement (they are only twelve days old, after all). Power in the Egyptian state is mainly in the hands of the military, and if military leaders can be convinced that liberalization is necessary, liberalization can occur. So far the most senior military figures have shown they have no interest in modifying the current system. However, the army's younger junior officers and its rank and file could still turn for the protestors.
The United States can play a positive role not just by adding pressure to the army and working with regime leaders, but by aiding the opposition. The American military has very close relations with the Egyptian military, but American diplomats still need to cultivate relations with potential reformers in Egypt and offer them assistance. Public statements of unequivocal support for democracy and substantive actions -- such as refusal to conduct military training until solid steps are taken toward reform -- would give air to the embattled activists. While the United States has only limited options to influence what happens in Egypt, it can help by continuing calls for reform and encouraging the regime to heed them. Ultimately, the United States does not have much to lose; it is American military aid that has sustained the security apparatus, subsidized American wheat and other food products that have fed the Egyptian multitudes, and economic aid that has kept the country solvent. Egypt needs the United States as much, if not more, than the United States needs Egypt, and none of these measures would change that reality. However, Egypt's strategic value to the United States will continue to diminish as it loses any claim to leadership among Arab nations, and as it spends more and more resources on retaining the ancien regime. Protests so far have not shaken the regime's resolve to crush dissent and maintain its own dominance -- democracy supporters must now find a way to increase pressure and make it harder for Mubarak and his cronies to deny the will of their people.
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