Why Should We Care?

On this blog I frequently assert that promoting democracy in the Middle East is in the interests of the United States and is good foreign policy.  My primary arguments for this rest on a definition of American interests in the Middle East and an assessment of the major long-term threats to those interests.  If I had to boil it down to a phrase or two, the argument would go something like this: the most significant threat to long-term American dominance in the Middle East is the failure of regional allies to adequately maintain stability, and political and economic reforms are necessary today to do so; the most appropriate way for the United States to contribute to reform is through democracy promotion.

While I believe that democracy promotion should be an important component of any successful American policy in the Middle East (most especially in the Arab world), I seldom feel the need to justify my position to an audience outside the foreign policy/political science establishment.  However, today I would like to go a bit further and try to explain why an ordinary American who does not care about our foreign policy should still care (at least a little) about democracy promotion.

My desire to explain my ideas in a broader context was prompted by a recent series of surveys on American foreign policy conducted by Pew Research, which finds, not surprisingly, that Americans are not too interested in democracy promotion.  Enthusiasm for this year's "Arab Spring" seems low -- 23% of respondents said they thought it would be good for the United States, while the plurality, 36%, said it would have no effect at all.  Explicit democracy promotion was rated as the lowest among a list of priorities, with only 13% of respondents saying it was a long-term foreign policy goal (protecting U.S. jobs came in as the most common priority, indicated by 84% of respondents).  In a related survey, 46% of respondents agreed with the statement that the United States should "mind its own business" internationally, a notion that does not agree with democracy promotion as foreign policy.

So as someone who believes that democracy promotion in the Middle East is of vital strategic interest to the United States, and who has dedicated the last couple years of his life to better understanding and achieving this goal, do I think American public opinion has it wrong? Absolutely not.  At the end of the day, it is not hard to see why other priorities -- protecting jobs, energy independence, reduction of military commitments overseas, etc. -- are more important to most people than democracy promotion.

America's role in the Middle East is a result of one simple fact that few politicians are willing to admit: the only reason the United States has vital strategic interests in the Middle East is to maintain its position as the world's sole superpower.  In other words, global hegemony is the single real motivation for the extent to which American foreign policy, and the use of American power, is geared toward domination of the Middle East.  It follows, then, that the only reason (beyond a humanitarian or altruistic motivation) to care about democracy promotion in the region is a desire for continued American dominance of the international arena.  There are many compelling arguments for democracy promotion in the region, but most of them are only valid if one believes that the  United States should strive to be a global power.

This notion has never been universally accepted in the United States, which has a longstanding isolationist streak.  In times of economic downturn such as the current period, when there are more than enough urgent domestic problems to be addressed, influence abroad becomes less attractive even to those that do believe the United States should be a world leader.

Furthermore, the primary goal of foreign policy is always to protect a state's interests.  Since it is often portrayed as a humanitarian cause which does not relate directly to American security or prosperity, and since its benefits are indirect and often intangible, democracy promotion appears to be exactly the kind of quixotic foreign adventure that is so unpopular among the general public (although it cannot hold a theoretical, financial, or political candle to such projects as the Global War on Terror when it comes to quixotic).

Let's recap: democracy promotion is good policy if the United States is interested in maintaining its global hegemony.  So long as one accepts that it is worthwhile for the United States to be a world superpower, democracy promotion in the Middle East is in its interests.  Projects such as global dominance and political and social reform abroad seem far less appealing when American society appears to be crumbling.  This is exacerbated by the fact that it is not easy to explain how democracy promotion directly benefits the American people, especially when one does not want to bring up the whole hegemony thing.  So then, if all this is true, why should Americans care about democracy promotion?

I believe there are many reasons, but in the most pragmatic terms democracy promotion is a solid investment.  American prosperity has come to depend on its position as a world superpower, and American security is now deeply linked with events in the Middle East.  Democracy promotion is a far more affordable and far less bloody way to preserve American interests in the Middle East than other options, such as the war in Iraq, secret drone strikes, proxy wars, an enormous network of bases, and an immense security/counterterrorism industry.  Financially, democracy promotion is a drop in the security budget bucket, and in the long term it is one of the only attractive solutions to the social and political challenges facing the Middle East.  While democracy promotion does not come in as a priority over jobs, immediate security, prosperity, and a whole range of other political issues, it does not have to.  It is cheap, effective, and low-risk.  Successful democracy promotion in the Middle East offers American taxpayers a substantial return on investment, and that is reason enough to care about it.

A Guide to Tunisia's Political Transition

Since January 14, 2011, Tunisia has embarked on an ambitious course of political reform and democratic transition.  An interim National Unity Government (NUG) has been appointed in the wake of the old regime to handle day-to-day affairs, and elections are scheduled for October 23 to elect a National Constituent Assembly, which will rewrite the constitution.  In addition to the NUG, a host of independent committees have been appointed to develop an administrative structure for the transition period, each charged with different and sometimes redundant tasks.  Though there is currently no law defining what a political party is or regulating their activities, parties are proliferating and beginning to campaign for support; most will field candidates to serve as delegates in the National Constituent Assembly.

Amidst all the commotion that has come from numerous and often un-coordinated attempts to develop liberal democratic processes in a recently eviscerated autocracy, it can be difficult at times to know exactly who is in charge.  For example, the Ministry of Interior, which has been led by three different individuals in the past five months and is responsible for licensing political parties, often does not seem to know just how many political parties it actually has cleared to operate legally (estimates range from 80 to 100 unique groups, including several that use the same name).

Here, in as simple a way as I can present it, is a diagram of the current government and various other authorities responsible for managing a democratic transition in Tunisia.  I have not included the Parliament because they have ceded all legal authority to the President, and I have not included regional and local government because the level of organization varies so much among the provinces.  Each of the three bodies described below are administratively independent and held together by little more than mutual consensus.  Without further ado, here is Tunisia's current and soon-to-be political hierarchy:

Speculation and Conjecture: Some Future Predictions

Although seldom useful, it's always fun to make predictions.  Here are a few of mine for the near future in the Arab world and the broader Middle East:


1) Syria and Yemen will both become engulfed in civil war over the next year.  This is not a particularly bold prediction because it may already be happening.  In Yemen it is easy enough to pick out a few factions that will vie for power (here is an interesting discussion on the matter), but in Syria it is less clear.  Certain parts of the military may turn against the Assad regime, or the regular army could start fighting against the other security agencies.  The conflict could develop along sectarian lines, or the pro-democracy protest movements could become violent in response to continued crackdowns.  In any case, the longer the Assad regime seeks to preserve itself, the greater the chance that Syria will devolve into civil war.  It is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad and his ruling cadre would rather rip Syria apart than voluntarily leave power, or enact reforms and reconcile with protestors.  Sadly, it also appears that they will have their way.

2) In the next 5-10 years Saudi Arabia's influence will increase, but it will not become a regional power broker.  As other states weaken, Saudi Arabia's relative power will grow considerably.  However, this increase in influence will probably be in spite of Saudi Arabia rather than because of it.  Saudi Arabia is rich, well-armed, and is able to project its influence through support of conservative Islam throughout the Muslim world.  The main historical competitors for regional dominance in the Arab world -- Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -- will probably not be able to project power beyond their borders in the near future.  The major non-Arab players in the Middle East -- Turkey, Israel, and Iran -- have been caught off guard by the Arab uprisings and none are in position to take a leading regional role.  This leaves Saudi Arabia more powerful by default.  However, with an army that, though well equipped, has never won a war, the growing cost of maintaining order at home, and an ideology whose appeal has been diminishing in the Arab world for years and is further weakened by democratic movements, Saudi Arabia will not be able to establish its regional hegemony.  For all its riches and all its military gewgaws, Saudi Arabia is still weak in several key respects, including its low human capital, dependence on foreign labor, growing difficulties in maintaining internal order, and reliance on foreign military assistance.  Though it may become more assertive and more capable of dictating the course of events in the Middle East, it will remain a secondary player to the dominant power in the region, which will continue to be the United States for at least the next few years.  That said, we come to my next prediction...

3) American influence in the Middle East will decline over the next decade, due to political incompetence rather than a decrease in real power.  The United States has all the means to remain the sole hegemonic power in the Middle East, but its position will continue to weaken from poor leadership.  Confronted with new challenges, American policy will not adapt fast enough to retain regional dominance.  The United States will continue to be the major foreign power in the region as a whole, but amidst growing perceptions of its inability to influence the broader currents of Arab politics and the shifting regional dynamic, it will become gradually less important.  The United States policy toward the Middle East is deeply flawed, and it will not change enough in the near future to avoid a significant loss of influence.


4) Tunisia and Egypt will both develop into democracies within the next five to seven years.  At this point in time Tunisia's progress toward a complete democratic transition is far more substantial than Egypt's.  The key difference is that in Tunisia the remaining elements of the old regime do not have a say in the transition process.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is still in charge, and while the SCAF does not have any interest in governing, it also continues to hold the real power in Egypt, and is only willing to liberalize the political arena enough to protect itself and return to business as usual.  Ultimately, though, time is on the side of the protestors; if their fundamental demand for representative government will not be abandoned, then eventually the military and the other powers-that-be in Egypt will recognize that it is in their interest to liberalize.  Transitions in both countries are threatened most by economic disarray, but the momentum for political change is quite strong.

5) Morocco's attempt to placate protestors will fail.  Always eager to cast itself as a different kind of autocracy, Morocco is currently entering a process of top-down reforms which the Palace refers to as "evolution" -- as opposed to "revolution," of course.  After large-scale protests began in Morocco on February 20, the King attempted to get out ahead of reform movements by announcing a program of constitutional reforms that could considerably reduce his power and answer protestor's demands while not overtly acknowledging them.  Now the announcement of constitutional reforms is imminent, to be followed by a referendum in early July and elections for a new parliament under the new constitution in early October.  While superficially promising, these reforms will amount to little more than the cosmetic changes that King Mohammed VI has implemented since he came to the throne in 1999.  The Moroccan protestors will not accept this token gesture, though it is unclear if they will be able to mount an uprising such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain.


6) The pro-democracy uprisings of 2011 will eventually be judged as a continuation of the past rather than a break from it.  Given the dramatic nature of the uprisings in every corner of the Arab world, and the fall of two governments (perhaps three including Yemen), 2011 currently seems like a wild break from the political currents of the past.  Yet over the long term, analysts will regard these movements as a continuation of the development of post-colonial political ideologies.  The common thread between pan-Arabism, Islamism, and now the so-called Arab Spring, is the desire for self-determination and freedom from foreign influences.  Pan-Arabism became the leading ideology of many Arab governments, perhaps most notably Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, but ultimately failed to achieve its goal of unifying the Arab people and freeing them from foreign domination.  Islamism, though it became a powerful cultural force and an ideology of resistance to the status quo, was only embraced by governments at the margins of the Arab world.  Today, the struggle for self-determination has taken a new tack.  While Islamists remain an influential political force, the desire for political rights and popular sovereignty is now being expressed on a large scale in terms of democracy and good governance.  This new development is not different in kind from the movements of the past, but rather in manner.  Whether it will ultimately prevail and help the Arab people secure their rights is still uncertain, but it has already shown its potential to transform the political landscape of the Middle East as we know it, and may yet have even greater significance.

Three Down? Yemen Passes a Turning Point

The protest movement in Yemen has been one of the most consistent, universal, and long-lasting of the recent wave of uprisings in the Arab world.  President Ali Abdallah Saleh, who has been in power in Yemen in some capacity since 1978, held on for nearly five months after major upheavals against him began in January.  After a seemingly endless array of failed resignation deals, protestors received their first genuine piece of good news over the weekend when Saleh left Yemen for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, along with a substantial entourage including key ministers of his government; it is a distinct likelihood that he will not return, even if he wants to (though that does not necessarily mean that his regime is finished).

What will happen now in Yemen is beyond me.  Saleh's Vice President is Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and that is more or less all I know about him.  Comparatively, though, of the three Arab states to force their presidents to leave power this year, Yemen is in the least advantageous position to emerge as a democracy, or as a functional centralized state of any kind, for that matter.  Yemen is currently on the verge of a serious humanitarian emergency.  Yemen is the poorest Arab country, with paltry natural resources, the highest birthrate in the world, the lowest rate of women's literacy in the world, and with an Islamic extremist presence of ever-growing concern.  It is awash in illegal arms and will run out of water in about ten years.  Never a harmonious state, it has suffered years of low-level internecine violence.  Saleh was an autocrat like Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, but he and his government seem never to have had much control over their territory.

Saleh's departure is good news for pro-democracy protestors -- a democratic transition was essentially impossible for as long as he remained in power.  However much the chances of such a transition have improved, they remain alarmingly slim.  The courage of peaceful protestors throughout Yemen has been inspiring, but it was an act of violence from a tribal militia that eventually sent Saleh packing.  As long as armed clans are the power-brokers in Yemen, it will remain a weak state, one with little chance of becoming a successful democracy.

As with the transitions currently underway in Egypt and Tunisia, there are a seemingly limitless number of possible outcomes for Yemen.  One possibility that is not shared with either Egypt or Tunisia is that Yemen as we now know it could disintegrate entirely.  Considering the spread of violence through the country now, and the difficulty of maintaining order throughout the past fifty years, a national government over all of Yemen may not replace Saleh.  It is possible that it could split into northern and southern realms, or disintegrate even further into tribal enclaves and small urbanized statelets around Aden, Sanaa, and the the major cities in between.

In any case, the Arab uprisings continue to demonstrate both the unity and the diversity of the Arab world.  While social unrest has swept nearly the entire region, its outcomes have varied significantly in each country.  The complaints of the protestors are remarkably similar, but government responses have covered a broad spectrum; outcomes have ranged from brutal crackdowns, to moderately successful appeasement, to government collapse and even civil war.  Three states have now managed to force their leaders out of power, but each case is quite different from the other, and illustrative of different and unique trends in modern Arab politics.  As events develop in the Arab world they seem less coherent in some ways and more so in others.

However, it is important to note what remains the same -- Arabs everywhere in the Middle East are demanding democratic rights and popular sovereignty.  The United States would be unwise to oppose this, but it is caught in a difficult situation because its alliances in the region have been based on support for autocrats.  There is no graceful way out of this quandary, but it is essential that American policymakers find a way to support democratic change in the Middle East now.  The status quo is shifting under our feet, and to ignore this and pursue business as usual could have dire consequences.  Yemen is an instructive example of what is at stake -- while democracy is still a faint hope there, the alternatives could be disastrous and are all too easy to imagine.

Some Reading, and a Read-out on Egypt's Second Day of Anger

This will have to be a brief post because I am short on time.  First, some reading recommendations -- here are a couple excellent pieces on the Arab uprisings as a regional phenomenon:


Larry Diamond in Foreign Affairs: "A Fourth Wave or False Start?  Democracy After the Arab Spring"

Michael Hudson for Jadaliyya: "Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reflections on the Current Wave of Protest in the Arab World"

Also worth checking out are Joseph Stiglitz's piece on Tunisia in the Financial Times, this article in Bloomberg News from Vali Nasr on the Saudi campaign to quash political reform throughout the Arab world, and this anonymous article on the Syrian media from the Daily Beast. 

One major news story to watch tomorrow and into the weekend is a new protest in Midan Tahrir in Egypt planned for this Friday.  This protest, which is intended to voice dissatisfaction with the current transition process and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), is a sign of the military's loss of favor with the Egyptian public.  During the January and February uprising, the military enjoyed a high level of public support.  This illusion was bound to fade as the transition period got under way, because the military in fact has no interest in democratization and has its own agenda for reform which does not match well with the general needs of most Egyptians.  The past few weeks have served to reveal the gap between what the military wants and what Egyptians want.  It is no accident that this Friday is being referred to as the "Friday to Save the Revolution" -- the SCAF's incompetent management and unwillingness to enact a transparent, democratic reform process is the greatest threat to the ideals of the Egyptian revolution, and activists seem to be running out of patience.

I am encouraged by these protests insofar as I believe the only way the SCAF will liberalize Egypt is under enormous popular pressure.  Protests such as these will be crucial to convince the military leadership that they need to make a more sincere commitment to meaningful political reform.  At the same time, I worry that demonstrations may not be enough in the end.  When Hosni Mubarak was still in power, activist groups were unified around one cause.   Since Mubarak stepped down on February 11, some divisions have emerged, and the military has quietly undermined the protest movements by allowing sectarian violence and rounding up political dissidents.  The repression is not really so quiet anymore -- on Thursday the army arrested four activists who had called for a Friday protest.  I think time is ultimately on the side of the protestors, but in the short term one must wonder if they will be able to sustain the necessary level of pressure to get real results from the SCAF.

One of the more interesting subplots in these protests is the role the Muslim Brotherhood and lesser Islamist groups are playing.  The Brotherhood's commitment to democracy has been a subject of debate for years; one camp of analysts has maintained that at bottom they are anti-democratic, while another camp argues that they are willing to share power and participate in democratic governments.  I have always fallen in the latter camp, but this week the Brotherhood has weakened my position by announcing its opposition to the Friday protests, siding clearly with the military.  Salafi groups, never considered pro-democratic by anyone, have also come down against the protests.

At the moment the MB does not seem concerned with the fate of Egyptian democracy, but with their own political fortunes.  The current transition is an unprecedented opportunity for the Brotherhood to gain power in an Egyptian government, and they seem more concerned with power than with true political reform.  They were slow to jump on the January 25 revolution bandwagon, and it seems they are still reluctant to do anything that might hurt the chances of increasing their relative control of Egyptian politics.  While this seems like it could change, it is still a discouraging sign.

Small Talk -- Obama Stays the Course

President Obama's speech (text here) on May 19 was billed as the announcement of a bold new strategy; when she introduced the President, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton extolled an "innovative" new approach that would change American foreign policy in the region.  What the President delivered was more a reaffirmation of past American policy, with a subtle shift in emphasis.  Of course, it was also exemplary of Obama's unique talent to deliver an even-handed, considered speech that balances multiple contradictory interests, and somehow leaves everyone pissed off and disappointed.

The speech was not well received anywhere in the Middle East.  In Israel President Obama's totally unremarkable (more on this later) reference to the 1967 borders as a basis of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations was described by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu as "indefensible." Palestinians were not pleased with Obama's speech either;  Fatah leader and occasional negotiator Nabil Shaath remarked that it contained "little hope" for Palestinians.  In the rest of the Middle East, reactions were subdued.  Aside from the fact that they have more pressing matters to worry about in Damascus, Cairo, and elsewhere, the President just did not say much in the way of bold and new.

Unlike many other observers, I was not disappointed by President Obama's speech.  Perhaps that is because I had somewhat low expectations, but I think in general it was neither a triumph nor an aberration.  The President said what needed to be said and nothing more.  In its present position the United States is forced to promulgate a cautious and inherently contradictory policy.  President Obama has shown no desire to transcend these contradictions or to take any unnecessary risks in his approach to the Middle East, and so it was unrealistic to believe his speech would announce anything unconventional.  Perhaps it is a matter of perspective, too; as someone who believes that the rules of international politics have not changed much over centuries, I tend to view anything heralded as a major shift in foreign policy to be more comical than momentous.

Of course, the portion of the President's speech that has received the most attention was his reference to the Israeli borders of 1967 as the basis for a peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  This is apparently the first time an American president has explicitly referred to the pre-1967 borders, but it is hardly a new idea (in fact, it is 44 years old).  Furthermore, the United States has implicitly agreed to use the pre-1967 borders as the basis for peace by supporting and upholding UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, and UNSCR 338, adopted in October 1973, not to mention every single Israel-Palestine peace plan endorsed by the United States ever.  The hubbub around this is based on hype, not facts.

Ultimately, however, Israel-Palestine was a relatively minor topic of the speech, and one of less interest to the Middle East as a whole.  The consequential news for the past five months has been coming from elsewhere in the region, and the Arab uprisings were appropriately the focus of President Obama's speech.  While it did not announce any major shift in American policy, the President's speech did acknowledge that a course correction is necessary.  President Obama came into office with the intention of "resetting" American relations with the Muslim world.  This reset should have meant a new focus on eliminating the pathologies perpetuated by American foreign policy over the past generation -- a redefinition of how the United States would relate to the states of the Middle East, and an acknowledgment of the harm it has done both to its interests and to Arab societies by aiding and abetting the predatory and abusive rule of autocrats and despots without regard for the welfare of their people.  Instead, it was a reaffirmation of such alliances, as political reform was thrown off the table in bilateral relations with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other American allies.  The Obama administration was virtually allergic to democracy promotion in the region, until it became impossible to ignore this past winter.

The President admitted as much in his speech, though whether he means what he said is yet to be seen.  Indeed, his words indicate that he realizes that the United States has been a part of the problem in Middle Eastern politics, but can still be a part of the solution.  Furthermore, the speech indicated that he understands that the necessary shift in American policy is one of method, not of philosophy.  Not only did he say that the United States will continue to pursue its interests, he correctly stated that American interests include meaningful political and economic reform in the Middle East.

In the short term, these remarks simply mean that the United States will continue its reactive, ad-hoc policy toward the Arab uprisings.  This is not such a bad thing in itself -- it certainly could be bad, if the Obama administration uses poor judgment in its reaction to events in the region (I would argue that in fact this has been happening in at least Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, but not to the extent that some Obama detractors would have you believe).  While I would like things to be simpler and more clear cut, considering the inherent difficulties of protecting all American interests in the region at this time, ad-hoc reactions may be the best one can hope for.

In the end, the President's speech was typical of his leadership style.  He remains cautious and risk-averse, interested in balancing between what he sees as conflicting goals in American policy.  He willfully rejected the cause of political reform in the Middle East before, but now cannot avoid it.  The events of the past months will not drastically alter his former approach the way the September 11, 2001 attacks did for George W. Bush.  In the end, the President gave no indication that he intends to move beyond business as usual in the Middle East.  It is a shame, but it seems that the Arab uprisings are being viewed in the American policy establishment as an obstacle rather than an opportunity.  Still, it is clear as well that circumstances are forcing a change in perspective; one can only hope that this change will come quickly enough for the United States to have a more positive impact.

Ex-speech-tations

Tomorrow (Thursday, May 19) Barack Obama will deliver an address to the American people and the international community on events in the Arab world and American policy in the Middle East.  The speech is expected to touch on a wide range of issues, from the killing of Osama bin Laden to the democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, to the Israel-Palestine conflict.  President Obama is expected to unveil a plan for economic aid to support democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, and some are hoping he will articulate a clear strategy for the American approach to a changing Middle East.  In terms of specific policy, expectations are that the President will outline in some way a regional strategy for response to the democratic wave in the Arab world.  It is believed he will indicate the United States' position on the reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and its effect on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

I do not know what the President will say tomorrow, but personally I am prepared for disappointment.  It will be a surprise to me if he actually goes into specific details on any of the current issues at play in the region, and even more if he announces a new strategic approach.  Still, it will be enlightening in other ways.  I will provide a full reaction to the speech after it is delivered, but for now, I will simply share what I would wish to hear from President Obama.  I understand that he cannot say many of the things I list below in a public speech, but I will be looking for indications that he or his administration understand them, and that they are employing a prudent and considered strategy to navigate the current challenges they face.

• The United States' relationships with Middle Eastern states is based on vital strategic interests.  For years these interests have been pursued with little regard for the health of Arab societies or the long-term sustainability of American-allied Arab regimes.  While this was often adequate to serve American interests, it has cased enormous systemic problems in the Arab world which can only be resolved by political and economic reform.  The uprisings of 2011 mark a historic milestone in the struggle of Arab peoples for liberty, dignity, and popular sovereignty.
• The United States can no longer ignore domestic politics in the Middle East.  The needs and aspirations of Arab peoples are legitimate and must be represented by their leaders.  The stability of the Arab world is paramount to American interests in the region, and the only basis for true stability over generations is effective, accountable governance.  
• In continuing to protect its interests and deepen relationships with its allies, the United States will stand unequivocally for the inalienable rights and dignity of the Arab people, and furthermore for all people across the globe.
• The overthrow of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt is a historic opportunity to create flourishing democracies in the Arab world.  The United States will contribute to this effort with economic and technical assistance as necessary to ensure the success of the transitions currently underway.  This support is offered not to impose an American solution, but to allow the Tunisians and Egyptians the necessary means to fulfill the goals of their revolution.  No state can will itself to democracy; American assistance will ensure that the Tunisians and Egyptians do not need to.
• Regarding the United States' autocratic allies, American policy will seek opportunities for reform and will encourage governments to respond to the legitimate demands of their people.  In the past there has been too little pressure and too much complacency toward despotic rulers.  It is not the place of the United States to forcibly remove these rulers, but what leverage exists to promote reform will be fully utilized.  The United States will also support democratic activists and protect them as best it can from repression.
• The United States' response will be on a country by country basis and will often seem hypocritical.  However, in this time it is crucial to understand the unique circumstances of reform movements and individual governments' willingness to change.  Rather than operate on vague region-wide assumptions, policy will be determined by intimate knowledge of the country in question and the potential for American influence there.
• The United States cannot expect stability by allying itself with coercive and corrupt governments, and neither can Israel expect peace through coercion and subjugation of the Palestinian people.  It is a great wish of Americans and people throughout the world to see peace in Israel-Palestine, but it is clearly not the wish of important power brokers on both sides.  While the United States will do whatever it can to facilitate negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, peace will not be possible until both sides are ready to make the necessary concessions.  The parameters of a two state solution are nearly unchanged since the 1970s; the major obstacle to peace is not lack of a reasonable solution, but the will of the parties involved to make political sacrifices.
• The United States, like all nations, designs its policy first and foremost to serve the interests of its people.  This is as true today in the Middle East as it is for any other region of the world at any other time in American history.  Today these interests are shared with the vast majority of Arab people: liberalization and protection of fundamental rights, political and social stability, economic progress, resistance to violent extremism, and peace in Israel and Palestine.  The United States will seek to cooperate with people throughout the Arab world to achieve these common goals.