Speculation and Conjecture: Some Future Predictions

Although seldom useful, it's always fun to make predictions.  Here are a few of mine for the near future in the Arab world and the broader Middle East:


1) Syria and Yemen will both become engulfed in civil war over the next year.  This is not a particularly bold prediction because it may already be happening.  In Yemen it is easy enough to pick out a few factions that will vie for power (here is an interesting discussion on the matter), but in Syria it is less clear.  Certain parts of the military may turn against the Assad regime, or the regular army could start fighting against the other security agencies.  The conflict could develop along sectarian lines, or the pro-democracy protest movements could become violent in response to continued crackdowns.  In any case, the longer the Assad regime seeks to preserve itself, the greater the chance that Syria will devolve into civil war.  It is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad and his ruling cadre would rather rip Syria apart than voluntarily leave power, or enact reforms and reconcile with protestors.  Sadly, it also appears that they will have their way.

2) In the next 5-10 years Saudi Arabia's influence will increase, but it will not become a regional power broker.  As other states weaken, Saudi Arabia's relative power will grow considerably.  However, this increase in influence will probably be in spite of Saudi Arabia rather than because of it.  Saudi Arabia is rich, well-armed, and is able to project its influence through support of conservative Islam throughout the Muslim world.  The main historical competitors for regional dominance in the Arab world -- Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -- will probably not be able to project power beyond their borders in the near future.  The major non-Arab players in the Middle East -- Turkey, Israel, and Iran -- have been caught off guard by the Arab uprisings and none are in position to take a leading regional role.  This leaves Saudi Arabia more powerful by default.  However, with an army that, though well equipped, has never won a war, the growing cost of maintaining order at home, and an ideology whose appeal has been diminishing in the Arab world for years and is further weakened by democratic movements, Saudi Arabia will not be able to establish its regional hegemony.  For all its riches and all its military gewgaws, Saudi Arabia is still weak in several key respects, including its low human capital, dependence on foreign labor, growing difficulties in maintaining internal order, and reliance on foreign military assistance.  Though it may become more assertive and more capable of dictating the course of events in the Middle East, it will remain a secondary player to the dominant power in the region, which will continue to be the United States for at least the next few years.  That said, we come to my next prediction...

3) American influence in the Middle East will decline over the next decade, due to political incompetence rather than a decrease in real power.  The United States has all the means to remain the sole hegemonic power in the Middle East, but its position will continue to weaken from poor leadership.  Confronted with new challenges, American policy will not adapt fast enough to retain regional dominance.  The United States will continue to be the major foreign power in the region as a whole, but amidst growing perceptions of its inability to influence the broader currents of Arab politics and the shifting regional dynamic, it will become gradually less important.  The United States policy toward the Middle East is deeply flawed, and it will not change enough in the near future to avoid a significant loss of influence.


4) Tunisia and Egypt will both develop into democracies within the next five to seven years.  At this point in time Tunisia's progress toward a complete democratic transition is far more substantial than Egypt's.  The key difference is that in Tunisia the remaining elements of the old regime do not have a say in the transition process.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is still in charge, and while the SCAF does not have any interest in governing, it also continues to hold the real power in Egypt, and is only willing to liberalize the political arena enough to protect itself and return to business as usual.  Ultimately, though, time is on the side of the protestors; if their fundamental demand for representative government will not be abandoned, then eventually the military and the other powers-that-be in Egypt will recognize that it is in their interest to liberalize.  Transitions in both countries are threatened most by economic disarray, but the momentum for political change is quite strong.

5) Morocco's attempt to placate protestors will fail.  Always eager to cast itself as a different kind of autocracy, Morocco is currently entering a process of top-down reforms which the Palace refers to as "evolution" -- as opposed to "revolution," of course.  After large-scale protests began in Morocco on February 20, the King attempted to get out ahead of reform movements by announcing a program of constitutional reforms that could considerably reduce his power and answer protestor's demands while not overtly acknowledging them.  Now the announcement of constitutional reforms is imminent, to be followed by a referendum in early July and elections for a new parliament under the new constitution in early October.  While superficially promising, these reforms will amount to little more than the cosmetic changes that King Mohammed VI has implemented since he came to the throne in 1999.  The Moroccan protestors will not accept this token gesture, though it is unclear if they will be able to mount an uprising such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain.


6) The pro-democracy uprisings of 2011 will eventually be judged as a continuation of the past rather than a break from it.  Given the dramatic nature of the uprisings in every corner of the Arab world, and the fall of two governments (perhaps three including Yemen), 2011 currently seems like a wild break from the political currents of the past.  Yet over the long term, analysts will regard these movements as a continuation of the development of post-colonial political ideologies.  The common thread between pan-Arabism, Islamism, and now the so-called Arab Spring, is the desire for self-determination and freedom from foreign influences.  Pan-Arabism became the leading ideology of many Arab governments, perhaps most notably Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, but ultimately failed to achieve its goal of unifying the Arab people and freeing them from foreign domination.  Islamism, though it became a powerful cultural force and an ideology of resistance to the status quo, was only embraced by governments at the margins of the Arab world.  Today, the struggle for self-determination has taken a new tack.  While Islamists remain an influential political force, the desire for political rights and popular sovereignty is now being expressed on a large scale in terms of democracy and good governance.  This new development is not different in kind from the movements of the past, but rather in manner.  Whether it will ultimately prevail and help the Arab people secure their rights is still uncertain, but it has already shown its potential to transform the political landscape of the Middle East as we know it, and may yet have even greater significance.

Getting Syrious

Hama, Syria --1982

Until now I have withheld from making too many comments about Syria, for two reasons: 1) I am not an expert on Syria, and there are quite a few people who know the country far better than I do, and 2) I did not want to pass judgment on the American reaction to the Syrian uprising until there was a clear political or diplomatic response from the Obama Administration.

Well, depending on when you start counting, it has been between four and five weeks since protests began, and at least three weeks since violence escalated significantly.  The Syrian government led by Bashar al-Asad has resorted to brutal repression of dissent, first attacking, arresting, or shooting peaceful protesters, and now simply killing indiscriminately.  While making preposterously trivial political concessions, such as repealing Syria's long standing emergency law while continuing a brutal onslaught against the protesters, Asad's regime has essentially declared war on its own people.  This is certainly not the first time that political dissent has been met with bloody reprisals in Syria.  The recent violence, especially the military occupation of Deraa, has drawn comparisons to the 1982 massacre of Muslim Brothers in Hama, which crushed a low-level militant Islamist resistance that had begun in the late 1970s.

The current period of unrest bears little resemblance to that era.  The protest movement in Syria is nationwide, not isolated in one city, and its supporters come from diverse backgrounds.  The movement is not Islamist, although Islamists are participating in the protests.  Rather, it is motivated by widespread disillusion with the Asad government, its corruption, economic mismanagement, violation of civil liberties, and merciless repression of any and all forms of dissent.  Like other pro-reform movements that have recently swept the Arab world, there is no clear leadership or platform for the protests; people are not united by an organization, but by a set of common, basic aspirations, not the least of which is to end the Baathist regime and the tyranny of the Asad family.  In fact, the only aspect of past strife that bears any close resemblance to the current uprising is the unduly violent response from the Syrian government.

Syria was long picked out as a sort of bulwark of authoritarianism, one of the least likely Arab states to become embroiled in a mass uprising.  Bashar al-Asad was considered relatively popular and more than capable of quashing any opposition.  It was expected that memories of Hama and pervasive security forces would intimidate and discourage Syrians from speaking out against their government.  While this has not turned out to be true -- protests did reach Syria, and a nationwide protest movement appears quite determined to endure even the harshest violence -- it does not seem that Asad is in any great danger of being forced out of power either.  So long as the army remains loyal to him, there will almost certainly be no victory for the protesters.

What might happen in Syria if Asad were overthrown is unclear.  The possibility of internecine warfare seems very real -- while the protesters come from all regions of Syria and from all its major ethnic groups and sects, there is no question that certain factions have remained loyal to the Asad regime, and they are easily characterized by sectarian background.  It is not difficult to imagine Sunnis seeking retribution against Alawis and Christians, and many speculate that post-Asad Syria could fall prey to the same  sectarian conflicts that plague its neighbors Lebanon and Iraq.

This uncertainty, combined with a perceived lack of American leverage in Syrian internal affairs, may have played a role in the Obama Administration's reticence toward anti-Asad activists.  Furthermore, one of Barack Obama's first initiatives in the Middle East as president was to seek a rapprochement with Syria and begin to restore normal bi-lateral relations.  Now, it seems that Asad's crackdown has gone a step too far, and there is some anticipation that the President will now authorize an increase of pressure on the Syrian government to at least stop attacking protesters (it seems doubtful that they will publicly call for Asad to step down, at least for the moment).

Asad himself does not have many options left if his crackdown does not work.  It is extremely doubtful that he is capable of delivering the necessary reforms to restore his legitimacy and satisfy the demands of protestors who increasingly (and in my opinion, rightly) consider him inseparable from the corruption and repression under which they suffer.  He can continue to wage war against his own people, but risks losing the loyalty of influential figures within his regime, who may see more opportunity in offering him as a concession to popular dissent, as the Egyptian army did with Hosni Mubarak.  Moreover, Asad would invite armed rebellion by escalating bloodshed; indeed, it is not inconceivable that some of the reports of attacks on Syrian security forces are the first signs of a civil war.  On the other hand it is far less likely that he will be able to muddle through with his current strategy of mixed repression and marginal concessions, which has only galvanized protestors against him.

One thing is clear -- Asad cannot make Syria's political problems go away.  In fact, his continued presence will doubtlessly exacerbate them.  His regime has built its power upon unfair patronage, corruption, and brutal repression of all opposition.  It will not be able to solve these inequities which threaten Syrian stability because ultimately they are its lifeblood.  It is no mistake that international actors have severe anxieties about forcefully removing Asad.  His government has carefully engineered Syrian politics so that there is no clear alternative to the current regime.

In any case, time is growing increasingly short.  While there is still time for the Syrian government to change its course, and there is still time for the United States and its allies to influence the outcome of the uprising, the events of the next week or two will probably limit available options.  The question now is not if Asad's regime will fall, but when it will, how it will happen, and what will replace him.  The eventual outcome will have resounding consequences for decades to come.