Speculation and Conjecture: Some Future Predictions

Although seldom useful, it's always fun to make predictions.  Here are a few of mine for the near future in the Arab world and the broader Middle East:


1) Syria and Yemen will both become engulfed in civil war over the next year.  This is not a particularly bold prediction because it may already be happening.  In Yemen it is easy enough to pick out a few factions that will vie for power (here is an interesting discussion on the matter), but in Syria it is less clear.  Certain parts of the military may turn against the Assad regime, or the regular army could start fighting against the other security agencies.  The conflict could develop along sectarian lines, or the pro-democracy protest movements could become violent in response to continued crackdowns.  In any case, the longer the Assad regime seeks to preserve itself, the greater the chance that Syria will devolve into civil war.  It is becoming increasingly clear that Bashar al-Assad and his ruling cadre would rather rip Syria apart than voluntarily leave power, or enact reforms and reconcile with protestors.  Sadly, it also appears that they will have their way.

2) In the next 5-10 years Saudi Arabia's influence will increase, but it will not become a regional power broker.  As other states weaken, Saudi Arabia's relative power will grow considerably.  However, this increase in influence will probably be in spite of Saudi Arabia rather than because of it.  Saudi Arabia is rich, well-armed, and is able to project its influence through support of conservative Islam throughout the Muslim world.  The main historical competitors for regional dominance in the Arab world -- Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -- will probably not be able to project power beyond their borders in the near future.  The major non-Arab players in the Middle East -- Turkey, Israel, and Iran -- have been caught off guard by the Arab uprisings and none are in position to take a leading regional role.  This leaves Saudi Arabia more powerful by default.  However, with an army that, though well equipped, has never won a war, the growing cost of maintaining order at home, and an ideology whose appeal has been diminishing in the Arab world for years and is further weakened by democratic movements, Saudi Arabia will not be able to establish its regional hegemony.  For all its riches and all its military gewgaws, Saudi Arabia is still weak in several key respects, including its low human capital, dependence on foreign labor, growing difficulties in maintaining internal order, and reliance on foreign military assistance.  Though it may become more assertive and more capable of dictating the course of events in the Middle East, it will remain a secondary player to the dominant power in the region, which will continue to be the United States for at least the next few years.  That said, we come to my next prediction...

3) American influence in the Middle East will decline over the next decade, due to political incompetence rather than a decrease in real power.  The United States has all the means to remain the sole hegemonic power in the Middle East, but its position will continue to weaken from poor leadership.  Confronted with new challenges, American policy will not adapt fast enough to retain regional dominance.  The United States will continue to be the major foreign power in the region as a whole, but amidst growing perceptions of its inability to influence the broader currents of Arab politics and the shifting regional dynamic, it will become gradually less important.  The United States policy toward the Middle East is deeply flawed, and it will not change enough in the near future to avoid a significant loss of influence.


4) Tunisia and Egypt will both develop into democracies within the next five to seven years.  At this point in time Tunisia's progress toward a complete democratic transition is far more substantial than Egypt's.  The key difference is that in Tunisia the remaining elements of the old regime do not have a say in the transition process.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is still in charge, and while the SCAF does not have any interest in governing, it also continues to hold the real power in Egypt, and is only willing to liberalize the political arena enough to protect itself and return to business as usual.  Ultimately, though, time is on the side of the protestors; if their fundamental demand for representative government will not be abandoned, then eventually the military and the other powers-that-be in Egypt will recognize that it is in their interest to liberalize.  Transitions in both countries are threatened most by economic disarray, but the momentum for political change is quite strong.

5) Morocco's attempt to placate protestors will fail.  Always eager to cast itself as a different kind of autocracy, Morocco is currently entering a process of top-down reforms which the Palace refers to as "evolution" -- as opposed to "revolution," of course.  After large-scale protests began in Morocco on February 20, the King attempted to get out ahead of reform movements by announcing a program of constitutional reforms that could considerably reduce his power and answer protestor's demands while not overtly acknowledging them.  Now the announcement of constitutional reforms is imminent, to be followed by a referendum in early July and elections for a new parliament under the new constitution in early October.  While superficially promising, these reforms will amount to little more than the cosmetic changes that King Mohammed VI has implemented since he came to the throne in 1999.  The Moroccan protestors will not accept this token gesture, though it is unclear if they will be able to mount an uprising such as in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain.


6) The pro-democracy uprisings of 2011 will eventually be judged as a continuation of the past rather than a break from it.  Given the dramatic nature of the uprisings in every corner of the Arab world, and the fall of two governments (perhaps three including Yemen), 2011 currently seems like a wild break from the political currents of the past.  Yet over the long term, analysts will regard these movements as a continuation of the development of post-colonial political ideologies.  The common thread between pan-Arabism, Islamism, and now the so-called Arab Spring, is the desire for self-determination and freedom from foreign influences.  Pan-Arabism became the leading ideology of many Arab governments, perhaps most notably Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, but ultimately failed to achieve its goal of unifying the Arab people and freeing them from foreign domination.  Islamism, though it became a powerful cultural force and an ideology of resistance to the status quo, was only embraced by governments at the margins of the Arab world.  Today, the struggle for self-determination has taken a new tack.  While Islamists remain an influential political force, the desire for political rights and popular sovereignty is now being expressed on a large scale in terms of democracy and good governance.  This new development is not different in kind from the movements of the past, but rather in manner.  Whether it will ultimately prevail and help the Arab people secure their rights is still uncertain, but it has already shown its potential to transform the political landscape of the Middle East as we know it, and may yet have even greater significance.

Egypt's Economy Hits a Speed Bump (April Fool's)

There was disappointing news today for Egypt's economy, as the Ministry of Tourism announced the cancellation of a highly anticipated promotion for 2011.  On Friday, April 1, the Tourism Minister Mounir Fakhry Abdel Nour announced that the "Hollywood Classics" reenactment series will be on hold for 2011 due to "political reasons."

The much ballyhooed reproduction of "Jaws 2," scheduled for late summer 2011, has been officially cancelled.  While the recent social upheavals were cited by the Minister as the main cause, there is speculation that the cancellation is also related to the mixed reviews of Egypt's real-life reproduction of the 1975 Steven Spielberg classic "Jaws" in the resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh.  The promotion became controversial when South Sinai governor and erstwhile Roy Scheider impersonator Mohammed Abdel Fadil Shousha went off-script and blamed Israel for releasing the shark, a costly ad-lib that caused him to be thrown off the project.

While the real-life reenactments have run into some trouble, Minister Abdel Nour remains confident that they can help revive Egypt's critical tourism sector after recent political turmoil.  "We still saw increases in revenue and a reduction in Russians from our presentation of 'Jaws',"  said Abdel Nour.  "We are hopeful our recreation of Hollywood classics in real time here in Egypt can promote increased tourism to other areas as well."  When asked if "Jaws 3" might be on the table for 2012, Abdel Nour responded, "We anticipate a shift in focus to some other regions for next year's season," adding, "that movie sucked anyway."

Sources close to the Ministry of Tourism have recently informed al-Jawaala that next year's probable recreation will be another Spielberg adventure, "Raiders of the Lost Ark."  There is still some disagreement over who will fill the role of pop-culture icon Indiana Jones, but History-Channel-darling and de rigeur archaeologist Zahi Hawass is an early frontrunner.  Others speculate that "The Ten Commandments" will be recreated, in an effort to boost tourism in the Sinai among evangelical Christians, with the ubiquitous Egyptian screen actor Adil Imam slated to play Moses.  However, Minister Abdel Nour threw cold water on this rumor by saying that cooperation with Israel on the project would be impossible, "until they give us our shark back."

One Step Forward, Two Steps Somewhere Else -- Egypt's Referendum

In a few ways the March 19 constitutional referendum in Egypt was a triumph.  However, it was ultimately not enough to foster a fully democratic state, and it may now set off a chain of events that will lead Egypt yet farther away from that end.  Nearly all elements of the referendum -- its drafting, its substantive content, its promotion, the process of the vote -- indicate the military committee's flimsy commitment to reform.  While the vote was historic, and there are several things to be happy about, the final product is not yet a democracy.  Sadly, it may be no more than a very well-dressed concession, which will alter the outward appearance of the government but leave all the vital parts of the ancien régime intact.

First, the good news.  The referendum passed in an orderly, fair vote, perhaps the cleanest and most credible of any in Egyptian history.  The reports on the conduct of polling (you can read a few here, here, and here) are pretty good; the vote was a dramatic improvement over recent elections in Egypt, which were spoiled by endemic violence, rigging, and extremely poor turnouts.  Some irregularities notwithstanding, the result of the vote is a fair expression of popular will, at least on the surface.

But like many previous so-called reforms in Egyptian politics, the devil is in the details.  The referendum was not rigged, it was not marred by widespread thuggery or vote-buying or corruption, and that is at least in part because there simply was not much at stake for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  The reforms themselves pave the way for another corrupt and self-serving regime, which once in place will have far-reaching executive power and little reason to oblige the needs of ordinary Egyptians.  It still allows for a highly selective nomination process which will filter out most non-establishment candidates for president.  While the amended constitution leaves the door open to more meaningful changes, the short time frame for elections favors elements that have no interest in greater liberalization, namely the NDP, its cronies, and the Muslim Brotherhood (though the Brotherhood is undergoing a fracturing process at the moment that may change it significantly in the coming months).

I do not doubt that the referendum's approval is genuine and fair.  However, it is notable that in spite of the droves of people seen waiting in lines at polling stations, less than half of Egypt's eligible voters actually did cast a ballot, or 18 million out of a possible 45 million.  Many of those who did not vote may have been against the amendments, and presumably many of them at least felt somewhat ambivalent; but regardless of their feelings this indicates that support for the amendments is not as overwhelming as the 77.2% yes vote may indicate.

Support for the referendum notwithstanding, Egypt has moved one step farther toward a shift in its political system, albeit a smaller one than many pro-reform activists would like to see.  Pluralism is likely to increase in post-Mubarak Egypt, at least for a while.  However, the established order, including the enormous NDP political machine, still holds many of the cards in this system.  It appears that if change in Egypt is to occur at all, it will have to be incremental.  Reformers must now turn from the referendum to prepare for parliamentary elections in September, which will be the next opportunity to bring real change onto the table.  An opposition parliament would have the power to call for a new constitution, and would be able to select delegates to draft it.  However, the opposition needs to create a far-reaching political message and turn a leaderless popular movement of once politically apathetic youth into a unified front against the patronage networks of the NDP and its allies.

Though the new constitutional amendments are substantially disappointing, their passage does not spell the end for democracy in Egypt.  There was no question that the military, given the chance to dictate the pace and content of reform, would meet only the bare minimum of demands for change and seek to preserve its own privileged status.  Of course, the military's strategic calculus is more daunting when it is as effectively practiced as it was during the referendum process.  Supporters of democratization in Egypt must remain mindful of the fact that they will not be given anything by the transitional government.  Liberal reform is seldom handed down from entrenched autocrats -- it will more likely need to be seized.

March Madness: Is America's Influence in the Middle East Waning?

Another week of 2011 has gone by, and another slew of milestones in Arab politics as well.  After a period of vacillation and indecision, NATO has started a bombing campaign in Libya in an effort to turn the tide against Muammar al-Qaddhafi.  Bahrain took advantage of the international community's fixation on Libya to unleash a second brutal crackdown on protesters and Shi'i dissidents, inviting GCC soldiers -- mainly from Saudi Arabia and the UAE -- to assist in maintaining control.  Faint signs of discontent in Syria turned into the first large-scale protests in several decades, which have provoked an unsurprisingly violent government crackdown.  Finally, Egyptian voters turned out in massive numbers for what may have been the first truly free poll in their lifetimes, a constitutional referendum that was approved by a sizable majority.

I wrote several weeks ago that the Arab democracy movements have entered a second phase marked by an authoritarian backlash against uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, and conflict within pro-reform factions and elements of the old regimes in Egypt and Tunisia.  It is now widely acknowledged that the wave of people power that swept away Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak has broken on a wall of determined autocrats who are willing to use all means necessary to retain power.  In Libya and Bahrain, regime leadership have declared war on their own people.  Violence is escalating in Yemen and Syria as well.  While the pace of protest movements has slowed, regime responses have intensified and shown that superior firepower may still trump populist uprisings, at least in the short term.

This second phase of the new Arab struggle for self-determination has also made the United States look increasingly irrelevant to regional dynamics.  A number of events make the United States seem feckless and lost in a rapidly changing environment: apparent indecision over intervention in Libya, coupled with unwillingness to be the public leader of operations there; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's cold reception in both Egypt and Tunisia; Bahrain's disregard for American calls for reform, and the intervention of the GCC in Bahrain without informing the United States of its plans all.  The United States' two most significant Arab allies -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- appear to be drifting away from American influence.  Bahrain, the seat of American naval power in the Persian Gulf, has openly flouted American wishes with the encouragement and direct assistance of other American allies.  Meanwhile, relations with an increasingly extreme Israeli administration grow more strained by the day, and Israel's own strategic relevance may be diminishing as the Arab world reforges itself and regional dynamics continue to transform.  On the surface, it seems that these events will add up to a weakening of American influence in the Middle East, and perhaps the end of American hegemony there altogether.

In the near future it seems almost certain that American influence will ebb in the Middle East.  The United States is a dominant foreign power in the region; change in the status quo threatens that dominance.  However, I am not buying into the American decline just yet.  Though recent events in the Arab world have demonstrated the limits of American influence, they do not mean that the United States is irrelevant, or that it cannot play a role in the region going forward.  While people in Egypt and Tunisia are not amused by the United States' sudden commitment to democracy in their respective countries, and while they may be wary of American intentions, they still share key interests with the United States, and they need American assistance, especially economic support.

In general, the idea that American relations with Middle Eastern states were based only on cozy relationships with autocrats strikes me as terribly naive.  States do not cooperate out of friendship for each other, but out of self-interest.  In other words, the Saudis, or the Egyptians, or the Jordanians do not work closely with the United States because they like us so much (they don't), but because collaboration works to their advantage.  American relations with states throughout the Middle East are based on mutual interests which will not disappear along with the autocrats.  The idea that these leaders are entirely deferent to American wishes is also a falsehood.  In fact, they routinely ignore the wishes of American policymakers when their interests contradict those of the United States.  One recent and particularly unpleasant example may be found in the collusion between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain against the Bahraini pro-democracy movement.  The Bahraini royal family has done away with all liberal or moderate affectations even while the United States urged them to respond to popular demands for reform.  Saudi Arabia has blatantly ignored American wishes and acted in its own interests in this case as well.

The United States has formed important alliances with autocratic states throughout the Middle East.  These alliances are based on mutual interests, many -- though admittedly not all -- of which would remain if these same autocrats were swept out of power.  Of course, aspects of these relationships will have to change, but in the end the United States has a great deal to offer emerging democracies in the Middle East.  The hypothetical end of despotism in the Middle East (at the moment that is still a distant and highly improbable eventuality) does not mean the end of American influence.  In fact, it is a new and more promising beginning not just for the Arab people but for American interests.

The entire reason I argue the United States should promote democracy in the Middle East is because it is beneficial to American interests.  Those who bemoan the loss of close relations with people like Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi King Abdullah should think twice about just how valuable American relations with such regimes could be in the future.  Alliance with these autocrats has already been counterproductive in many ways for years now.  Lacking legitimacy and popular support, these regimes have become corrupt, ossified wards of American largesse.  They have failed to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, counter the growing influence of Iran, or effectively combat Islamic extremism -- in fact their continued leadership has exacerbated these problems.  They have led an economic and social decline that benefits no one but American adversaries and a self-interested elite.

Yet paradoxically the current upheavals throughout the Arab world demonstrate the value of American power in the region and its importance going forward.  Though the United States is superficially filling an ancillary role during NATO operations in Libya, it is the critical strategic power.  American weapons, American money, and American strategic objectives are the driving force behind the no-fly zone in Libya, because the United States is quite simply the only nation powerful enough to manage it (keep in mind that 75% of NATO's defense budget is funded by the United States).  In neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, American economic aid, and to a lesser extent political influence, is crucial to nascent reform movements.  For better or worse, the United States has contributed greatly to the current regional outlook, and it is still by far the most powerful single actor in the region.

The current crisis threatens the strategically favorable status quo shaped by American foreign policy.  However, that is no reason to lament the old system.  Crisis creates opportunity, and the United States needs to seize it by altering its outdated approach to the Middle East.  Strong democracies and effective governance in the Arab world will benefit American strategic and economic interests more than the illegitimate and repressive states of the past and present.  Trade-offs and short term sacrifices will be necessary, but ultimately these are tolerable for a still-dominant hegemonic power.  Of course, if the United States throws its weight behind continued autocracy, or simply sits on the sideline, then the short-term erosion of its influence will soon become permanent.

Egypt's Second Big Day

It's Referendum Day in Egypt, and if this feels a little too soon to you, you are not alone.  The short period of time between the public proposal of Egypt's constitutional amendments and a nationwide referendum is causing a great deal of anxiety in Egypt and among observers abroad.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has continued to forge ahead regardless, dropping subtle hints that they do not understand or care about the democratic process.  The most tone deaf of these signs is probably their request for a cease of all media discussion of the referendum for the past 48 hours.  I am not really sure where they got this idea, but it seems as if they are taking the "secret" part of secret ballot way too seriously.

I have already offered my take on the actual content of the amendments.  However, the amendments themselves are not the only test of Egypt's prospects for democratization.  The conduction of a poll presents several noteworthy problems.  There have been many votes in Egypt in the post-1952 era, none resembling an orderly exercise of popular will.  Elections are typically a chaotic affair, marked by widespread violence, fraud, and other kinds of foul play.  The past two presidential elections were especially ugly, with dozens of people killed in each one.

But there are several important reasons to believe that the March 19 referendum will go differently.  Not least among them is the fact that the referendum could be a win-win proposition for the military and established order, making foul play unnecessary for a favorable outcome.  In the end, a "yes" or "no" vote should not dramatically weaken the position of these elements.  The military almost certainly wants a yes vote, because it will lend them credibility while not threatening the fundamental structure of the state which gives them such privileged status.  However, a no vote could still work to their advantage.  If the amendments are rejected, the military might conclude that the constitution is fine the way it is.  Even if the public does not tolerate such an outcome, the transition remains in the hands of the military, and they can offer more or less significant reforms at their discretion.  Furthermore, debate over the reforms themselves causes division within the opposition, making the military relatively stronger and complicating efforts to mount pressure for a more serious commitment to democracy.

At the same time, the referendum contains some opportunities for the pro-reform camp.  While the passing of the referendum creates numerous dangers and offers little in the way of true change, it also does not doom the opposition.  Activist groups have proven their ability to mobilize masses of people and influence the military leadership, and it seems unlikely to me that this would become a non-factor if the referendum passed.  Differences of opinion and tactics may limit the opposition's effectiveness, but I doubt they will to a great enough extent to marginalize the protest movement altogether.

Ultimately, the outcome of the referendum process as whole -- more so than the vote alone -- is crucial to a democratic transformation in Egypt.  The poll's management so far has been decidedly undemocratic, as are the amendments under consideration.  Yet both are improvements over the past, and they do not eliminate the opportunity for meaningful change down the road.  Authoritarian elements are running out of moves in Egypt; trying to spoil this vote with the same kind of rigging and violence of past elections will not be accepted by the Egyptian people or the international community (of course, that does not mean they won't try).  I expect this poll to be controversial, though probably not as blatantly fraudulent as last fall's parliamentary elections.  In any case it will be dangerous indeed for the government to try to steal this vote.

While today's vote will most likely cloud Egypt's future even more, it may answer some important questions about the final intentions of the military (if they have those), the state of the opposition, and the prospects for democratization.  There will be no definitive answers, but the outcome of the referendum will likely set the course for events over the next few months.