Getting Syrious

Hama, Syria --1982

Until now I have withheld from making too many comments about Syria, for two reasons: 1) I am not an expert on Syria, and there are quite a few people who know the country far better than I do, and 2) I did not want to pass judgment on the American reaction to the Syrian uprising until there was a clear political or diplomatic response from the Obama Administration.

Well, depending on when you start counting, it has been between four and five weeks since protests began, and at least three weeks since violence escalated significantly.  The Syrian government led by Bashar al-Asad has resorted to brutal repression of dissent, first attacking, arresting, or shooting peaceful protesters, and now simply killing indiscriminately.  While making preposterously trivial political concessions, such as repealing Syria's long standing emergency law while continuing a brutal onslaught against the protesters, Asad's regime has essentially declared war on its own people.  This is certainly not the first time that political dissent has been met with bloody reprisals in Syria.  The recent violence, especially the military occupation of Deraa, has drawn comparisons to the 1982 massacre of Muslim Brothers in Hama, which crushed a low-level militant Islamist resistance that had begun in the late 1970s.

The current period of unrest bears little resemblance to that era.  The protest movement in Syria is nationwide, not isolated in one city, and its supporters come from diverse backgrounds.  The movement is not Islamist, although Islamists are participating in the protests.  Rather, it is motivated by widespread disillusion with the Asad government, its corruption, economic mismanagement, violation of civil liberties, and merciless repression of any and all forms of dissent.  Like other pro-reform movements that have recently swept the Arab world, there is no clear leadership or platform for the protests; people are not united by an organization, but by a set of common, basic aspirations, not the least of which is to end the Baathist regime and the tyranny of the Asad family.  In fact, the only aspect of past strife that bears any close resemblance to the current uprising is the unduly violent response from the Syrian government.

Syria was long picked out as a sort of bulwark of authoritarianism, one of the least likely Arab states to become embroiled in a mass uprising.  Bashar al-Asad was considered relatively popular and more than capable of quashing any opposition.  It was expected that memories of Hama and pervasive security forces would intimidate and discourage Syrians from speaking out against their government.  While this has not turned out to be true -- protests did reach Syria, and a nationwide protest movement appears quite determined to endure even the harshest violence -- it does not seem that Asad is in any great danger of being forced out of power either.  So long as the army remains loyal to him, there will almost certainly be no victory for the protesters.

What might happen in Syria if Asad were overthrown is unclear.  The possibility of internecine warfare seems very real -- while the protesters come from all regions of Syria and from all its major ethnic groups and sects, there is no question that certain factions have remained loyal to the Asad regime, and they are easily characterized by sectarian background.  It is not difficult to imagine Sunnis seeking retribution against Alawis and Christians, and many speculate that post-Asad Syria could fall prey to the same  sectarian conflicts that plague its neighbors Lebanon and Iraq.

This uncertainty, combined with a perceived lack of American leverage in Syrian internal affairs, may have played a role in the Obama Administration's reticence toward anti-Asad activists.  Furthermore, one of Barack Obama's first initiatives in the Middle East as president was to seek a rapprochement with Syria and begin to restore normal bi-lateral relations.  Now, it seems that Asad's crackdown has gone a step too far, and there is some anticipation that the President will now authorize an increase of pressure on the Syrian government to at least stop attacking protesters (it seems doubtful that they will publicly call for Asad to step down, at least for the moment).

Asad himself does not have many options left if his crackdown does not work.  It is extremely doubtful that he is capable of delivering the necessary reforms to restore his legitimacy and satisfy the demands of protestors who increasingly (and in my opinion, rightly) consider him inseparable from the corruption and repression under which they suffer.  He can continue to wage war against his own people, but risks losing the loyalty of influential figures within his regime, who may see more opportunity in offering him as a concession to popular dissent, as the Egyptian army did with Hosni Mubarak.  Moreover, Asad would invite armed rebellion by escalating bloodshed; indeed, it is not inconceivable that some of the reports of attacks on Syrian security forces are the first signs of a civil war.  On the other hand it is far less likely that he will be able to muddle through with his current strategy of mixed repression and marginal concessions, which has only galvanized protestors against him.

One thing is clear -- Asad cannot make Syria's political problems go away.  In fact, his continued presence will doubtlessly exacerbate them.  His regime has built its power upon unfair patronage, corruption, and brutal repression of all opposition.  It will not be able to solve these inequities which threaten Syrian stability because ultimately they are its lifeblood.  It is no mistake that international actors have severe anxieties about forcefully removing Asad.  His government has carefully engineered Syrian politics so that there is no clear alternative to the current regime.

In any case, time is growing increasingly short.  While there is still time for the Syrian government to change its course, and there is still time for the United States and its allies to influence the outcome of the uprising, the events of the next week or two will probably limit available options.  The question now is not if Asad's regime will fall, but when it will, how it will happen, and what will replace him.  The eventual outcome will have resounding consequences for decades to come.

What's Next? Taking Stock of the Arab Uprisings

As time drags farther on from the breathless first moments of the Arab uprisings this winter, their precise meaning becomes ever more enigmatic.  The early days of this year made it easy to see the interrelationship of politics among Arab states.   Small protests in Tunisia became national movements throughout the entire Middle East and led to the fall of two seemingly intractable governments.  The grievances of protestors, their demands, and their demography were remarkably uniform -- they even borrowed each other's slogans and shared tactics for staging rallies and for impromptu first aid.  Their message, championed by pan-Arab satellite networks, was one of ideological unity against a status quo that was no longer acceptable.

In contrast, the second phase of the uprisings has brought the differences among Arab states to the fore.  Due to their unique political dynamics, the uprisings have had different outcomes in each of the Arab states.  Tunisia was the catalyst for the current upheaval, and it has gone farther than any other Arab country toward eliminating the old system.  As in Tunisia, Egyptians forced their president to leave office, but many of the critical elements of his old regime remain, and they do not seem to be in imminent danger.

Elsewhere in the Arab world the autocrats have managed to survive for the moment.  The three at the greatest risk of sudden overthrow are probably Muammar al-Qaddhafi of Libya, Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen, and Bashar al-Asad of Syria.  Protests in each of these countries, and in Bahrain as well, have become quite bloody. In Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and Algeria, protests have earned concessions and promises for reform, but are probably not powerful enough to stage a revolution or seriously alter their governments.

So what exactly is happening in the Arab world?  Instead of providing an opportunity for perspective, the passage of weeks and months has only offered confounding, contradictory, and ambiguous developments.  In search of some readily comprehensible meaning, a host of old terms have been reassigned to the unrest in the Arab world.  Tunisia's uprising became the Jasmine Revolution, a rehash of the term coined for Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's accession to power in 1987.  The spread of protests became the Arab Spring, a term that has been used to describe various pro-reform movements in the Arab world since as early as 2003.  While Eastern European revolutions were assigned colors, Arab uprisings have been assigned dates -- January 14 for Tunisia, January 25 or February 11 for Egypt, February 14 for Bahrain, February 17 for Libya, February 20 for Morocco.  Yet none of these terms even hints at a greater understanding of what has transpired, and what it means over the long term, or what it means just for next week.

At the moment the ultimate significance of this period in Middle East history is probably not possible to predict with any precision, nor is there any certain outcome for the Arab awakening/ Spring/ Intifadah/ Fourth Wave/ Fifth Wave/ what-have-you.  Still, the likely events fall within certain parameters.  Here are three extreme scenarios for the near future; I believe the actual course of events will fall somewhere in between these possibilities:

1) Authoritarian Backlash.  Unable to consolidate, democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt are co-opted by illiberal forces and a new version of the security state takes hold.  Entrenched forces throughout the Middle East regain their footing and use extensive repression to cow their restive populations.  Seeing the uprisings of early 2011 as a momentary interruption of the prevailing autocratic hold on the Middle East, foreign powers go about rebuilding relations with repressive regimes and drop calls for reform.  The defeated protest movements feed a new generation of radicals and terrorist movements who once more become the most recognizable face of resistance against the region's governments and the foreign alliances that help sustain them.  Iran seeks to capitalize on the continued marginalization of Shi'is and the broader lack of legitimacy among Arab governments to increase its regional influence.

2) Liberal Renaissance.  Pro-democracy forces overcome massive odds and violent resistance from despotic incumbent regimes.  With a few exceptions the movement spreads throughout the Arab world and orderly transitions eventually occur in most states.  The United States recognizes the changing tide, and divests itself from longtime allies, forging new relationships based on mutually held security interests and economic partnership.  With no foothold in the Arab world and lacking any significant ideological appeal, Iran's influence wanes.  Other legacies of more radical Islamism moderate or become marginalized as they integrate further into democratic politics and adapt to existence in open societies.


3) Weak and Decentralized States.  A series of internal political stalemates greatly weakens the post-colonial Arab system of states.  Civil war in Libya results in a deadlock, and it breaks into two or more statelets.  The central government in Yemen fades and its regions break into tribal enclaves or into loosely governed northern and southern divisions.  Syria collapses and descends into violence as factions compete for power.  Never strong states, Iraq and Lebanon further disintegrate.  Egypt and Tunisia struggle to forge new governments, and trudge through long periods of disorder marked by strife and economic decline.  Extremist groups are able to expand their operations and find many new recruits among orphans and other victims of the increased levels of violence and civil war.  The modern map of Arab states slowly transforms as states break up.


While I do not believe that any of these scenarios will occur, none are entirely inconceivable.  At any rate, it seems most likely that elements of all three will play out to varying degrees.  Ultimately I expect the course of events to vary significantly from country to country; there is no discernible progression to the uprisings in the Arab world now, and it is a virtual certainty that none will arise going forward.  There are too many differences and mitigating factors for one democratic movement to spread uniformly throughout the Middle East, or for one counter-revolution to roll back all of the past months' changes.  In the short term, the authoritarian reprisal against reform movements has not crested yet.  Saudi Arabia in particular is beginning to produce an authoritarians' response to the uprisings, and it is not pretty.

But in the end, no authoritarian backlash seems likely to prevent what has begun in the Arab world.  The system of repression, patronage, and manipulation -- employed effectively by Arab leaders for decades -- is crumbling, and it is hard to imagine that things will return to the way they were.  Even the most deeply entrenched dictators now seem beleaguered, vulnerable, and feckless against the tide of popular discontent.  Some, perhaps even most, of the incumbent regimes may yet survive, but they will not escape unscathed, and they will not be able to continue ruling indefinitely.  In many ways it seems only a matter of time before more dramatic changes arrive in the Arab world.  The final influence of these changes on American interests in the Middle East will depend in part on how American policymakers respond to them.  The options may not be clear, but the stakes certainly are.  I will examine some of the factors shaping current American policy in the Middle East, and how the United States can respond constructively to the current state of affairs, in my next post.

Arab Autocrats' Protest Response Flow Chart

Egypt's Economy Hits a Speed Bump (April Fool's)

There was disappointing news today for Egypt's economy, as the Ministry of Tourism announced the cancellation of a highly anticipated promotion for 2011.  On Friday, April 1, the Tourism Minister Mounir Fakhry Abdel Nour announced that the "Hollywood Classics" reenactment series will be on hold for 2011 due to "political reasons."

The much ballyhooed reproduction of "Jaws 2," scheduled for late summer 2011, has been officially cancelled.  While the recent social upheavals were cited by the Minister as the main cause, there is speculation that the cancellation is also related to the mixed reviews of Egypt's real-life reproduction of the 1975 Steven Spielberg classic "Jaws" in the resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh.  The promotion became controversial when South Sinai governor and erstwhile Roy Scheider impersonator Mohammed Abdel Fadil Shousha went off-script and blamed Israel for releasing the shark, a costly ad-lib that caused him to be thrown off the project.

While the real-life reenactments have run into some trouble, Minister Abdel Nour remains confident that they can help revive Egypt's critical tourism sector after recent political turmoil.  "We still saw increases in revenue and a reduction in Russians from our presentation of 'Jaws',"  said Abdel Nour.  "We are hopeful our recreation of Hollywood classics in real time here in Egypt can promote increased tourism to other areas as well."  When asked if "Jaws 3" might be on the table for 2012, Abdel Nour responded, "We anticipate a shift in focus to some other regions for next year's season," adding, "that movie sucked anyway."

Sources close to the Ministry of Tourism have recently informed al-Jawaala that next year's probable recreation will be another Spielberg adventure, "Raiders of the Lost Ark."  There is still some disagreement over who will fill the role of pop-culture icon Indiana Jones, but History-Channel-darling and de rigeur archaeologist Zahi Hawass is an early frontrunner.  Others speculate that "The Ten Commandments" will be recreated, in an effort to boost tourism in the Sinai among evangelical Christians, with the ubiquitous Egyptian screen actor Adil Imam slated to play Moses.  However, Minister Abdel Nour threw cold water on this rumor by saying that cooperation with Israel on the project would be impossible, "until they give us our shark back."

One Step Forward, Two Steps Somewhere Else -- Egypt's Referendum

In a few ways the March 19 constitutional referendum in Egypt was a triumph.  However, it was ultimately not enough to foster a fully democratic state, and it may now set off a chain of events that will lead Egypt yet farther away from that end.  Nearly all elements of the referendum -- its drafting, its substantive content, its promotion, the process of the vote -- indicate the military committee's flimsy commitment to reform.  While the vote was historic, and there are several things to be happy about, the final product is not yet a democracy.  Sadly, it may be no more than a very well-dressed concession, which will alter the outward appearance of the government but leave all the vital parts of the ancien régime intact.

First, the good news.  The referendum passed in an orderly, fair vote, perhaps the cleanest and most credible of any in Egyptian history.  The reports on the conduct of polling (you can read a few here, here, and here) are pretty good; the vote was a dramatic improvement over recent elections in Egypt, which were spoiled by endemic violence, rigging, and extremely poor turnouts.  Some irregularities notwithstanding, the result of the vote is a fair expression of popular will, at least on the surface.

But like many previous so-called reforms in Egyptian politics, the devil is in the details.  The referendum was not rigged, it was not marred by widespread thuggery or vote-buying or corruption, and that is at least in part because there simply was not much at stake for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  The reforms themselves pave the way for another corrupt and self-serving regime, which once in place will have far-reaching executive power and little reason to oblige the needs of ordinary Egyptians.  It still allows for a highly selective nomination process which will filter out most non-establishment candidates for president.  While the amended constitution leaves the door open to more meaningful changes, the short time frame for elections favors elements that have no interest in greater liberalization, namely the NDP, its cronies, and the Muslim Brotherhood (though the Brotherhood is undergoing a fracturing process at the moment that may change it significantly in the coming months).

I do not doubt that the referendum's approval is genuine and fair.  However, it is notable that in spite of the droves of people seen waiting in lines at polling stations, less than half of Egypt's eligible voters actually did cast a ballot, or 18 million out of a possible 45 million.  Many of those who did not vote may have been against the amendments, and presumably many of them at least felt somewhat ambivalent; but regardless of their feelings this indicates that support for the amendments is not as overwhelming as the 77.2% yes vote may indicate.

Support for the referendum notwithstanding, Egypt has moved one step farther toward a shift in its political system, albeit a smaller one than many pro-reform activists would like to see.  Pluralism is likely to increase in post-Mubarak Egypt, at least for a while.  However, the established order, including the enormous NDP political machine, still holds many of the cards in this system.  It appears that if change in Egypt is to occur at all, it will have to be incremental.  Reformers must now turn from the referendum to prepare for parliamentary elections in September, which will be the next opportunity to bring real change onto the table.  An opposition parliament would have the power to call for a new constitution, and would be able to select delegates to draft it.  However, the opposition needs to create a far-reaching political message and turn a leaderless popular movement of once politically apathetic youth into a unified front against the patronage networks of the NDP and its allies.

Though the new constitutional amendments are substantially disappointing, their passage does not spell the end for democracy in Egypt.  There was no question that the military, given the chance to dictate the pace and content of reform, would meet only the bare minimum of demands for change and seek to preserve its own privileged status.  Of course, the military's strategic calculus is more daunting when it is as effectively practiced as it was during the referendum process.  Supporters of democratization in Egypt must remain mindful of the fact that they will not be given anything by the transitional government.  Liberal reform is seldom handed down from entrenched autocrats -- it will more likely need to be seized.

March Madness: Is America's Influence in the Middle East Waning?

Another week of 2011 has gone by, and another slew of milestones in Arab politics as well.  After a period of vacillation and indecision, NATO has started a bombing campaign in Libya in an effort to turn the tide against Muammar al-Qaddhafi.  Bahrain took advantage of the international community's fixation on Libya to unleash a second brutal crackdown on protesters and Shi'i dissidents, inviting GCC soldiers -- mainly from Saudi Arabia and the UAE -- to assist in maintaining control.  Faint signs of discontent in Syria turned into the first large-scale protests in several decades, which have provoked an unsurprisingly violent government crackdown.  Finally, Egyptian voters turned out in massive numbers for what may have been the first truly free poll in their lifetimes, a constitutional referendum that was approved by a sizable majority.

I wrote several weeks ago that the Arab democracy movements have entered a second phase marked by an authoritarian backlash against uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, and conflict within pro-reform factions and elements of the old regimes in Egypt and Tunisia.  It is now widely acknowledged that the wave of people power that swept away Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak has broken on a wall of determined autocrats who are willing to use all means necessary to retain power.  In Libya and Bahrain, regime leadership have declared war on their own people.  Violence is escalating in Yemen and Syria as well.  While the pace of protest movements has slowed, regime responses have intensified and shown that superior firepower may still trump populist uprisings, at least in the short term.

This second phase of the new Arab struggle for self-determination has also made the United States look increasingly irrelevant to regional dynamics.  A number of events make the United States seem feckless and lost in a rapidly changing environment: apparent indecision over intervention in Libya, coupled with unwillingness to be the public leader of operations there; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's cold reception in both Egypt and Tunisia; Bahrain's disregard for American calls for reform, and the intervention of the GCC in Bahrain without informing the United States of its plans all.  The United States' two most significant Arab allies -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- appear to be drifting away from American influence.  Bahrain, the seat of American naval power in the Persian Gulf, has openly flouted American wishes with the encouragement and direct assistance of other American allies.  Meanwhile, relations with an increasingly extreme Israeli administration grow more strained by the day, and Israel's own strategic relevance may be diminishing as the Arab world reforges itself and regional dynamics continue to transform.  On the surface, it seems that these events will add up to a weakening of American influence in the Middle East, and perhaps the end of American hegemony there altogether.

In the near future it seems almost certain that American influence will ebb in the Middle East.  The United States is a dominant foreign power in the region; change in the status quo threatens that dominance.  However, I am not buying into the American decline just yet.  Though recent events in the Arab world have demonstrated the limits of American influence, they do not mean that the United States is irrelevant, or that it cannot play a role in the region going forward.  While people in Egypt and Tunisia are not amused by the United States' sudden commitment to democracy in their respective countries, and while they may be wary of American intentions, they still share key interests with the United States, and they need American assistance, especially economic support.

In general, the idea that American relations with Middle Eastern states were based only on cozy relationships with autocrats strikes me as terribly naive.  States do not cooperate out of friendship for each other, but out of self-interest.  In other words, the Saudis, or the Egyptians, or the Jordanians do not work closely with the United States because they like us so much (they don't), but because collaboration works to their advantage.  American relations with states throughout the Middle East are based on mutual interests which will not disappear along with the autocrats.  The idea that these leaders are entirely deferent to American wishes is also a falsehood.  In fact, they routinely ignore the wishes of American policymakers when their interests contradict those of the United States.  One recent and particularly unpleasant example may be found in the collusion between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain against the Bahraini pro-democracy movement.  The Bahraini royal family has done away with all liberal or moderate affectations even while the United States urged them to respond to popular demands for reform.  Saudi Arabia has blatantly ignored American wishes and acted in its own interests in this case as well.

The United States has formed important alliances with autocratic states throughout the Middle East.  These alliances are based on mutual interests, many -- though admittedly not all -- of which would remain if these same autocrats were swept out of power.  Of course, aspects of these relationships will have to change, but in the end the United States has a great deal to offer emerging democracies in the Middle East.  The hypothetical end of despotism in the Middle East (at the moment that is still a distant and highly improbable eventuality) does not mean the end of American influence.  In fact, it is a new and more promising beginning not just for the Arab people but for American interests.

The entire reason I argue the United States should promote democracy in the Middle East is because it is beneficial to American interests.  Those who bemoan the loss of close relations with people like Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi King Abdullah should think twice about just how valuable American relations with such regimes could be in the future.  Alliance with these autocrats has already been counterproductive in many ways for years now.  Lacking legitimacy and popular support, these regimes have become corrupt, ossified wards of American largesse.  They have failed to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, counter the growing influence of Iran, or effectively combat Islamic extremism -- in fact their continued leadership has exacerbated these problems.  They have led an economic and social decline that benefits no one but American adversaries and a self-interested elite.

Yet paradoxically the current upheavals throughout the Arab world demonstrate the value of American power in the region and its importance going forward.  Though the United States is superficially filling an ancillary role during NATO operations in Libya, it is the critical strategic power.  American weapons, American money, and American strategic objectives are the driving force behind the no-fly zone in Libya, because the United States is quite simply the only nation powerful enough to manage it (keep in mind that 75% of NATO's defense budget is funded by the United States).  In neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, American economic aid, and to a lesser extent political influence, is crucial to nascent reform movements.  For better or worse, the United States has contributed greatly to the current regional outlook, and it is still by far the most powerful single actor in the region.

The current crisis threatens the strategically favorable status quo shaped by American foreign policy.  However, that is no reason to lament the old system.  Crisis creates opportunity, and the United States needs to seize it by altering its outdated approach to the Middle East.  Strong democracies and effective governance in the Arab world will benefit American strategic and economic interests more than the illegitimate and repressive states of the past and present.  Trade-offs and short term sacrifices will be necessary, but ultimately these are tolerable for a still-dominant hegemonic power.  Of course, if the United States throws its weight behind continued autocracy, or simply sits on the sideline, then the short-term erosion of its influence will soon become permanent.

Egypt's Second Big Day

It's Referendum Day in Egypt, and if this feels a little too soon to you, you are not alone.  The short period of time between the public proposal of Egypt's constitutional amendments and a nationwide referendum is causing a great deal of anxiety in Egypt and among observers abroad.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has continued to forge ahead regardless, dropping subtle hints that they do not understand or care about the democratic process.  The most tone deaf of these signs is probably their request for a cease of all media discussion of the referendum for the past 48 hours.  I am not really sure where they got this idea, but it seems as if they are taking the "secret" part of secret ballot way too seriously.

I have already offered my take on the actual content of the amendments.  However, the amendments themselves are not the only test of Egypt's prospects for democratization.  The conduction of a poll presents several noteworthy problems.  There have been many votes in Egypt in the post-1952 era, none resembling an orderly exercise of popular will.  Elections are typically a chaotic affair, marked by widespread violence, fraud, and other kinds of foul play.  The past two presidential elections were especially ugly, with dozens of people killed in each one.

But there are several important reasons to believe that the March 19 referendum will go differently.  Not least among them is the fact that the referendum could be a win-win proposition for the military and established order, making foul play unnecessary for a favorable outcome.  In the end, a "yes" or "no" vote should not dramatically weaken the position of these elements.  The military almost certainly wants a yes vote, because it will lend them credibility while not threatening the fundamental structure of the state which gives them such privileged status.  However, a no vote could still work to their advantage.  If the amendments are rejected, the military might conclude that the constitution is fine the way it is.  Even if the public does not tolerate such an outcome, the transition remains in the hands of the military, and they can offer more or less significant reforms at their discretion.  Furthermore, debate over the reforms themselves causes division within the opposition, making the military relatively stronger and complicating efforts to mount pressure for a more serious commitment to democracy.

At the same time, the referendum contains some opportunities for the pro-reform camp.  While the passing of the referendum creates numerous dangers and offers little in the way of true change, it also does not doom the opposition.  Activist groups have proven their ability to mobilize masses of people and influence the military leadership, and it seems unlikely to me that this would become a non-factor if the referendum passed.  Differences of opinion and tactics may limit the opposition's effectiveness, but I doubt they will to a great enough extent to marginalize the protest movement altogether.

Ultimately, the outcome of the referendum process as whole -- more so than the vote alone -- is crucial to a democratic transformation in Egypt.  The poll's management so far has been decidedly undemocratic, as are the amendments under consideration.  Yet both are improvements over the past, and they do not eliminate the opportunity for meaningful change down the road.  Authoritarian elements are running out of moves in Egypt; trying to spoil this vote with the same kind of rigging and violence of past elections will not be accepted by the Egyptian people or the international community (of course, that does not mean they won't try).  I expect this poll to be controversial, though probably not as blatantly fraudulent as last fall's parliamentary elections.  In any case it will be dangerous indeed for the government to try to steal this vote.

While today's vote will most likely cloud Egypt's future even more, it may answer some important questions about the final intentions of the military (if they have those), the state of the opposition, and the prospects for democratization.  There will be no definitive answers, but the outcome of the referendum will likely set the course for events over the next few months.