Bargain Breakdown, Democratic Opportunity

In a previous post I discussed the democratic bargain, an important feature of Arab politics since the post-colonial era.  In brief, the democratic bargain is an exchange of political rights for important social services, which formed the basis of legitimacy for governments throughout the Arab world, but has by and large fallen apart in recent decades.  Unable to provide properly for their populace, Arab autocrats have built up fearsome mechanisms of repression and carefully constructed networks of economic patronage to preserve their dominance.  The uprisings that began in Tunisia and have swept through every corner of the Arab world are a response to the failure of governments to serve their people, and a backlash against years of oppression and humiliation at the hands of cruel despots and their henchmen.

In spite of these systemic failures, the democratic bargain continues to be a tool to deflect popular dissent, as evidenced by the massive economic and financial concessions to protest movements in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (though it is mainly a preemptive measure in the last case), and now even Libya.  While in some cases these measures may reduce and ultimately help quell social unrest, the democratic bargain seems to be finally breaking.  It certainly was not enough to dissuade protestors in Bahrain or Algeria, or anywhere else in the Arab world, for that matter.  Though protests elsewhere have been more muted, this can hardly be attributed to a temporary reduction in the price of sugar.

Insufficient to address the fundamental grievances of citizens for years, the democratic bargain may be dead at last.  If this proves to be the case, a new era is likely to begin in Arab politics, in which regimes seek a new basis for their legitimacy, devise a way to sustain control while making tactical changes to their policies, or collapse and give way to a new order.  For now, the Arab Middle East seems to have entered a period of transition, the ultimate outcome of which is unpredictable.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that a process has been set in motion that will be very hard, if not impossible, for incumbent regimes to reverse.  People across the region have been inspired to demand their right to participate in government, to determine their future, and to hold their leaders accountable.

I believe that the best resolution to this process -- for the people of the Middle East and for the United States, which maintains vital strategic interests in the region -- is democratization.  I have argued extensively in the past that the United States should support democratization in the Middle East.  However, nothing I have written has made so elegant a case as the protest movements themselves, which have eviscerated many of the cynical, disingenuous arguments against democracy in the region, and whose very existence disproves the argument that Arab autocracies can bring the stability that American policymakers covet.  Yet it is still far from certain that the end of the democratic bargain will signify the beginning of a democratic revolution.

At present, the successful democratization of any state in the Middle East depends on three major factors:

1) The Extent of People Power and Support for Full Change: The popular movements in Tunisia and Egypt have been inspiring in the truest sense of the word.  Not only have they given wayward bloggers seemingly endless material to pontificate and declare seismic historical shifts in places where they do not live, they have actually spurred reform movements across the Arab world on an unprecedented scale.  However, for all their drama the protests have not yet succeeded in installing democracy in any state.  While it is true that not nearly enough time has passed for such an eventuality to transpire, it may also be true that the current movements are not up to the task.  We may already be encountering the limitations of people power in Egypt, where a military cadre appears steadfast and determined to have its way on reforms.  Unrest in Tunisia has increased of late as dissatisfaction with the pace and content of reforms has begun to surface.  The protest movements in both these countries have far exceeded expectations because they have created a genuine opportunity for democratization, the first in a generation in each case.  Yet there is still a major gap between a defunct autocracy and a flourishing democracy, and many obstacles to overcome in between those two states.  Protests will need to become broad networks with the power to sustain pressure and the discipline to stay unified.  It is unclear at the moment whether this will be possible, and how it will happen if it is.

2) Regime Dependence on Continued Autocracy for Survival: Continued despotism in the Middle East is due in part to the fact that incumbent regimes cannot survive without it.  A victory for a figure like Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika or Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh or their parties in a free election is nearly unimaginable.  Regimes are resistant to liberalization because they know it will mean the end of their tenure, or worse.  Years of rule in the face of enormous opposition can create dangerous enemies, and many Arab leaders must fear for their lives if they lose the protection of their security services.  Autocrats resist reform because they need to.

This is not the typical case in monarchies.  In Morocco, for example, protests have demanded greater political rights, an end to corruption, and a constitutional monarchy, but not King Mohammed VI's head. In fact, the King himself is relatively popular, and Moroccans are not yet calling for an end to their monarchy, but merely to be included to a greater extent in their political process.  Circumstances are similar in Jordan, where many Jordanians remain loyal to King Abdbullah II, but still protest for greater rights and better treatment from their government.  Many political analysts have proposed that democracy promotion in monarchies will be simpler, because kings and princes have a certain degree of legitimacy that would allow them to retain much of their wealth and status while allowing greater participation in government.  This may be true, but it also gives the Arab monarchies confidence that they can resist reform without fearing their annihilation.  Still, democratization will depend in many ways on whether current power-brokers can devise a way to liberalize that they do not deem to be an existential threat.

3) The Development Potential of Alternatives to the Status Quo:  In the event of a successful uprising or meaningful concessions from a ruling regime, democratization in the long term is still not guaranteed.  In the absence of tangible progress on reform and development, regression and the rise of a new authoritarian order may occur.  Political leadership is the first of a litany of challenges facing the Arab world.  Any governing power faces stagnant economies, high unemployment, social turmoil, and a dearth of effective social institutions.  Failure to address any of these problems may lead to further instability and create opportunities for a military coup or the erosion of liberal institutions.  Reformers need to provide a development alternative that can implement a democratic infrastructure and simultaneously create jobs, improve social services, and restore stability.  The patience of Arab publics and the ability of new leadership to govern effectively will be seriously tested before any democratic transformation is concluded.

*International Involvement:  The role of international players like the United States and the European Union will be important in this process, though it is necessarily secondary in comparison to the above three factors.  While international pressure cannot force a transition, it can lend credibility to activists and limit incumbent regimes' capacity to withstand domestic unrest. A withdrawal of support from former allies can have important effects as well; though American pressure was not the decisive factor in pushing Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to resign, he would have been far better positioned to outlast protestors if the United States strongly pledged its support to him.

Democracy assistance to states in transition will also be critical. States like Tunisia -- which lacks any democratic institutions -- could benefit immensely from foreign assistance, which would provide the necessary resources and technical expertise to build a pluralistic political environment and hold open elections. The United States and other powers may not be able to autonomously grant democracy to the Arab world, but they are able to provide valuable support to reformers in the region.

Ultimately, the era of rentier autocracies appears to be coming to an end in the Middle East. Citizens throughout the region are demanding their rights and appropriate reforms to afford them the opportunities they deserve. It is unlikely that in the end they will settle for half-measures, continued mistreatment, and underdevelopment, which is all that the current regimes have to offer them. Reform has been stalled for years already, and now that fear of repression is diminishing, activists are emboldened. Though Middle Eastern tyrants have ruled with an iron fist, they have accumulated far more rust than previously suspected. Today there is more hope than ever that Arab peoples will find a way to take their future into their own hands.