Oil, Blood, Democracy... a Point of Clarification

Amidst all the current turmoil in the Arab world, the most violent, bizarre, and enigmatic popular uprising has been in Libya.  Conflict there currently straddles the line between revolt and civil war, as 42-year strongman Muammar al-Qaddhafi has ordered the massacre of demonstrators.  The atrocities Qaddhafi has perpetrated against his own people over the past few days are alarming even in the context of his four decades of rule with complete disregard for human rights, and a full-blown international emergency may soon be at hand.

Some commentators have taken events in Libya as a lesson that rapprochement with dictators seldom works to the advantage of the international community, and can often have disastrous consequences.  After decades as an international pariah, over the past ten years the Western powers have cautiously rebuilt relations with Libya.  These efforts were a result of economic and strategic interests -- once portrayed as a reprehensible villain, Qaddhafi became a reformed figure, an important ally in the war on terror, a poster child for nuclear non-proliferation, and an asset to international business.  An article in The Economist describes this change and its moral costs for the Western leaders who enabled Libya's re-engagement with the international community.  It also recounts the numerous advantages derived from cooperation with Qaddhafi, highlighting the lesson that there is no moral certainty in international politics, and though arguments can be made for many courses of action, few turn out to be ethically satisfactory.

However, the article ends with an error of analysis which bears mentioning.  In the final paragraph, the author describes a dichotomy between amoral Realpolitik and a kinder, altruistic motivation for foreign relations:

"This is not an argument for callousness. The lesson from the Arab awakening is an uplifting one. Hard-headed students of realpolitik like to think that only they see the world as it truly is, and that those who pursue human rights and democracy have their heads in the clouds. In their world, the Middle East was not ready for democracy, Arabs not interested in human rights, and the strongmen the only bulwark between the region and Islamic revolution. Yet after the wave of secular uprisings, it is the cynics who seem out of touch, and the idealists have turned out to be the realists."

While there is an important lesson here -- that the Arab uprising has exposed the short-sightedness of unequivocal support for autocrats in the Middle East -- the implication that support for democracy and human rights is necessarily idealistic is false.


The question of how to handle relations with any foreign leader is a question of foreign policy.  For better or for worse, morality is not and cannot be a major component of most foreign policy decision-making (of course, there are important exceptions).  The question of whether or not an individual action is morally righteous is difficult enough, and enormous tracts have been written with the goal of determining the difference between right and wrong.  When actions are on the scale of international relations, their repercussions are so complex and occur over such long periods of time that it becomes nearly impossible to ever act with moral certainty.  The single-most important factor in foreign policymaking is not morality, then, but expediency.  This is not necessarily because policymakers are heartless, but because they operate in an ambiguous and difficult world where they cannot dwell on esoteric matters of philosophy, but must act in the interests of their government and the citizens it represents.


The problem with the "Hard-headed" strategists who believed "the Middle East was not ready for democracy, Arabs not interested in human rights, and the strongmen the only bulwark between the region and Islamic revolution" was not that they were not interested in implementing the most morally correct policy.  The problem is that they were wrong.  While supporting autocrats in the Middle East may have once served American interests, it has been counterproductive for decades.  Today democracy promotion in the Middle East is the most desirable course for the United States because it is the most advantageous choice, not because it is the right one (whether or not it is truly right in the ethical sense). 


Though the Economist essay presents a nuanced narrative of the dilemmas in isolating or collaborating with a despot like Muammar al-Qaddhafi, it ultimately misses the point.  Democracy promotion in the Middle East is one of the rare elegant solutions to a problem of international politics, because it is amenable to realists and idealists.  Greater liberalization in the region can serve American interests and improve the welfare of the people living there.  In this case, there does not need to be a choice between self-interest and altruism -- rather, the choice is between a theoretically sound strategy and one that has empirically failed. 

Bargain Breakdown, Democratic Opportunity

In a previous post I discussed the democratic bargain, an important feature of Arab politics since the post-colonial era.  In brief, the democratic bargain is an exchange of political rights for important social services, which formed the basis of legitimacy for governments throughout the Arab world, but has by and large fallen apart in recent decades.  Unable to provide properly for their populace, Arab autocrats have built up fearsome mechanisms of repression and carefully constructed networks of economic patronage to preserve their dominance.  The uprisings that began in Tunisia and have swept through every corner of the Arab world are a response to the failure of governments to serve their people, and a backlash against years of oppression and humiliation at the hands of cruel despots and their henchmen.

In spite of these systemic failures, the democratic bargain continues to be a tool to deflect popular dissent, as evidenced by the massive economic and financial concessions to protest movements in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (though it is mainly a preemptive measure in the last case), and now even Libya.  While in some cases these measures may reduce and ultimately help quell social unrest, the democratic bargain seems to be finally breaking.  It certainly was not enough to dissuade protestors in Bahrain or Algeria, or anywhere else in the Arab world, for that matter.  Though protests elsewhere have been more muted, this can hardly be attributed to a temporary reduction in the price of sugar.

Insufficient to address the fundamental grievances of citizens for years, the democratic bargain may be dead at last.  If this proves to be the case, a new era is likely to begin in Arab politics, in which regimes seek a new basis for their legitimacy, devise a way to sustain control while making tactical changes to their policies, or collapse and give way to a new order.  For now, the Arab Middle East seems to have entered a period of transition, the ultimate outcome of which is unpredictable.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that a process has been set in motion that will be very hard, if not impossible, for incumbent regimes to reverse.  People across the region have been inspired to demand their right to participate in government, to determine their future, and to hold their leaders accountable.

I believe that the best resolution to this process -- for the people of the Middle East and for the United States, which maintains vital strategic interests in the region -- is democratization.  I have argued extensively in the past that the United States should support democratization in the Middle East.  However, nothing I have written has made so elegant a case as the protest movements themselves, which have eviscerated many of the cynical, disingenuous arguments against democracy in the region, and whose very existence disproves the argument that Arab autocracies can bring the stability that American policymakers covet.  Yet it is still far from certain that the end of the democratic bargain will signify the beginning of a democratic revolution.

At present, the successful democratization of any state in the Middle East depends on three major factors:

1) The Extent of People Power and Support for Full Change: The popular movements in Tunisia and Egypt have been inspiring in the truest sense of the word.  Not only have they given wayward bloggers seemingly endless material to pontificate and declare seismic historical shifts in places where they do not live, they have actually spurred reform movements across the Arab world on an unprecedented scale.  However, for all their drama the protests have not yet succeeded in installing democracy in any state.  While it is true that not nearly enough time has passed for such an eventuality to transpire, it may also be true that the current movements are not up to the task.  We may already be encountering the limitations of people power in Egypt, where a military cadre appears steadfast and determined to have its way on reforms.  Unrest in Tunisia has increased of late as dissatisfaction with the pace and content of reforms has begun to surface.  The protest movements in both these countries have far exceeded expectations because they have created a genuine opportunity for democratization, the first in a generation in each case.  Yet there is still a major gap between a defunct autocracy and a flourishing democracy, and many obstacles to overcome in between those two states.  Protests will need to become broad networks with the power to sustain pressure and the discipline to stay unified.  It is unclear at the moment whether this will be possible, and how it will happen if it is.

2) Regime Dependence on Continued Autocracy for Survival: Continued despotism in the Middle East is due in part to the fact that incumbent regimes cannot survive without it.  A victory for a figure like Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika or Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh or their parties in a free election is nearly unimaginable.  Regimes are resistant to liberalization because they know it will mean the end of their tenure, or worse.  Years of rule in the face of enormous opposition can create dangerous enemies, and many Arab leaders must fear for their lives if they lose the protection of their security services.  Autocrats resist reform because they need to.

This is not the typical case in monarchies.  In Morocco, for example, protests have demanded greater political rights, an end to corruption, and a constitutional monarchy, but not King Mohammed VI's head. In fact, the King himself is relatively popular, and Moroccans are not yet calling for an end to their monarchy, but merely to be included to a greater extent in their political process.  Circumstances are similar in Jordan, where many Jordanians remain loyal to King Abdbullah II, but still protest for greater rights and better treatment from their government.  Many political analysts have proposed that democracy promotion in monarchies will be simpler, because kings and princes have a certain degree of legitimacy that would allow them to retain much of their wealth and status while allowing greater participation in government.  This may be true, but it also gives the Arab monarchies confidence that they can resist reform without fearing their annihilation.  Still, democratization will depend in many ways on whether current power-brokers can devise a way to liberalize that they do not deem to be an existential threat.

3) The Development Potential of Alternatives to the Status Quo:  In the event of a successful uprising or meaningful concessions from a ruling regime, democratization in the long term is still not guaranteed.  In the absence of tangible progress on reform and development, regression and the rise of a new authoritarian order may occur.  Political leadership is the first of a litany of challenges facing the Arab world.  Any governing power faces stagnant economies, high unemployment, social turmoil, and a dearth of effective social institutions.  Failure to address any of these problems may lead to further instability and create opportunities for a military coup or the erosion of liberal institutions.  Reformers need to provide a development alternative that can implement a democratic infrastructure and simultaneously create jobs, improve social services, and restore stability.  The patience of Arab publics and the ability of new leadership to govern effectively will be seriously tested before any democratic transformation is concluded.

*International Involvement:  The role of international players like the United States and the European Union will be important in this process, though it is necessarily secondary in comparison to the above three factors.  While international pressure cannot force a transition, it can lend credibility to activists and limit incumbent regimes' capacity to withstand domestic unrest. A withdrawal of support from former allies can have important effects as well; though American pressure was not the decisive factor in pushing Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to resign, he would have been far better positioned to outlast protestors if the United States strongly pledged its support to him.

Democracy assistance to states in transition will also be critical. States like Tunisia -- which lacks any democratic institutions -- could benefit immensely from foreign assistance, which would provide the necessary resources and technical expertise to build a pluralistic political environment and hold open elections. The United States and other powers may not be able to autonomously grant democracy to the Arab world, but they are able to provide valuable support to reformers in the region.

Ultimately, the era of rentier autocracies appears to be coming to an end in the Middle East. Citizens throughout the region are demanding their rights and appropriate reforms to afford them the opportunities they deserve. It is unlikely that in the end they will settle for half-measures, continued mistreatment, and underdevelopment, which is all that the current regimes have to offer them. Reform has been stalled for years already, and now that fear of repression is diminishing, activists are emboldened. Though Middle Eastern tyrants have ruled with an iron fist, they have accumulated far more rust than previously suspected. Today there is more hope than ever that Arab peoples will find a way to take their future into their own hands.

The End of the Democratic Bargain

This week protest movements in the Arab world have continued to expand and intensify.  Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya have all experienced historic levels of unrest, while large protest movements have also begun in Jordan, Yemen, and Algeria.  In addition to these seven countries, demonstrations have been organized in Syria, Morocco, Kuwait, Mauritania, Sudan, Oman, and Iraq.  In short, a wave of protests calling for political reform (and in most cases for democratization) has swept through the entire Arab world.

There is no question that this movement is distinctly Arab, and not limited to one particular part of the Arab world writ large.  From the moment protests began in Tunisia it became clear that Arabs throughout the Middle East still identify closely with each other, and saw that their neighbors' were suffering under conditions very similar to their own.  The cry for democracy has been heard nearly everywhere -- from the poorer one-party military states to the richest Gulf sheikdoms, the full spectrum of the Arab world has joined in the groundswell for change.  Many of these states -- besides the fact that they are Arab -- are quite different.  They vary considerably in size, population, geography, wealth, politics, history, political economy, local culture, and ethnic or sectarian makeup.  Still, nearly every Arab state has seen a call for liberalization and reform in the recent months.

One useful way to explain this phenomenon is what Steven Heydemann refers to as the "democratic bargain."  Similar to the concept of a "democracy of bread" as it is sometimes known in North Africa, the democratic bargain describes an implicit agreement between rulers and ruled in the Arab Middle East.  In brief, under the democratic bargain governed peoples may exchange their political freedom for social stability and services from the state, allowing governments to secure political quietism and rule as they please so long as they are able to provide services such as education, health care, and secure employment opportunities.

Incumbent governments everywhere in the Arab world use the democratic bargain as a tool to retain their authority and weaken opposition.  In fact, the first response of many Arab governments to the revolt in Tunisia -- such as Algeria and Jordan -- was to raise subsidies on basic goods and offer pay raises to public sector employees.  Bahrain has employed the most literal interpretation of the democratic bargain so far, offering each Bahraini family 1000 dinars ($2650) in the days before several planned protests (since then, King Hamad has become a little more hard-nosed).

In the post-colonial era, many Arab states built their legitimacy on a mixture of populism, nationalism, and in some cases (such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco) religious authority.  Ruling regimes were not born out of popular sovereignty, but they derived legitimacy by providing jobs and basic services to their people (and often by supplanting years of unwelcome foreign domination).  The enormous government bureaucracies throughout the Arab world are a legacy of the democratic bargain, which compelled governments to guarantee jobs to their university graduates.

Arab governments have been unable to hold up their end of the democratic bargain for decades.  Steady population growth and economic decline have combined to create a situation in which states that based their legitimacy on the ability to provide for their people are unable to do so.  At the same time, the populist and nationalist rhetoric that lent these governments some ideological credibility have eroded and ultimately been repudiated by the Arab public.

Lacking popular support and any semblance of political legitimacy, Arab states turned to repression as a means to hold onto power.  Fierce security services grew to brutalize their people and cow opposition to ensure survival of the incumbent regime.

Foreign military aid, and in some cases revenue from oil exports, have allowed many Arab regimes to artificially perpetuate their regimes in defiance of their own people and their failure to continue the democratic bargain.  The region-wide revolts against this system are the result of years of disservice and abuse the Arabs have suffered at the hands of their own governments.  Today they seek a restoration of some form of legitimacy for their beleaguered states, and a new democratic bargain.

However, this does not mean they are willing to accept another strongman leader in exchange for dead-end bureaucratic jobs and unsustainable price subsidies.  By and large the protest movements are calling for democracy, or at the very least fair treatment from their governments and respect for their rights.  The old democratic bargain has been ineffective for years, and the recent awakening of the Arab world is based on a desire for true democracy, legitimate popular sovereignty, and a government that will serve its people.  The chances for success in this endeavor have increased dramatically -- today they depend primarily on three factors, which I will discuss in my next post.

"Some Things Will Never Change:" A Military in Denial

Take a deep breath... the battle for reform is only just begun.  Over the past few days, jubilation in Egypt over Hosni Mubarak's resignation has largely subsided, giving way to apprehension as Egyptians wait to learn more about the military's intentions for the transition.  Protests persist and Midan Tahrir, the sentimental center of the protests in Cairo, remains occupied by activists.  Still, the first major obstacle to democratization in Egypt has been removed, and it is possible now to seriously discuss reform and advance an agenda for transformation of the Egyptian state.

The Egyptian government as it existed -- until the military dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution pending a referendum -- was deeply flawed.  There is no shortage of sensible and productive ideas for reform, in part because there is just so much that was wrong about the way government operated under Mubarak.  A few good suggestions can be read here, here, here, here, and here -- this is not an exhaustive list, but it represents most of the reasonable proposals for transition toward democracy.  

However, discussion of practicable democratic reform programs for Egypt may soon be little more than academic.  While it is mostly clear what must happen for Egypt to liberalize, it is not clear whether the military cadre in charge of governing is remotely interested in relinquishing power, or whether the military even considers democracy a good idea.  

Indeed, at present it seems far more likely that the military is pursuing a course of cosmetic reforms that will offer some concessions to the opposition and supporters of the protests, while leaving the system that they revolted against largely unchanged.  The military has identified six articles of Egypt's current constitution for amendment by a special commission it appointed without consulting the opposition in a process devoid of transparency.  The articles in question concern the election of the president and parliament, and in their current form they facilitate political exclusion and the perpetuation of a one-party system.  However, the military council has not indicated any intention to repeal the notorious emergency law, one of the core demands of the protest movement.  Egypt has been under some form of emergency law for all but three years since 1952 -- the law enables the regime to make arbitrary arrests, deny due process of the law, try citizens in military courts, restrict free assembly and association, and legalizes numerous other violations of civil rights.  It provides the critical legal framework for the security apparatus to repress dissent and allow the incumbent regime to dominate the political arena.  

While the articles being considered for amendment certainly need to be changed, the Egyptian constitution is little more than a patchwork of amendments and clauses that serve to consolidate power in the executive and eliminate avenues of political opposition (the most recent batch of amendments, 34 total, were added in two months during 2007).  It is not a solid basis for a liberal state, but the military still intends to preserve it with only a few amendments.  Meanwhile, Mubarak's cabinet remains in office and the military leadership continues to urge protestors to go home and leave reform to them, with just enough consultation to lend their final decisions a semblance of legitimacy.

Since 1952, Egypt has essentially been a military regime with a civilian face.  The protests have torn off that face, forcing the suspension of parliament, the effective end of the National Democratic Party, and the resignation of the president.  The military will seek to put on a new face, while keeping its same organs and vital mechanisms unchanged.  For now, it does not seem interested in democratization or meaningfully addressing the numerous problems for which Egyptians have demanded a resolution.

The current situation in Egypt illustrates two basic principles of politics quite well.  First, those who hold power will always seek to maintain the status quo, because they want to preserve their influence and prosperity.  Second, decision-makers will always act in their self-interest, or at least according to their perception of it.  Together these two principles may predict the military's approach to the current period of transition.  They may also clarify a strategy for pressuring the regime to adopt a real program of reform that eventually brings about democratization in Egypt.

Egypt's military leadership has a very clear interest in preserving the status quo, a situation in which they enjoy power, prestige, and prosperity (the military has enormous holdings in the Egyptian economy, and military leaders have used its enterprises to considerably enrich themselves over the past generation).  The protest movement has shaken the very foundations of this status quo, and the Egyptian people have clearly demanded a fundamental change to their government.  The dysfunctions, corruption, and injustices that led the populace to rise up and unseat their president cannot be easily fixed while maintaining the favorable status quo.  So the military will now go to great lengths to weaken, divide, and ultimately marginalize the opposition; its leaders will try to make enough concessions to defang the protestors but prevent truly meaningful reform.  It is naïve to assume that the military would go against its own self-interest, and at the moment it clearly does not consider democratization a good way to preserve its prominence.  

However, if the military can be persuaded to accept that it will benefit more from a stable democracy than from a tattered and broken autocracy, then reform has a chance.  It will not be easy for top-level military commanders who have supported the current regime for decades to admit that they need to liberalize and allow greater political participation, but it is probably necessary.  The military is an essential institution, and it cannot be forced relinquish its role and retire to a beachside redoubt.  Instead, it must support true reform for the political process in Egypt to move forward.  

Phar-Out -- Dawn of a New Era in Egypt?

Only hours after a speech in which Hosni Mubarak appeared rattled and confused but still determined as ever to endure to the bitter end, he was gone.  A terse statement from Vice President Omar Suleiman marked the first time an Egyptian president has voluntarily left his office.  All of a sudden, the formerly ironically-named Midan al-Tahrir (Liberation Square), the center of the largest protests at the heart of Cairo, became the very aptly-named Midan al-Tahrir.  Victory for the people of Egypt over their parasitic president and three-decade iron fist has finally arrived.

Egypt is left now in an extra-constitutional vacuum and there is no predicting what may happen next, but one would be hard pressed to find anyone who cares right now.  The moment is just too sweet to pay attention to anything else.

Like many Americans, I traveled to Egypt during college to study Arabic.  Besides the town where I grew up, I have lived in Egypt as long as I have lived anywhere in the world, and I cannot help but feel irrepressible joy upon the triumph of the protestors, many of whom are my friends, teachers, or teammates.  Less than a month ago, autocracy in Egypt seemed as permanent and immovable as the pyramids.  For years there was simply no hope for liberalization or any kind of positive change -- those in power helped themselves and artfully divided, co-opted, and repressed their opposition.

The system was obviously dysfunctional and ultimately untenable.  Still, the regime projected an air of immutability and destiny that nobody questioned.  Scholars almost universally acknowledged that Egypt was in serious need of reform, but stopped short of predicting a popular uprising such as the one that has materialized over the past weeks.  Though everybody saw something like it coming, nobody saw these events in particular.

The regional effect of Mubarak's departure will become clearer in the next few weeks.  Events in Egypt could have an even greater transformative potential than those in Tunisia.  However it is unlikely that there will be a linear response among Arab publics -- that is, one should not expect even more uprisings to occur now that would not have occurred had Tunisia been the only Arab state to overthrow its president.  The effect of Egypt's uprising will probably be more subtle, especially in the early stages.

With power now entirely in the hands of the military, Egypt is entering a transitional period.  The current environment, from a legal and political standpoint, is wide open.  Mubarak's bequest of leadership to his top officers is not constitutionally sanctioned, and the present constitution may become increasingly irrelevant if the military decides it is not necessary to shore up its own legitimacy.  At this point, there are infinite possible outcomes for the Egyptian state, and democracy is only one of them.  In short, the odds are against an ideal end to this sublime event, and it is important that reformers within Egypt and also from the international community act quickly and decisively to protect the rights and aspirations of the Egyptian people.

Today is the beginning of what may be a long and arduous struggle for the fate of Egypt, and perhaps even for the Arab world writ large.  But it is also the end of decades of corrupt and abusive rule that made Egypt a ward of international aid sustained by brutality and denial of human rights.  The Egyptian people's endeavor for freedom and self-determination is so natural, irreproachable, and just that it cannot be overlooked, no matter what momentous challenges linger just over the horizon.  There is still much work to be done, but what has already been accomplished is truly magnificent.

NUGgets of Encouraging News

Okay, it's time to come clean. You completely forgot about Tunisia, didn't you?  Go ahead and say it.  "I forgot about Tunisia and now I have no clue what's going on."  I know it might be hard, but you need to admit it before we can move on.  There's no need to be shy, I know you did it anyway, and I'm ready to forgive you for it.  There -- that feels better, right?

For those who do not consume Middle Eastern news for caloric sustenance it was pretty easy to miss the reports coming out of Tunisia for the last two weeks.  With drama in Egypt unfolding by the minute, Tunisia has been sent back to the JV squad of world news stories.  Fortunately, your humble Jawaala has closely watched events in Tunisia and I am happy to say that recent developments -- though less spectacular than legions of protestors fighting pitched battles in the street -- are perhaps equally remarkable.

Since the overthrow of President and noted scarf model Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia has made several important steps toward democratization.  Initial reports of a committee of "wise men" made up of political veterans from the opposition proved to be overblown; no committee has formed and discussion of its potential membership has ceased.  Instead, three independent committees appointed by the interim National Unity Government (NUG) have taken up a guiding role for  the transition to a new government.  The committees are investigating human rights, corruption, and political reform, and they have been working since late January.

The NUG has also begun to address the colossal task of reforming the Ministry of Interior.  The ministry's formidable police force and security agencies were the main instrument of repression under the Ben Ali regime.  Currently the last major stronghold of Ben Ali loyalists in the country, reform of the ministry and the police forces is a key to progress going forward.  The interim Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi and his staff have proven their commitment to reform by foiling a brief coup attempt led by former officers, continuing to purge the security services of regime allies, and negotiating an end to a strike by the national police force for an across-the-board pay raise and unionization rights.  A newly independent judiciary has sought to freeze the international assets of the Ben Ali family, and arrested numerous members of the old guard responsible for corruption and human rights abuses, including former Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem.

Meanwhile, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) has been formally disbanded and the interim President has been given the legal authority to issue decrees without the approval of a parliament that functioned for years as a network for distribution of economic favors and as a rubber stamp for the executive.  The intention of this measure is to expedite the reform process, and though this is risky from any perspective it does show that the NUG intends to enact laws that may not sit well with the remnants of the former government.  The NUG also dismissed all 24 regional governors and has consulted with opposition and the powerful UGTT trade union to appoint new interim governors.  One of the most promising developments is the launch of Tunisia's first independent news channel, Sawt an-Nas.  The lack of independent media poses a major challenge to Tunisian democracy, and Sawt an-Nas is an important first step toward a flourishing free press.  Furthermore, the state-owned press agencies have been developing into reliable news sources since Ben Ali's abdication, as their leadership was forced out by pro-democracy activists and many journalists committed to objective reporting have chosen to remain (Tunisians by and large have welcomed the change in their media and they are staying well informed on the minutiae of the transition government).

Of course, there are difficulties.  Unrest continues in certain regions, and loyalty among the police forces remains a major concern.  The Tunisian economy has slowed significantly, labor strikes continue, political parties and civil society still have no local presence, and preparations for elections and constitutional reform have only just begun.  However, at present Tunisians appear to be making progress toward a positive outcome, and the old regime is beginning to fade into obscurity.  The NUG has shown a commitment to establishing order and fostering a liberal democracy.  Though all of these developments are encouraging, the movement for reform is still very delicate.  No substantive changes have been made yet, and there is no guarantee that the NUG and the opposition parties will be able to continue to collaborate and use their energy productively.  But it seems clear now that the Tunisian people believe their progress can set an example for the Arab nation and indeed the entire world.  Tunisia has taken several important steps toward a momentous transition, and no matter what happens in the Middle East it will be an exciting country to watch over the coming months.

Is There a Way Forward in Egypt?

The protests that rocked Egypt on January 25 surprised everyone involved -- foreign observers and governments, Egyptian politicians, the security services, even the protestors themselves seemed shocked at the magnitude of the moment.  All of a sudden, a nation that had long endured humiliation and incompetent leadership had decided it could endure no more, something many, including myself, never expected to see in their lifetime.

Since then the Mubarak government's strategy to survive the crisis has come into focus as one of the rare "teachable moments" of authoritarian repression.  The regime has deftly employed a cocktail of insincere conciliatory gestures and violent attacks that display an alarming level of disdain and indifference for the welfare and desires of its people.  The major components of this strategy include:

1. Good Soldier, Bad Cop -- The military has been walking a tightrope in the streets since it was first called into service last week.  Expressing support for peaceful protests and pledging not to intervene, the military sought to portray itself as a neutral institution.  This initial neutrality has since turned to complicity, as soldiers did nothing to maintain law and order when the police withdrew from the streets, and as they stood aside and allowed plain-clothed regime agents and hired thugs to savagely attack unarmed protestors.  The military has never shown any interest in supporting democracy.  Instead, it has allowed the police to crack down on protestors while Hosni Mubarak placed a slew of military leaders in his new cabinet and appointed intelligence chief and general Omar Suleiman to the position of Vice President.  Throughout the uprising the military has been careful not to cross the line of firing on peaceful demonstrations, while allowing the regime to use all other tools at its disposal to quell the protests.  The result is a military which has taken an even stronger role in Egyptian politics and will be loath to relinquish it to the same activists whose slaughter it has enabled.

2. Hem, Haw, Hedge -- While turning the security services loose and arresting activists and reporters, President Mubarak and his inner circle have offered a number of ultimately worthless concessions, including Mubarak's pledge to step down from the presidency in September.  The regime has offered several other meaningless concessions and empty promises, such as the firing of Mubarak's cabinet, promises of constitutional reform, and a review of disputed parliamentary elections.  The ruling National Democratic Party has begun a game of musical chairs in which officials are being replaced by close allies and deputies in the spirit -- but not the palpable flesh -- of change.  None of these maneuvers are superficially bad for democracy activists, but none of them require the regime to begin real reform.  All of the signs thus far are that these measures will only serve to re-touch the pluralistic veneer that disguises the autocratic Egyptian leadership.  Regime officials have promised reform before -- there is no reason to believe that this time they actually intend to change the system, because they only stand to lose by doing so.  However, continuing to offer token concessions helps deflect international criticism and may entice some of the opposition into cooperation.

3. Blame Everyone Else -- The government continues to deflect criticism and identify scapegoats as the source of all trouble in Egypt.  Former ministers Habib al-Adly, Ahmed el-Maghrabi, and Zuhair Garana, as well as Ahmed Ezz, a wealthy businessman, have all been banned from travel pending probes "to establish who was criminally and administratively responsible for all those events," according to the Ministry of Interior.  The de rigeur threats of an Islamist takeover have also surfaced once again, and received inordinate attention in the West considering just how little the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's only Islamist party with significant popular support, has actually been involved in the protests thus far.  It is not surprising that the Egyptian leadership would deny responsibility for its failures, but it is indicative of the systemic constraints that prevent the ruling cadre from pursuing any meaningful change, let alone democratization.


At present, the regime seems set to outlast the protestors, and intent on preserving the current system of one-party rule with heavy influence and decisive control from the military.  The international community and especially the United States, after a week of reportedly trying to convince Egyptian leaders to embark on real change, has apparently settled for the subtle shift that has already occurred.  On Saturday, press secretary Robert Gibbs called for such "concrete steps" as "dialogue" with the opposition.  American and European policymakers have begun to express their support for Omar Suleiman as Vice President and for a "gradual transition" in Egypt.  I doubt that President Obama, Hillary Clinton, or their European counterparts truly believe that democratization is possible with the current personnel managing a transition.  Instead, they have decided to settle for a handoff from Mubarak to the next general, and they are ready to accept whatever that may entail in exchange for his cooperation on regional issues and military coordination.


If this is true, it spells the effective end of this episode in Egyptian history.  Unprecedented domestic pressure has not yet  been enough to convince the regime that it is time to liberalize, and with the support of the international community its seems that shift will not occur for some time yet.  Of course, a change from one autocrat to another does not solve the numerous problems that have fomented the protests.  If anything, it exacerbates them.  Furthermore, failure to elicit a meaningful response from the government at this time opens the door to radicalization of an enormous generation of young Egyptians.  That is a sobering prospect considering how much of the modern militant Islamist movement was born in Egyptian prisons. While Islamists have been conspicuously absent from the uprisings going on throughout the Arab world, they stand to gain if the current movement for reform is stifled with an American blessing.  Islamist or not, protests are far more likely to be violent in the future if there is no other means for Egyptians to resist their repression.  There are many dangers to a revolution in Egypt, but such a change will only be uglier and bloodier the longer it is delayed.

There is still a chance for these protests to become a true democratic movement (they are only twelve days old, after all).  Power in the Egyptian state is mainly in the hands of the military, and if military leaders can be convinced that liberalization is necessary, liberalization can occur.  So far the most senior military figures have shown they have no interest in modifying the current system.  However, the army's younger junior officers and its rank and file could still turn for the protestors.

The United States can play a positive role not just by adding pressure to the army and working with regime leaders, but by aiding the opposition.  The American military has very close relations with the Egyptian military, but American diplomats still need to cultivate relations with potential reformers in Egypt and offer them assistance.  Public statements of unequivocal support for democracy and substantive actions -- such as refusal to conduct military training until solid steps are taken toward reform -- would give air to the embattled activists.  While the United States has only limited options to influence what happens in Egypt, it can help by continuing calls for reform and encouraging the regime to heed them.  Ultimately, the United States does not have much to lose; it is American military aid that has sustained the security apparatus, subsidized American wheat and other food products that have fed the Egyptian multitudes, and economic aid that has kept the country solvent.  Egypt needs the United States as much, if not more, than the United States needs Egypt, and none of these measures would change that reality.  However, Egypt's strategic value to the United States will continue to diminish as it loses any claim to leadership among Arab nations, and as it spends more and more resources on retaining the ancien regime.  Protests so far have not shaken the regime's resolve to crush dissent and maintain its own dominance -- democracy supporters must now find a way to increase pressure and make it harder for Mubarak and his cronies to deny the will of their people.

Far From Over -- The State Strikes Back

1953: A mob hired by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Tehran

2011: Hired pro-Mubarak thugs attack demonstrators in Cairo

More events than I can possibly address have occurred in Egypt since my last post.  While protests have turned ugly as the regime has allowed its lackeys to attack innocent and unarmed people, the government has been making moves to preserve itself and weaken the popular movement against it.  Scholars are busy speculating on Egypt's fate, and predictions range from unduly rosy to overly grim.  There is an abundance of thorough coverage of every minute of the protests and all of the side plots as they develop, and like most of my colleagues I have been glued to my news feed since last Tuesday watching events unfold as closely as I possibly can. 

When a story is constantly changing and dramatic events are constantly coming to light, there is a danger of losing our perspective, and missing the greater significance of these events.  If I take a step back from what is immediately going on, I am sad to say that the situation in Egypt looks very bleak to me.

A few months ago -- when nobody expected an uprising in Egypt on the scale that we have witnessed -- the major question of Egyptian politics was what would happen after Mubarak left the presidency.  There was a significant chance that he would be too infirm to run for reelection in September 2011, and it was also possible that he could pass away well before then.  While it seemed that his son Gamal may have been preparing to take over for his father, intelligence chief Omar Suleiman was also considered a top candidate for the presidency.  There was no sign that the succession would bring about any meaningful reforms of Egypt's highly dysfunctional political system or its moribund economy, but optimists saw an opportunity to press for change through a newly energized opposition movement with the possible leadership of Mohamed ElBaradei.

Circumstances today, in spite of all the dramatic and wholly unexpected events that have taken place in the interim, are much the same.  The end of Mubarak's presidency is imminent, and succession seems likely now to fall to Omar Suleiman (perhaps the one definitive difference between now and early December 2010 is that Gamal Mubarak will certainly not replace his father).  Reforms are possible, and they are actually being discussed by the regime, but there is no guarantee of such reforms besides the word of the routinely insincere regime leadership.  ElBaradei is still the only feasible leader for a unified opposition, which is far more motivated now, but still has no meaningful say in how influence is brokered within the government.  Meanwhile the police continue to brutalize the people, the military is complicit, and Mubarak clings to power.

In short, Mubarak's pledge to step down is virtually meaningless.  While he may leave office in September, he could also drop dead tomorrow, and this possibility is no different that it was before protests began on January 25.  The military continues to govern in Egypt, and the regime has set about destroying whatever momentum the protests created, allowing chaos to deflate the demonstrators and using violence to drive them back into their homes and force Egyptians to beg their president for order.  

What has taken place in Egypt is a far cry from true revolution, and has not yet caused any substantive change in the order of things.  Mubarak and his cronies know that they can outlast the protestors -- eventually people will need to return home and take care of their families, and they are completely outmatched by well-armed security forces that are unafraid to use violence.  If the situation continues as it is, these protests will become a footnote to the story of how Hosni Mubarak named a successor and how Egypt's military regime continued to govern with indifference and even contempt for its people.  A few weeks out of Mubarak's thirty year tenure, preceded by thirty years of prior dictatorship, followed by who knows how many years of ongoing dictatorship (and yes, Joe Biden, that is what this is called).

Still, it is difficult for me to believe that all is lost.  There is no denying that the opposition movement in Egypt is as strong as it has ever been, and that the current moment is a once-in-a-generation opportunity for democratization.  Egypt is in dire need of a more effective and legitimate political system, and a failure to bring that about now would be a crushing tragedy.  The United States can still play an important role in facilitating true change, and the protestors could still turn the tide if the military can be convinced that it needs to support democracy and take on a more constructive role in Egyptian society.  I will address how I believe the uprising in Egypt can be redeemed, and how it could become a true democratic revolution, in my next post.